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I. INTRODUCTION
Controversies over Uber and Lyft, as the title of this article suggests,
recall a similar dispute two centuries ago during the early stages of the Indus-
trial Revolution. English inventors developed mechanized spinning and
weaving in the last half of the 18th century.1 The result was an enormous
increase in the production of cotton cloth, lowering the cost of clothing for
all ranks of society.2 The new technologies, however, threatened the structure
of work for hand spinners and weavers who were now so inefficient, by com-
parison, that their enterprises were not viable.3 They reacted with a frenzy of
sabotage.4 They burned thousands of power looms,5 and engaged in other
direct actions, seeking to limit the spread of the innovations.6 Today, taxicab
drivers and taxicab medallion holders stand in the shoes of the hand weavers
and hand spinners. They are filing lawsuits7 and introducing ordinances8 to
make Uber and Lyft go away. Though arson is not yet a popular weapon in
their arsenal, the taxicab passion is not much less than the textile passion of
1. See RICHARD MARSDEN, COTTON SPINNING: ITS DEVELOPMENT, PRINCIPLES,
AND PRACTICE 4 (George Bell & Sons ed., 1903).
2. See C. Knick Harley, Cotton Textile Prices and the Industrial Revolution, 51
ECON. HIST. REV. 49, 58–59 (1998).
3. See Katrina Navickas, The Search for “General Ludd”: the Mythology of Lud-
dism, 30 SOC. HIST. 281, 281 (2005) (assessing reality and perception of Lud-
dist movement; noting its violence).
4. See id.
5. Who Were the Luddites?, LIBCOM.ORG (Oct. 13, 2016), https://libcom.org/his-
tory/who-were-luddites.
6. Navickas, supra note 3.
7. See Greenwich Taxi, Inc., v. Uber Techs., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 3d 327 (D. Conn.
2015) (dismissing claims); L.A. Taxi Coop., Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 114 F.
Supp. 3d 852 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (dismissing most claims); Yellow Group LLC
v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. 12 C 7967, 2014 WL 3396055 (N.D. Ill. July 10,
2014) (dismissing most claims; allowing some claims to stand for some plain-
tiffs); Boston Cab Dispatch, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Civil Action No.
13–10769–NMG, 2014 WL 1338148 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 2014) (dismissing
Lanham Act and state misrepresentation claims; denying motion to dismiss un-
fair competition claims).
8. See Brendan Bakala, The End of Uber in Chicago? Ordinance Would Require
Fingerprinting of Rideshare Drivers and Limit Surge Pricing, ILL. POL’Y (Sept.
2, 2017), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/the-end-of-uber-in-chicago-ordinance-
would-require-fingerprinting-of-rideshare-drivers-and-limit-surge-pricing/ (re-
porting on proposed ordinance introduced by alderman allied with taxi indus-
try); Harriet Taylor, Uber and Lyft are Getting Pushback from Municipalities
All Over the US, CNBC (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/02/
uber-and-lyft-are-getting-pushback-from-municipalities-all-over-the-us.html
(reporting on municipal regulations resulting in part from pressure from taxi
companies).
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the 1780s. Despite threats to the traditional taxicab industry, most observers
expect the gig9 phenomenon—exemplified by Uber—to spread,10 so getting
the focus of the argument right is important. Much energy is being expended
in arguing about whether ride-hailing11 drivers are employees or independent
contractors.12 That’s the wrong argument. Stakeholders and reformers should
be focusing on whether Uber drivers need additional legal protection or
whether they have freely embraced a new kind of market and can look after
themselves.
The thesis of this article is that protecting gig workers as employees
under traditional labor and employment law13 is a bad idea.14 It is an intellec-
9. The word “gig” first came into the popular English lexicon in the 1930s to refer
to one-off performance engagements by musicians. See Gig, 1 RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF HISTORICAL AMERICAN SLANG (J.E. Lighter ed., 1994).
10. ANDREW MCAFEE & ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON, MACHINE PLATFORM CROWD
186–92 (2017) (predicting spread of consumer-oriented platforms such as
Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, Grubhub, and Caviar to business-to-business contexts such
as trucking, warehouse rental, booking venues for business conferences); MAT-
THEW TAYLOR ET AL., GOOD WORK: THE TAYLOR REVIEW OF MODERN WORK-
ING PRACTICES 28 (July 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
good-work-the-taylor-review-of-modern-working-practices (predicting sub-
stantial expansion, including into retail sector). See infra Section II.C (review-
ing other gig markets).
11. Uber and Lyft are the largest ride-hailing services, as infra section II.A ex-
plains. Many commentators refer to them as “ride-sharing” services, but this is
a mischaracterization; most Uber and Lyft rides are not shared.
12. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Are Uber Drivers Employees? The Answer Will
Shape The Sharing Economy, FORBES (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/omribenshahar/2017/11/15/are-uber-drivers-employees-the-answer-
will-shape-the-sharing-economy.
13. The criteria for distinguishing traditional employees from independent contrac-
tors are reasonably well established. See Carlson v. FedEx Ground Package
Sys., Inc., 787 F.3d 1313, 1318–19 (11th Cir. 2015) (applying Florida law,
which uses ten non-exclusive factors expressed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 220(2): “[(1)] the extent of control which, by the parties’ agreement,
the employer exercises over the details of the work; [(2)] whether or not the
one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; [(3)] the kind of
occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done
under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; [(4)]
the skills required in the particular occupation; [(5)] whether the employer or
the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work; [(6)]
the length of time for which the person is employed; [(7)] the method of pay-
ment, whether by the time or by the job; [(8)] whether or not the work is part of
the regular business of the employer; [(9)] whether or not the parties believe
that they are creating the relation of master and servant; and [(10)] whether the
principal is or is not a business.”). The criteria for distinguishing employees
from independent contractors under minimum wage law is slightly different,
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tually lazy way of adapting law to new technologies. Two elements support
this position. First, the nature of the legal relationships between buyers and
sellers of work services in the gig economy is quite different from the struc-
ture of the relationship in a factory environment. This factory environment is
what gave rise to current elements of labor and employment law.15 Second,
shoehorning gig work into the employment compartment is likely to produce
inefficient outcomes and undermine efficient and equitable distribution of
resources. It will frustrate the expectations and aspirations of workers it in-
tends to “protect.”16 Classifying ride-hailing drivers as employees would sub-
ject them to all of the traditional types of labor and employment protection,17
forcing a considerable modification of existing practices, yet such traditional
categories of protection do not match what the drivers themselves say they
emphasizing an economic realities test of economic dependence. See Scantland
v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 2013) (listing
criteria).
14. The author is not the only one to recognize this. See Seth D. Harris & Alan B.
Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First Century
Work: The “Independent Worker,” THE HAMILTON PROJECT 15–21 (Dec. 7,
2015), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/modernizing_labor_laws_for_
twenty_first_century_work_independent_worker (proposing new legal cate-
gory of “independent worker,” who would be protected by rights to bargain
collectively, prohibitions against discrimination, tax withholding and unem-
ployment taxes, and workers compensation, but not minimum wage and over-
time rules); Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, The Gig Economy: How to
Modernize the Rules of Work to Fit the Times, MILKEN INST. REV. (May 2,
2016), http://www.milkenreview.org/articles/the-gig-economy (rejecting
“square pegs into round holes” result of traditional choice between employee
and independent contractor; proposing new labor law regime for gig workers,
paralleling those for employees and independent contractors; summarizing
Hamilton Project paper). See also Jane Dokko et al., Workers and the Online
Gig Economy, THE HAMILTON PROJECT (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.hamilton-
project.org/papers/workers_and_the_online_gig_economy (framing context of
gig economy and identifying regulatory and measurement gaps). The Hamilton
Project is an initiative of the Brookings Institution aimed at proposing new
economic policies into the national economic debate. About THP, THE HAMIL-
TON PROJECT, http://www.hamiltonproject.org/about/ (last visited Aug. 22,
2019). The project’s website offers several dozen papers, most of them reflect-
ing a left-of-center view on labor markets and policy. See Papers, THE HAMIL-
TON PROJECT, http://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/ (last visited Aug. 22,
2019). See discussion Infra Section V.
15. See William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in
the Guilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 769–70 (1985).
16. See Ruth Collier et al., Labor Platforms and Gig Work: The Failure to Regu-
late 4 (Inst. For Res. on Labor and Emp., Working Paper No. 106-17, 2017),
http://irle.berkeley.edu/files/2017/Labor-Platforms-and-Gig-Work.pdf.
17. See id. at 3.
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are concerned about: levels of compensation18 and adjustment of disputes
with passengers19
Things were different 125 years ago. As factory production spread in
the American industrial revolution,20 a political consensus grew that workers
needed protection from concentrated capital.21 In the 1920 Ford plant, the
tools of workers were large and capital-intensive; the workers had to be
brought to the tools, instead of the tools being dispersed among the work-
ers.22 The same thing was true in the steel and automobile industries, in the
spinning and weaving industry,23 and in most other fabrication industries,
regardless of the materials used. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)24
and the Railway Labor Act25 sought to equalize disparate bargaining power
that favored employers. The Fair Labor Standards Act26 prescribed a floor for
wages and working conditions for workers thought to be at a disadvantage
and unable to procure adequate conditions on their own.27 Under those stat-
utes, status as an “employee” was important because only employees were
18. See Leslie Hook, Uber: The Uncomfortable View from the Driving Seat, FIN.
TIMES (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/c9a8b592-a81d-11e7-ab55-
27219df83c97.
19. See Carla Green & Sam Levin, Homeless, Assaulted, Broke: Drivers Left Be-
hind as Uber Promises Change at the Top, THE GUARDIAN (June 17, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jun/17/uber-drivers-homeless-as-
sault-travis-kalanick.
20. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Stitching Up Labor Markets (forthcoming).
21. A subordinate conclusion was that the mechanisms of labor law could not work
effectively if industrial homework in “sweatshops” was allowed to flourish. See
infra Section III.B.
22. See Kat Eschner, One Hundred and Three Years Ago Today, Henry Ford Intro-
duced the Assembly Line, SMITHSONIAN.COM (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www
.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/one-hundred-and-three-years-ago-today-
henry-ford-introduced-assembly-line-his-workers-hated-it-180961267/.
23. See Perritt, supra note 20.
24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–188 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-442 (excluding Pub.
L. No. 115-334)).
25. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–165 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-442 (excluding Pub.
L. No. 115-334)).
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–209 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-442 (excluding Pub.
L. No. 115-334)).
27. These were not only efforts to repair instances of market failure; they were
instances in which the market worked too well to satisfy social distributional
goals. In a purely competitive labor market, unemployed workers could bid
down wage levels employers had to pay a race to the bottom.
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thought to need the protection from their employers; independent contractors
could take care of themselves.28
Now the relevant inquiry is not whether gig workers should be classified
as employees or independent contractors; the relevant inquiry is whether
they, like the factory workers of the 1930s, need the government’s help to
strike a better deal with those that hire them. Collective bargaining agree-
ments covering a large factory where employees work for their entire produc-
tive lives is no longer the model of work arrangements in today’s labor
markets,29 which are influenced by evolving global capital and product mar-
kets.30 Relatively short-term worker attachment to employers, and many
more second and supplementary jobs represent an entirely different arrange-
ment of labor markets.31 The potential for market failure and abuse differs
according to the structure of these markets.32 Determining what kind of legal
intervention might be appropriate for gig labor markets requires a sophisti-
cated inquiry into the structure of the new industries. Even if workers need
similar protection in gig labor markets as their factory forerunners, the an-
swer may be different.
This article begins by considering the nature of gig labor markets, point-
ing out that they are not new; they antedate the Internet by a couple of hun-
dred years. It assesses their market structure and identifies instances of
market failure and other sources of transaction costs that may place workers
at a disadvantage. Then, it considers justifications for new regulation of these
markets, both the economic ones and the political ones, synthesizing from
empirical data on worker complaints about the gig economy. Next, it devel-
ops a taxonomy of regulatory protections and considers which of these might
be well suited for the actual conditions of gig work. It concludes with a
comprehensive proposal for regulation that mostly can be implemented by
the courts, without legislation.
28. Among tests for determining if a worker is an employee or contractor, a large
factor is “economic dependence,” essentially the extent to which a worker can
take care of themselves. See, e.g., Parrish v. Premier Directional Drilling, L.P.,
17-51089, 2019 WL 973091, at *5 (5th Cir. Feb. 28, 2019).
29. See SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., BUSINESS AND HUMAN CAPITAL CHAL-
LENGES TODAY AND IN THE FUTURE 28, 30 (2015), https://www.shrm.org/hr-
today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys/Documents/15-0502%20
Bus_HC_Challenges_Report_FINAL.pdf.
30. See Adrian Moore, The Changing Workplace and the New Self-Employed
Economy, REASON FOUND. (May 8, 2018), https://reason.org/policy-study/the-
changing-workplace-and-the-new-self-employed-economy/.
31. See id.
32. See generally John O. Ledyard, Market Failure, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DIC-
TIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Palgrave Macmillan ed., 2018) (ebook) (explaining
concept of market failure).
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II. GIG MARKETS
Gig markets are ones in which workers are also producers and in which
workers often work for different entities at the same time, determine their
own schedules unilaterally, and independently determine how much to
work.33 The term “gig markets” comes from the world of music, in which
performances by independent musicians have these same characteristics.34
Gig platform markets,35 which have been a relatively small part of the west-
ern economy, are now expanding rapidly36 through transportation services.
These services are organized as Transportation Network Companies (TNCs)
and facilitate “prearranged transportation services for compensation using an
online-enabled application (app) or platform to connect users with Partners
using their personal vehicles.”37 The two most prominent TNCs are Uber and
Lyft.38 Curb offers a similar service through taxis but is active in only sixty
cities.39 Via is actively recruiting drivers, but it offers a somewhat different
service, more like an on-demand bus line, with multiple passengers per
33. “Commentators have been quick to point out that many aspects of the gig econ-
omy—the flexible schedules, the lack of in-person supervision, the ability to
work for many businesses at the same time—defy simple classification.” Em-
ployment Law—National Labor Relations Act—NLRB Classifies Canvassers as
Employees, Not Independent Contractors, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2039, 2042
(2016) (noting that gig workers “get to be their own boss” but often suffer from
disparities in power over work).
34. Highsteppin’ Productions, LLC v. Porter, 719 F. Supp. 2d 140, 141–42 (D.
Mass. 2010) (using the term “gig” to refer to a musical performance).
35. See Harris & Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing, supra note 14, at 10, fig. 1
(showing growth in various gig occupations, including Uber, Lyft, GrubHub,
Mechanical Turk, and TaskRabbit); id. at 11, fig. 2 (showing cumulative web
searches for different gig platforms in 2015, with Uber dominant, GrubHub
next at 18.5 % as many searches as Uber, and Lyft with 12.4 % as many
searches as Uber); id. app. 28–33 (describing business models of various
platforms).
36. See TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 10, at 25, 28 (reporting that 4% of UK employ-
ment is in gig economy, but 12% of non-participants say they want to try it;
and predicting substantial expansion, including into retail sector).
37. Chad G. Kunsman, Ride-Sharing-Company Drivers: Employees or Indepen-
dent Contractors?, 26 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 137, 140 (2016) (citations
omitted).
38. Uber, Lyft, and other TNCs are referred to collectively as “ride-hailing
services.”
39. CURB MOBILITY, https://gocurb.com (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
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ride.40 Competition for the two dominant players, Uber and Lyft, is greater
internationally than in the United States.41
A. How Uber Works
Uber operates a business model similar, in some ways, to a taxi enter-
prise. They offer the same services, i.e., transporting passengers from one
location to another,42 but instead of using the traditional hail-wave or tele-
phone request methods of summoning a passing cab, users (or passengers)
open an app43 on their smartphones and upload their location and destination
to request a ride (a request).44 The app sends the request to the nearest driver
(referred to by Uber as a Partner)45 and the Uber software alerts the driver
that there is a nearby ride request. The driver can either accept or decline the
request within ten seconds or the request will time out and be forwarded to
the next closest available driver.46 A driver does not know the destination of
the request until he accepts and picks up the user,47 and in some cities, driv-
ers cannot view a rider’s rating prior to pick up. If the driver accepts the
request, the software gives him turn-by-turn directions to the pickup location
and the name of the passenger. When the passenger is aboard, the driver taps
an icon on the application to begin the trip and gets turn-by turn directions to
the destination the passenger already entered when making the pickup re-
quest. At the destination, the driver taps an icon on the application to end the
trip and his earnings are eventually calculated and displayed on the screen.
The agreement between Uber and its drivers provides that Uber will
collect fares from passengers and distribute the collected fare to the driver,48
less certain service fees payable to Uber. Uber drivers are paid once per
40. See VIA, https://my.drivewithvia.com/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
41. See Madeleine Johnson, Who Are Uber’s Biggest Competitors?, NASDAQ
(Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/who-are-ubers-biggest-com-
petitors-cm860923 (discussing Curb, Didi Chuxing in China, Grab in Southeast
Asia, and Ola in Mumbai).
42. Kunsman, supra note 37, at 141.
43. An “app” is an application designed to operate on a smart phone, usually lim-
ited to a particular vendor of goods or services.
44. Kunsman, supra note 37, at 141.
45. Uber calls their Drivers Partners in communications, announcements, and its
agreements.
46. Kunsman, supra note 37, at 141.
47. The author uses the Uber and Lyft apps.
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week49 via direct deposit to their bank account and are only paid for the work
they perform; and the more requests a driver accepts and completes, the more
money the driver earns. The fares are structured as either pickup or on-trip
fees. The pickup fees include a: (1) base fare; (2) charge per mile en route to
pick up location; (3) variable long pickup fee; and (4) charge per minute en
route to pick up location. The on-trip fees include a: (1) booking fee; (2)
minimum fare; (3) charge per mile en route to pick up location; and (4)
charge per minute en route to pick up location. For example, the estimated
fare from Chicago’s McCormick Place Conference Center to Chicago Kent
College of Law50 includes: (1) a $1.79 base fare; (2) $.28 charge per minute
to pick up; (3) $.81 charge per mile to pick up; (4) $1.85 booking fee; (5)
$4.85 minimum fare; (6) $.28 charge per minute to drop off; and (7) $.81
charge per mile to drop off. The total fare of such a trip is estimated to be
$15.14,51 of which the driver should expect to receive approximately $13.52
Uber offers different types of service, each with its own schedule of
rider fees and driver sharing arrangements: Uber Pool, Uber X, Uber XL,
Uber Select, and Uber Black. Greenlight hubs are centers where Uber drivers
can interact face-to-face with Uber support personnel.53 They exist in places
with substantial numbers of drivers; for example, Chicago has four loca-
tions.54 Uber and Lyft also implement surge pricing where demand by riders
exceeds the supply of drivers. Uber software highlights those locations on the
driver app indicating higher rates for passengers and higher pay for drivers.
49. Id.
50. The actual fare structure and the levels of each element vary from place to
place and with market conditions. See Addendum, RASIER, LLC (May 22,
2017) (replacing section 4 of Technology Services Agreement), https://uber-
regulatory-documents.s3.amazonaws.com/reddog/country/United%20States/
p2p/RASIER%20Financial%20Terms%20Addendum%20May%2022%202017
%20-%20v2.pdf (describing, without quantifying, fare structure and service
fees owed by driver to Rasier, agent for Uber).
51. See Uber Fare Estimator, UBER, https://www.uber.com/us/en/price-estimate
(last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
52. See Technology Services Agreement, supra note 48.
53. See Alyssa Newcomb, Inside the Place Where Uber Tries to Make Nice With
Its Drivers, NBC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-
news/inside-place-where-uber-tries-make-nice-its-drivers-n749031; See Alyssa
Newcomb, Uber Opens ‘Greenlight Hub,’ In-Person Support Center for Driv-
ers, in Secaucus, HUDSON CTY. VIEW (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=Wa75l_oz-Wc.
54. Find an Uber Greenlight Hub, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/chicago/
contact/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
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This strategy is consistent with the literature on how geographic fare differ-
entials influence supply and demand.55
B. Signing Up to Drive for Uber
To support the analysis in this article, the author signed up as both an
Uber and a Lyft driver. Signing up is quick and painless. The author com-
pleted the basic steps in the process, online, in less than half an hour for each
service. The author had to provide basic contact information, and upload
photographs of his driver’s license, insurance certificate, and vehicle registra-
tion. He had to provide his Social Security Number and consent to a back-
ground check. He also had to schedule a vehicle inspection, which he
reserved online for a Sunday afternoon within five hours of beginning the
registration process. The early stages of the sign-up process offered the op-
portunity to obtain a vehicle through Uber or its partners. Both Uber and Lyft
advertised third-party vehicle renting and leasing arrangements and made it
easy to sign up for them as an integral part of enrolling as a driver.
Appearing at the physical center for registration, training, and vehicle
inspection took less than an hour. Uber’s “Hub” was better organized than
Lyft’s but imperfect in its delivery of services. To get his vehicle inspected,
the author visited Uber’s North Avenue Greenlight Hub in Chicago on March
25, 2018. The Hub occupied a clean and reasonably attractive, though Spar-
tan, floor in a small industrial building. The entrance led to a reception desk
where a greeter with a computer terminal found the author’s record immedi-
ately and told him, with a friendly smile, to sit down for a short wait.56 After
about twenty minutes, the author’s name was called and popped up on a
video display directing him to a particular station; about a dozen stations
were marked, but only three or four of them were in operation on the Sunday
afternoon. The support person at the designated station found his record, ver-
ified that the system had his documentation (driver’s license, registration,
and insurance verification images), and directed him to sit down again in
another area. After a short wait, another support person came and asked for
the key to the car. Someone else went outside to inspect the car and came
back in about five minutes with the form showing that it was approved. The
initial online registration had directed the author to bring his bank account
information to the Greenlight Hub, but Uber’s support personnel said that the
author would need to come back after his background check was complete to
provide the bank account information. Only at that time would the author
receive his decals, what Uber calls “trade dress,” for affixing to his vehicle.
The whole process took about thirty-five minutes.
55. Ricardo Lagos, An Alternative Approach to Search Frictions, 108:5 J. POL.
ECON. 865–66 (Oct. 2000) (concluding that fare increases shift search to areas
with higher fares and reduce search frictions in those areas).
56. The author was about twenty-five minutes early for his scheduled appointment.
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The author still does not have his Uber decals (trade dress) and has been
operating on temporary trade dress received by email after making a sepa-
rate, specific request. After about a week, the author received a message that
his background check was complete and that he now could drive. He queried
the help function and asked where his vehicle stickers were. He was told that
he could be emailed temporary stickers and that the others would arrive in
the mail. He started driving with the temporary stickers and had still not
received his permanent decals some two weeks later. Nor had he received his
chauffeur license from Uber, even though he asked about it through a help
function inquiry and was told he would receive it in due course. The author is
driving for both Uber and Lyft with the Lyft-provided chauffeur license,
which should be sufficient for both services under the Chicago city ordi-
nance. The additional instruction required by the Chicago city ordinance for
a chauffeur license was satisfied for both services by presenting the would-be
driver with screens of aphorisms about safety including honoring the thirty
mph speed limit, not to pick up or drop off passengers in bicycle lanes, and
not to drive while impaired by alcohol or drugs or when distracted by
cellphones. Uber did offer some day-one tips but nothing on using the app.
On the other hand, the Uber video on how to do deliveries was quite good.
The Lyft registration process was somewhat more elaborate and time-
consuming than Uber’s. The Lyft center had an actual group lesson on how
to use the Lyft application and highlights on the Chicago TNP regulations.
Driver applicants had to complete a short tutorial and quiz on their smart
phones regarding airport regulations. While Uber inspected the author’s vehi-
cle with on-site personnel, Lyft required drivers to cross the street to a Midas
Muffler facility. This facility was chaotic and took advantage of driver appli-
cants by finding minor exceptions, such as burned out bulbs, to exact addi-
tional fees before approving the vehicles.57 The Lyft indoctrination of new
drivers is superior to that delivered by Uber; for example, Lyft sent an email
with links to a video, “Take a Practice Ride,” and with tips under “Day 1
Need-to-Knows.” However, there were only common-sense textual tips and
instructions to use the app to see an actual video. The video did not make it
clear whether it was simulating a ride request or presenting an actual request.
Declining the simulated request produced a warning, which did not make it
clear whether that warning was simulated or real. The tutorial was a bust.
Further vignettes of the author’s experience are provided in Section III.D.1.f.
57. The author’s vehicle had passed an Uber inspection two weeks before the Lyft
inspection. It is possible, but unlikely, that a headlight bulb could have burned
out in the interim.
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C. Other Gig Labor Markets
Uber and Lyft are neither the first, nor the only gig, labor markets in the
American economy.58 For instance, literature exists on outwork arrangements
in the garment industry.59 Owner-operator trucking has been a prominent
phenomenon in the gig industry since the 1930s.60 Now, some 90% of over
the road and local cartage freight is hauled by owner-operators as opposed to
employees of trucking companies.61 Another example is Amazon, which en-
tered the gig market for delivery services with AmazonFlex.62
1. Owner-Operator Truckers
The owner-operator labor market attracts relatively little controversy,
although it has long represented gig ordering. Owner-operators, as the termi-
nology suggests, own their own truck tractors and arrange, on an ad-hoc ba-
58. Harris & Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing, supra note 14, at 28–33 (ap-
pendix table briefly describing 26 different gig platforms).
59. Compare Nancy L. Green, Fashion, Flexible Specialization, and the Sweat-
shop, in SWEATSHOP USA 43–47 (Daniel E. Bender & Richard A. Greenwald
eds., 2003) (describing late 19th and early 20th century putting-out systems),
with MCAFEE & BRYNJOLFSSON, supra note 10 (explaining that gig enterprises
like Uber have (almost) no assets and depend on a “thin lawyer” of computer-
ized control). See Green, Fashion, supra note 59 (arguing that outwork systems
tend to emerge when the product markets require flexibility: avoidance of fixed
costs; avoidance of a fixed labor force; and avoidance of restrictive rules for
the labor market); John R. Commons, The Sweating System in the Clothing
Trade, in TRADE UNIONISM AND LABOR PROBLEMS (John R. Commons ed.,
1905).
60. Todd Dills, Breaking Free: Owner-Operator History Upon Overdrive’s 50th
Anniversary, OVERDRIVE (Sept. 1, 2011), https://www.overdriveonline.com/
breaking-free/; SHANE HAMILTON, TRUCKING COUNTRY: THE ROAD TO
AMERICA’S WAL-MART ECONOMY (2014) (describing historical struggle by
owner operators); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & James A. Wilkinson, Economic Pres-
sure and Antitrust, 23 AM. U.L. REV. 521 (1974) (analyzing antitrust liability
of owner-operators who organized protests against federal wage and price con-
trol program).
61. See Trucking Industry in the United States, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia
.org/wiki/Trucking_industry_in_the_United_States (last visited Aug. 22, 2019);
see generally Owner-Operator and Professional Employee Driver Facts,
OWNER-OPERATORS & IND. DRIVER ASS’N FOUND., https://www.ooida.com/
OOIDA%20Foundation/RecentResearch/OOfacts.asp (last visited Aug. 22,
2019).
62. On April 9, 2018, at approximately 3:30 p.m., the author received an Amazon
delivery. The personnel who delivered the boxes were in an ordinary sedan and
were dressed in casual clothes. This suggests that Amazon is entering the gig
market for delivery services. See Make $18–$25/hour, AMAZONFLEX, https://
flex.amazon.com/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
64 SMU Science and Technology Law Review [Vol. XXII
sis, to transport trailers from one point to another. Owner-operators emerged
in the industry almost as soon as highways and truck vehicles advanced to
the point that highway transportation was attractive to shippers and consign-
ees as an alternative to rail or water transportation. The Teamsters union,
however, sought to strangle the owner-operator phenomenon at birth, once
the union recognized that, as independent contractors, the owner-operators
would be exempt from collective bargaining under the NLRA.63 The union
used not only traditional labor organizing pressure but also, joined by the
power of regulated truckers, used its standing before the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) to condition operating rights on the use of employees as
drivers.64 Owner-operators were, for a time, relegated to local grocery deliv-
eries and hauling agricultural products until the operators gradually began to
fight back.65 Particularly significant in creating space for owner-operators
was deregulation of the trucking industry in the 1980s during the Carter Ad-
ministration.66 Even before its abolition, the ICC had begun to act to address
63. See Local 814, Int’l Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen v. Nat’l
Labor Relations Bd., 546 F.2d 989, 990, 565–66 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (describing
Teamsters’ efforts to prohibit use of owner-operators in lieu of employees).
64. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 303–04 (1953) (summa-
rizing the history of shift to owner-operators—use by operators of “non-owned
equipment”—and the ICC’s response); id. at 306 (noting the “demoralizing
effect on industry); id. at 308 (summarizing the ICC rules, including those re-
quiring that some routes be driven by employees of certificated carrier); id. at
309 (“All agree that the rules thus abolish trip leasing”).
65. See Wales Transp. Co. v. Interstate Comm. Comm’n, 728 F.2d 774, 778–79
(5th Cir. 1984) (sustaining the ICC order involving owner operators against
traditional trucking line claim that the ICC order was an ultra-vires effort to
regulate terms of employment and working conditions).
66. In re M & M Transp. Co., 13 B.R. 861, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (internal foot-
notes omitted) (adjudicating dispute over value of operating rights in
bankruptcy).
[T]he enactment on July 1, 1980 of the Motor Carrier Act of that year,
Pub. L. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 et seq. . . . achieved a sweeping change in the
trucking industry. It reversed nearly half a century of experience under
prior legislation, 49 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., by effectuating its policy of der-
egulation, a policy designed to lessen the national government’s economic
regulation of this industry.
The regulatory structure under prior law had the effect of severely limiting
entry into the trucking industry, for it stringently limited the opportunity of
a motor carrier to obtain operating rights from the ICC. An inevitable co-
rollary of these restrictions was the benefit to those who were successful in
procuring ICC-granted operating rights of limited competition, for if no
other rights were conferred, the successful carrier had a virtual monopoly.
The value of such exclusivity was plain. Indeed, in recognition of the in-
trinsic value of these federally given operating rights, motor carriers car-
ried them on their books as valuable assets. Apart from the benefit derived
2019] Don’t Burn the Looms 65
some of the problems faced by owner-operators, such as a lack of resources
to sue carriers for breach of contract.67
Today, everyone accepts that owner-operators are independent contrac-
tors and that their compensation and working conditions are outside the reach
of labor laws. The owner-operator labor market is bound by an infrastructure
that is not nearly as formal or rigorous as the Uber dispatch system, but their
qualifications and hours of work are closely regulated by the Department of
Transportation.68 The barriers to entry are somewhat greater for owner-opera-
tors than they are for Uber drivers. Owner-operators must obtain a motor
carrier certificate from the United States Department of Transportation’s
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA),69 and they must ob-
tain commercial driver’s licenses (CDLs) from state motor vehicle authori-
from a continued operation in a virtually competition free area, holders of
these rights were also able to profit from the restrictive nature of the regu-
lations governing the marketplace when the time came to sell their rights.
Substantial profit could be had from a sale as it was easier for carriers to
gain entry into a marketplace by the purchase of existing rights. While the
ICC had to approve the sale, at least the routes, designated points and type
of haulage had already undergone administrative scrutiny.
The deregulation flowing from the 1980 statute has changed the face of all
this. The new statutory and regulatory structure contemplates virtually un-
limited entry and provides for a simple and expeditious grant of operating
rights upon payment of a minimal fee. An existing operating right, previ-
ously valued at cost and subject to amortization, now must be written off
as an extraordinary loss. It is thus plain that the value of previously
granted rights to operate on the nation’s highways has been permanently
impaired by the elimination of monopolistic benefits which, of course, im-
pacted adversely on a profitable operation.
67. See Interstate Comm. Comm’n, Lease and Interchange of Vehicles (Rules
Modifications), 132 M.C.C. 916, 918 (1982) (declaring intention to take
agency action for abusive contractual practices).
68. See What is Operating Authority (MC number) and Who Needs It?, U.S. DEP’T
TRANSP. FED. MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMIN. (Nov. 21, 2017), https://ask
.fmcsa.dot.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/245.
69. See 49 U.S.C. § 13902 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-94); 49 C.F.R. parts
365, 368 (2018); 49 C.F.R. § 392.9a (2018); see How Do I Get Operating Au-
thority (MC Number)?, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. FED. MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY AD-
MIN. (Sept. 18, 2017), https://ask.fmcsa.dot.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/194
(explaining that an MC number is required for vehicles weighing more than
10,000 pounds or those that transport hazardous materials, but not for private
carriers, transporting their own cargo, carriers of exempt commodities, and car-
riers that operate within federally designated “commercial zones,” such as
those involving multi-state metropolitan areas).
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ties. Getting operating authority takes about a month, costs $300, and
involves making an online application and providing proof of insurance.70
Owner-operators of the 21st century use one or more of a dozen or so
established load boards to arrange for trailers to transport.71 The load boards,
unlike the Uber and Lyft networks, do not actually match driver and shipper,
but rather, they provide drivers and shippers with lists of potential counter-
parts.72 The load boards do some screening based on selection criteria entered
by the searching entity and may provide information about shipper financial
responsibility, promptness in paying accounts payable, and creditworthi-
ness.73 Some boards also provide information on rates agreed to with other
owner-operators, traffic congestion, and other factors influencing the selec-
tion of routes (lines).74 The Owner-Operators and Independent Driver Asso-
ciation (OOIDA) makes available a special arrangement with the largest of
these load boards, Dial-A-Truck (DAT) at $35 per month for basic services.75
The owner-operator message boards are full of advice and anecdotes about
how operators can negotiate effectively with brokers they perceive as ready
and eager to accept their services.76
Conflicts sometimes exist among owner-operators, brokers, and the
shippers, however. A 1984 challenge to ICC owner-operator regulations77
illustrates other owner operator grievances including: (1) failure to make
prompt payment to operators78; (2) imposing unusual types or amounts of
70. See U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. FED. MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMIN., Unified Regis-
tration System, https://portal.fmcsa.dot.gov/UrsRegistrationWizard/ (last vis-
ited Aug. 22, 2019).
71. See The Five Best Load Boards Every Trucker Should Know, RTS FINANCIAL
(July 25, 2017), http://www.rtsfinancial.com/articles/top-five-load-boards-
every-trucker-should-know (identifying DAT Solutions, Truckstop.com, 123
Loadboard, OOIDA’s DAT Members Edge, and Direct Freight).
72. See Load Board Features, DAT MEMBERS EDGE, http://www.mymembersedge
.com/products/features (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Load Board Packages, DAT MEMBERS EDGE, http://www.mymembersedge
.com/products (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
76. See My First Week as an Owner Operator . . . Ouch!, TRUCKERS REPORT (Feb.
15, 2011), https://www.thetruckersreport.com/truckingindustryforum/threads/
my-first-week-as-an-owner-operator-ouch.133412/page-3; Is Being am Owner-
Operator Worth It?, TRUCKER TERRITORY, https://truckerterritory.progressive
commercial.com/toolbox/owner-operator-worth/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2019)
(summarizing considerations).
77. See Wales Transp. Co. v. ICC, 728 F.2d 774, 778–79 (5th Cir. 1984).
78. Id. at 781.
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paperwork for payment79; and (3) shifting to operators the liability for fines
arising from overweight and oversize trailers.80 In the 2010 case of Owner-
Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc. v. Landstar System, Inc.,81
the plaintiffs claimed that:
Landstar violated 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(d) and (h), provisions of the
Truth–in–Leasing regulations, 49 C.F.R. § 376.1 et seq., by fail-
ing to disclose in their lease agreements that banking fee charges
would be deducted from compensation paid to the truck owners
and drivers, and by failing to provide documentation regarding the
computation of charge-back items including pricing information
submitted by Qualcomm Incorporated (Qualcomm). The
Owner–Operators also [sought] restitution or disgorgement.82
The court of appeals found that the original lease did not comply with the
federal regulation on disclosure of banking fee deductions83 but rejected the
plaintiffs’ claims on charge-backs.84 It held that restitution and disgorgement
were not available under the Motor Carrier Act,85 and that the plaintiffs had
not yet proved actual damages and remanded for trial of that question.86 The
court further stated that, “[b]ecause the Owner–Operators failed to establish
that actual damages can be easily calculated for all class members, the Dis-
trict Court did not abuse its discretion in decertifying the class for actual
damages.”87
2. Other Examples
AmazonFlex is a specialized version of Uber Delivery which allows gig
workers to schedule blocks of time on particular days during which they
deliver packages to Amazon customers, replacing UPS, USPS, and FedEx
delivery.88 Domino’s Pizza hires gig workers as drivers, and, like Amazon-
Flex, requires them to work pre-designated blocks of time. Platforms similar
to Uber and Lyft include those such as Craigslist and eBay. Craigslist pro-
vides a global reach for what are basically newspaper want ads by porting
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 622 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2010).
82. Id. at 1310 (describing claims).
83. Id. at 1318.
84. Id. at 1322–23.
85. Id. at 1324.
86. Id. at 1326.
87. Landstar Sys., 622 F.3d at 1327.
88. AMAZON FLEX, https://flex.amazon.com/about (2018) (video overview of Ama-
zon Flex).
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them onto the Internet.89 eBay is comparable to an upscale virtual flea mar-
ket.90 These platforms perform searching and matching functions, relying on
buyers and sellers to engage in ad hoc negotiation about their terms. eBay
assures performance by escrowing payments and also provides a dispute res-
olution mechanism.91 Other examples of gig markets exist, but their charac-
teristics distinguish them from Uber and Lyft.
Gig markets fairly similar to Uber and Lyft include Mechanical Turk,
Airbnb, and the plan reportedly being tested by General Motors to allow car
owners to rent their personal automobiles to others on a short-term basis.
Mechanical Turk is similar in that it facilitates workers’ going to customers
to perform services while using their own capital equipment.92 It differs sig-
nificantly in that the nature of the service is not narrowly defined, making it
more difficult for efficient matching to occur because of ambiguities in what
customers want and what workers offer.93 Airbnb differs from Uber and Lyft
in that the assets offered—residential housing structures—are not mobile.94
The customer must go to the worker’s premise.95 Additionally, the urban
transportation service provided by Uber is fungible, while the housing ser-
vices provided through Airbnb are unique and differentiated.96 Lastly, most
Airbnb hosts perform only limited services, unlike the driving and route se-
lection performed by Uber and Lyft drivers; they simply make their assets
available to customers.97 Airbnb does not organize a labor market so much as
it organizes a product market.98
Platforms fairly similar to Uber and Lyft with greater automation than
Craigslist and eBay include TaskRabbit, Moonlighting, and Mega Pros. Tas-
kRabbit99 and Moonlighting100 automate more of the matching process, in-
cluding, in the case of TaskRabbit, matching bids and requests for
compensation. However, whether buyer and seller make a deal and the terms
89. CRAIGSLIST, www.craigslist.com (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
90. EBAY, www.ebay.com (2019).
91. RESOLUTION CENTER, https://resolutioncenter.ebay.com/ (2019).
92. See Harris & Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing, supra note 14, at 19.
93. See id. at 31.
94. See id. at 10.
95. MCAFEE & BRYNJOLFSSON, supra note 10, at 222–23.
96. Id. at 222 (noting that urban transportation is undifferentiated but that short-
term housing is highly differentiated). Id. at 201 (describing Uber’s early
growth at the expense of monopolistic taxicab enterprises).
97. See id. at 222.
98. See id. at 222–23.
99. TASKRABBIT, www.taskrabbit.com (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
100. MOONLIGHTING, www.moonlighting.com (2018).
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of their deal are negotiated conventionally online.101 A platform in Chicago,
called Mega Pros, is a network that ties together home craftsman, including
appliance servicing, gutter and siding work, painting contractors, and home
improvement contractors.102 Mega Pros is a brand and advertises extensively
on radio. A potential customer makes contact by telephone, or Internet mes-
sage, and the enterprise arranges for someone with appropriate skills to do
the work.103 However, the details of the actual gig are worked out between
service personnel and the customer.104 Mega Pros is not involved in the in-
voicing and payment process.105 Uber and Lyft lie beyond these platforms in
their functionality. They not only match buyers and sellers of services; they
also automate payment based on a compensation formula that the platform
determines.106 While riders and drivers can elect among several options, they
may not negotiate their own compensation arrangements; indeed, the contract
terms of service prohibit them from doing so.107
D. Market Structure
The gig networks and platforms of the 21st century are simply markets.
They perform the same functions as farmers’ markets, stock and futures ex-
changes, and, more recently, online markets such as eBay and Amazon. With
respect to ride-hailing drivers, the market structure is usually analyzed as a
labor market, although it is often difficult to disentangle labor markets and
product markets altogether because supply and demand in product markets
influences supply and demand in the associated labor market. Considering
the intermediaries as well as the drivers and riders, analysis of market struc-
ture is more complex. Uber drivers are simultaneously buyers and sellers in
101. The author tested TaskRabbit and Moonlighting by seeking someone to “edit a
50-page manuscript for a law review article, checking citations for conform-
ance with ‘Blue Book,’” TaskRabbit matched the task with several dozen can-
didates who held themselves out as editors. They had widely varying
experience. One said he could do a good job editing because he had “written
several papers in college.” Another presented himself as an editor who values
brevity, but his reviews said things like “took down my old TVo¯unt, and
mounted new one,” and “install[ed] a ceiling fan that proved tricky due to a gas
pipe.” Others advertised experience in editing published books and articles.
Prices also varied widely, ranging from $50 per hour at the low end to $100 per
hour at the upper end. Moonlighting reported only fifteen matches, with gener-
ally lower prices.
102. MEGA PROS, https://megapros.com/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
103. Id.
104. See THE MEGA PROS DIFFERENCE, https://megapros.com/why-mega-pros/ (last
visited Aug. 22, 2019).
105. See id.
106. See Harris & Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizine, supra note 14, at 31–33.
107. See id.
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two different markets. They sell their labor and their vehicle services in one
market, where the riders are the consumers and the drivers are the suppliers.
They buy108 network services from Uber in the other market. In this market,
Uber is the supplier and the drivers are the consumers. A third market does
not involve the drivers: the market in which Uber sells its network to the
riders. The first market exemplifies almost pure competition. There are many
drivers; their services are fungible, and they provide them to thousands of
riders, who are largely indifferent to their sources of supply. It is the second
market where barriers to competition exist.
Labor markets that are purely competitive do not need regulation be-
cause participants are capable of taking care of themselves, but analysis of
the market’s structure is necessary to determine competitiveness.109 The con-
sumer side of the Uber and Lyft markets is quite competitive because
thousands of buyers (riders) are willing to pay hundreds, or thousands, of
sellers (drivers) to pick them up and take them where they want to go. Some-
one wanting a ride across town or to the airport has a half-dozen or more
choices. In most cities, she can choose between Uber and Lyft, take any one
of several competing taxis, take the bus or rapid transit, drive a personal
automobile, or rent a car. Choice among these alternatives is driven by a
combination of cost and convenience. The problem is that riders and sellers
confront huge transaction costs in finding each other at the right time and
place. As in any perfectly competitive market, individual buyers and sellers
lack the capacity to influence prices and other terms on which deals can be
made in the marketplace; a buyer or seller seeking terms better than the equi-
librium determined by supply and demand simply won’t find deals. Ride
hailing intermediaries, primarily Uber and Lyft, have risen to reduce these
transaction costs. Although differing levels of automation among the plat-
forms may restrict the choices of suppliers, or customers, by matching in-
stead of showing all available products or services, this technology reduces
the transaction costs of shopping, depending on the platform’s design.
The driver side of the market is less competitive. The Taylor Review
explains that the key factor in making gig labor markets unfair is the “imbal-
ance of power,” which may arise from a dominant local employer or a domi-
nant employer for a particular skill.110 Uber and Lyft dominate the market in
the form of an oligopoly on the product side, a market in which few sellers
and many buyers compete, and an oligopsony on the labor side, a market in
108. The drivers “buy” the service in the sense that they share the total revenue paid
by the rider.
109. See Barbara Ann White, Countervailing Power—Different Rules for Different
Conduct and Context in Antitrust Law and Economics, 41 DUKE L.J. 1045,
1055–59 (1992) (comparing role of market structure as determinant of compet-
itiveness under different schools of thought).
110. TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 10, at 26.
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which few buyers and many sellers compete.111 As in all oligopolies and
oligopsonies, the side of the market with only a few participants has disparate
access to information and disparate bargaining power, compared to the side
of the market with many players.112 Most U.S. markets for driving services
are duopolies, with Via and Curb also present in a few markets. Curb is not,
however, purely competitive with either Uber or Lyft because one must be
qualified as a taxi driver to drive for Curb.113 Although they have some de-
gree of control over the prices they pay, they face more competitive markets
on the product side and so have less control over pricing to consumers.
These power imbalances disproportionately affect workers with low
skills or who are immobile.114 In other words, the imbalance of power arises
from limited alternatives.115 Oligopolies and oligopsonies exemplify a num-
ber of types of market failure: transaction costs, contracts of adhesion,
switching costs, barriers to entry, and price inelasticity. Contracts of adhesion
matter, because they preclude bargaining between buyer and seller, an as-
sumption that underlies the model of perfect competition. Switching costs
matter because they impede the driver switching between competing ride-
hailing services, which they would otherwise be able to do fluidly as one or
the other improves the terms it offers. Barriers to entry matter because, if
they are low, a driver dissatisfied with the limited number of providers sim-
ply can start his own ride hailing service. Price inelasticity matters, because it
retards driver willingness to look for a better deal.
1. Transaction Costs
Frictionless markets, like those hypothesized in basic economics
courses, do not exist.116 Participants in all real markets encounter transaction
costs. Uber and Lyft enormously reduce the transaction costs associated with
111. See James Murphy Dowd, Oligopsony Power: Antitrust Injury and Collusive
Buyer Practices in Input Markets, 76 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 1075, 1084–85
(1996) (“Oligopsony is essentially the demand-side manifestation of
oligopoly”).
112. See White, supra note 109, at 1079–80.
113. See Harris & Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizine, supra note 14, at 29.
114. TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 10, at 26.
115. Imbalances of power arise from limited competitive alternatives to one side of
the transaction, which can arise from switching costs or barriers to entry. Op-
portunities for exploitation in all markets depends upon the availability of alter-
natives: competition between markets. This in turn depends upon barriers to
entry, including natural-monopoly tendencies and on switching costs. See TAY-
LOR ET AL., supra note 10.
116. See Ning Wang, Transaction Costs and the Structure of the Market: A Case
Study, 58 AMER. J. ECON. & SOC. 783, 784 (1999) (failing to consider transac-
tion costs removes understanding of markets from reality; analyzing specific
transaction costs in markets; using Chinese fish markets as case study).
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drivers and riders finding each other.117 These result from information asym-
metries as between individual drivers and the Uber or Lyft platform. In the-
ory, an individual could also set out on his own to find riders by cruising the
streets with some kind of advertisement on the vehicle, but the efficiency of
finding riders in that way is extremely low. The platform knows who wants a
ride at any instant in time and makes it seamless for the driver to match
himself with one of those riders. Without a relationship with the platform, the
driver is clueless as to potential riders. These platforms also reduce what
would be very large transaction costs of riders performing background inves-
tigations on potential drivers. Potential riders likely would be deterred by the
absence of any assurance that such an unknown and un-vouched-for driver is
safe. They similarly reduce the symmetrical transaction costs of negotiating
and making payment for services rendered between riders and drivers.
However, institutions developed to reduce transaction costs and make
markets more efficient introduce new transaction costs of their own because
drivers are dependent on their platforms and lack the power to negotiate their
own terms. Uber sets the terms of the deal; drivers can take it or leave it.
Switching costs, however, are quite low; an Uber driver owns his own car
and retains his privilege to work with Lyft, taxicab companies, or delivery
services like Domino’s Pizza or AmazonFlex. Because the work rules are
embedded in the software, instead of being implemented by a hierarchy of
supervisors, payroll clerks, and human resource professionals, the rigidities
associated with traditional organizational structures do not exist. If the plat-
form enterprise decides to change the way a rider’s payment is shared with
drivers, it can do so simply by changing a few lines of computer code. Tens
of thousands of drivers experience the change simultaneously on their smart
phones. Similarly, if the platform decides to change the way it notifies driv-
ers about ride opportunities based on calculations of supply and demand, it
already has the data to make appropriate changes. Of course, careful manage-
ment of software updates is necessary to prevent collapse of the system, but
the process of change is still much easier than having to republish employee
policy manuals all over the country and retrain multiple levels of supervisors.
Transaction costs may simply make markets less efficient, or they may create
imbalances of power.
2. Contracts of Adhesion
The platform itself has disproportionate power. In the case of Uber and
Lyft, no real negotiation occurs between the participants in the platform, on
either the buyer or the seller side. The platform writes the terms of participa-
tion, and buyers and sellers either must accept them or not, in a take-it-or-
leave-it manner. In other words, Uber and Lyft and similar platforms operate
117. See Lagos, An Alternative Approach to Search Frictions, supra note 55 (apply-
ing “matching function approach” to enable consideration of search frictions in
taxicab markets, the Lagos study predicts that technology that reduces search
frictions such as Uber’s and Lyft’s will improve social welfare).
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through contracts of adhesion. The law-and-economics movement defends
contracts of adhesion as efficient and urges courts to enforce them.118 How-
ever, others perceive them as negating the essential characteristics of private
contracting in markets: bargained for exchange. Appeals to “freedom of con-
tract” to privilege such contracts are illusory and it is appropriate for the law
to intervene to protect the weaker parties in this exchange. That perception
underlies much consumer-protection regulation and much labor and employ-
ment regulation, although the early labor reformers did not use the same ter-
minology. Despite the contracts of adhesion used by each ride-hailing
service, drivers are not without choice. They can leave one and go to another
or drive for multiple services, as the spirit moves them.
3. Switching Costs
Switching costs matter because low switching costs mitigate the dispar-
ity of power resulting from contracts of adhesion. If many different buyers
offer their own contracts of adhesion, sellers can maintain choice if they can
easily switch from one buyer to another. Switching costs are low for drivers
with both Uber and Lyft, who permit their drivers to drive for the other enter-
prise and for other enterprises. No fee is required to sign up for either, and
the only investment is a few minutes to sign up.119 The capital a driver uses is
his own automobile, which can be used in either service. Even assuming that
the only relevant skill set is driving a vehicle, individuals possessing that
skill can become a driver for Uber, Lyft, or services like GrubHub, Domino’s
Pizza,120 or, in increasing numbers of markets, Amazon.121 Barriers to entry
exist in other similar occupations, but they are modest. Driving a taxi de-
pends upon obtaining the chauffeur license and finding a medallion holder
willing to enter into a contract.122 Driving for FedEx or UPS requires a com-
118. See Richard A. Posner & Lucian Arye Bebchuk, One-Side Contracts in Com-
petitive Consumer Markets, COASE-SANDOR WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN L. &
ECON. (2006), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics/347/.
119. See UBER: DRIVE WITH UBER, https://www.uber.com/a/us/?var=org2&exp=706
22_t2 (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
120. See QUICK TIPS. GREAT HOURS. AND YOU’RE ALWAYS IN CHARGE OF THE
RADIO, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5627ccd4e4b030f0c573a8f7/
56357bf2e4b07d5e1832b38a/56357cb0e4b0767213f56831/1513190480296/
Dominos-recruitment-email-III.png?format=500w (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
121. See AMAZON FLEX, https://flex.amazon.com/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2019)
(“Make $18–$25/hour. Be your own boss, set your own schedule, and have
more time to pursue your goals and dreams. Join us and put the power of Ama-
zon behind you.”); see BECOME AN INDEPENDENT AMAZON FLEX DELIVERY
DRIVER, https://amazonflexbusiness.com/flex-cities (last visited Mar. 6, 2019)
(reporting presence in fifty cities).
122. See Basic Requirements to Drive a Taxi, DIV. MOTOR VEHICLES, https://www
.dmv.org/special-licenses/driving-a-taxi-cab.php#Basic-Requirements-to-
Drive-a-Taxi (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
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mercial driver’s license and various collectively bargained hiring rules in the
case of UPS.123
An important type of switching costs is the capital embedded in the
enterprise a market participant is leaving. For example, if a worker for a
talent agency has invested $1,000 in software that is only capable of perform-
ing useful functions at the particular agency for whom the worker works, and
other agencies use different software, which also requires worker investment,
switching costs include the cost of the software at the new agency. Even
though economists say that sunk costs should be disregarded in making ra-
tional economic decisions, sunk costs frequently have payoffs over time be-
cause they represent investment assets that have continuing utility. If one
pays cash for an automobile, for example, the cost of the car is sunk, but the
owner can expect five or more years of transportation function from the car.
If he scraps it, he is giving up functionality.
The availability of other work and the cost of switching influences bar-
gaining power, as explained by the well-known principle of negotiation the-
ory: Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement (BATNA).124 The BATNA
principle says that one’s position—what one is willing to accept—in any
negotiation is rationally determined by the best alternative to a negotiated
agreement.125 If a worker believes he can get a job with another enterprise at
$15 per hour, he rationally should not accept employment with his existing
enterprise at $12 an hour. He will insist that his current enterprise pay him at
least $15 an hour or he will switch jobs. His enterprise’s willingness to pay
him $15 depends on how it assesses its alternatives. If it thinks it can hire
somebody else for $13, it will refuse to pay the first worker more than that.
Switching costs matters, because if the wage differential is the assumed three
dollars per hour, but it cost the worker $1,000 to switch, he faces a loss until
he can earn the thousand dollars back with the new enterprise.
4. Barriers to Entry
Barriers to entry in the labor market matter. The issue is whether suppli-
ers of labor are relatively independent of platform providers because they can
“do-it-yourself”—perform the same functions independent of the platform.126
123. See Qualifications/Specifications, FEDEX, https://customcritical.fedex.com/us/
owneroperator/quals/default.shtml (last visited Aug. 22, 2019); see also
Kathryn Walsh, How to Become a UPS Driver, CAREER TRENDS, https://career-
trend.com/how-2189918-become-ups-driver.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
124. See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1991).
125. Id.
126. When a driver undertakes his own matching activity, he is engaging in a form
of vertical integration; the driver is now not only performing the driving func-
tion and supplying the vehicle, but also performing the marketing, sales, and
dispatch functions.
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Whether they can do it themselves depends on the barriers to entry. Barriers
to entry matter, not only in the sense that other drivers may offer their ser-
vices, increasing competition to incumbent drivers and diluting their bargain-
ing power, but also in the sense that barriers to entry in the platform market
reduce the bargaining power of drivers and force them to accept whatever the
platform offers without any real negotiation. Economies of scale and scope,
including substantial network effects, limit new entry into the TNP market.
That is why it is an oligopoly.127
Most gig arrangements involve “two-sided” or “multi-sided” plat-
forms.128 Gig intermediaries like Uber are sometimes referred to as “two-
sided platforms,” and the term “matchmaker” evokes appreciation of their
multisided nature as well. In that respect, they’re like most markets, in that
they facilitate transactions between sellers and buyers. Delivery services like
AmazonFlex, Domino’s Pizza, and Uber Delivery are multisided platforms.
While original Uber and Lyft matched two actors in the market—drivers and
riders—delivery services have at least a third side: the supplier of the prod-
uct. This can be a product from Amazon or a pizza from Domino’s or any
other item that needs to be delivered. The customer not only wants the prod-
uct; she also wants it at a particular location, so transportation services are
bundled with the tangible product. AmazonFlex and the other multisided
platforms organize a gig submarket for the transportation service and bundle
it together with the customer and the supplier. The more sides to a platform,
the greater the barriers to entry, because now the driver not only must find
customers, he also must construct a network of suppliers.
Barriers to entry in the market for platform services depends in part on
the tendency toward natural monopoly. The tendency toward natural monop-
oly depends upon the presence of network effects and on economies of scale.
An enterprise providing a service with substantial network effects is likely to
experience a natural monopoly phenomenon, as is one that enjoys substantial
economies of scale. A particular enterprise may become the natural monopo-
list, or it may get squeezed out of the market by another that becomes the
natural monopolist. Gig networks exhibit large network effects.129 They are
like telephone companies, in that suppliers and customers want to subscribe
to the network with the greatest number of contacts. Ride-hailing customers
want the network with the largest number of drivers. Ride-hailing drivers
127. An oligopoly is a market in which only a limited number of producers can stay
in business. Oligopoly, MIRIAM-WEBSTER, https://miriam-webster.com/diction-
ary/oligopoly (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
128. See MCAFEE & BRYNJOLFSSON, supra note 10, at 214 (explaining power of
two-sided networks); DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MATCH-
MAKERS: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF MULTISIDED PLATFORMS 14–19 (2016) (ex-
plaining power of multi-sided matchmakers).
129. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 128, at 25–30 (explaining network
effects); MCAFEE & BRYNJOLFSSON, supra note 10, at 140–42 (discussing net-
work effects).
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want the network with the largest number of customers. Network effects,
however, are bound by the geographic character of the market. Someone who
wants a ride in Chicago doesn’t care how many drivers are in the Uber net-
work in Boston.130 Otherwise, economies of scale are likely to be modest.
For instance, any reasonably skilled computer programmer can develop
an application in any one of dozens of programming languages that matches
persons offering a service with those who want to consume it. Development
and debugging of such an application need not cost more than a few thousand
dollars, depending on how much the entrepreneur is capable of doing him-
self. Making it available on a website or through a smartphone app is trivial,
both in effort and cost.
The requirements of the application include:
• A highly reliable backend database, capable of tracking the location
and state of riders and drivers online at the time.
• Separate apps for riders and drivers that have the following
capabilities:
° Display user’s position on a map, updated continuously;
° Display position of drivers and riders to each other;
° Compute efficient routes from one place to another and display it
on the screen, backed up by voice synthesizer turn-by-turn
commands;
° Perform trip accounting calculations and interface with riders’
credit card accounts and drivers’ bank accounts.
Of course, merely developing the software is not enough to launch a success-
ful entry. Substantial advertising expenditures and a persuasive message are
necessary to break into the markets, both for drivers and riders.
5. Price Inelasticity
Price elasticity matters because sensitivity to price differences and
changes shape the propensity to seek substitutes for both drivers and riders.
A number of econometric studies have been done over the last twenty years
about urban on-demand transportation including taxicabs, limousines, and
ride-hailing services.131 The studies focused on supply of services, mainly
130. One cares about how many residential properties are offered on the service like
AirBnB only in those areas to which one intends to travel.
131. See Hai Yang et al., A Multiperiod Dynamic Model of Taxi Services with En-
dogenous Service Intensity, 53 OPS. RES. 501 (2005) (building on early models
by allowing taxi drivers to choose certain numbers of hours per day to drive
and describing vacant and occupied taxi movements, including search behavior
by drivers, in terms of demand elasticity, and congestion effects; considering
interaction among profits, intensity of taxi supply, waiting times, fares, and
demand through mathematical models; emphasis is relationship between types
of regulation and social welfare); Ricardo Lagos, An Analysis of the Market for
Taxicab Rides in New York City, 44 INT’L ECON. REV. 423 (2003) (examining
effects of search and meeting frictions on supply and demand of cabs, in light
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involving taxi drivers, showing that while drivers are more willing to work
when compensation is higher, they work only until they have reached a cer-
tain number of hours or a certain level of earnings, and then they clock off.132
No studies have been conducted on the cross elasticities of supply—the fac-
tors that determine whether a driver works for a taxicab company, the limo
company, or a particular ride hailing service; that is probably because Uber
and Lyft only recently became a visible part of the on-demand transportation
system. Demand-side studies reinforce the intuition that passengers are rela-
tively insensitive to price, but more sensitive to waiting times and trip times.
A typical passenger who orders a cab does not care much how much it costs,
but he cares how long he will have to wait for the cab to arrive, and how long
the trip will take once he is in the cab. However, studies of cross elasticity of
demand are not available either. But despite the price inelasticity of demand
for taxicab services, it is plausible to conclude that passengers will move to
substitutes when the relative price changes, even a little.
These studies of driver and passenger behavior have only indirect impli-
cations for how the labor market for drivers should be regulated. They sug-
gest that regulation changing fares and driver compensation may have
relatively little effect, except to increase the returns to the entrepreneurs or-
ganizing the services. On the other hand, increasing the price of Uber and
Lyft, relative to taxis, is likely to diminish the demand for Uber and Lyft.
They also suggest that increasing driver compensation may not pull forth
much additional work from drivers, because drivers are more interested in
how long they work and how much they make than in maximizing earnings,
and increased compensation rates mean they can meet earnings targets with
less time.
III. JUSTIFYING REGULATION
The law intervenes and regulates an industry either when economic
analysis suggests that the market, operating alone, will not allocate resources
efficiently or will not distribute them equitably, or when political forces de-
termine to advantage one interest group over another.
of regulatory changes). Bus, rapid transit, and rental cars are close substitutes
but are not exactly on-demand. As close substitutes, they factor into the assess-
ment of demand for the on-demand services.
132. See Henry S. Farber, The Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers, 113 J.
POL. ECON. 46 (2005) (concluding that decision by cab driver to stop work is
primarily related to cumulative hours works up to that point; noting other stu-
dents that suggest strongly negative wage elasticity—drivers stop work as soon
as they have earned a target income).
78 SMU Science and Technology Law Review [Vol. XXII
A. Risk-Based Regulation
The second Coase Theorem postulates that regulation is not necessary to
assure allocative efficiency in frictionless markets.133 As long as property
rights exist and contracts are enforceable, actors in the market will calculate
their own preference functions and bargain accordingly to exchange property
rights. The Theorem, however, does not say that distributional fairness will
be assured.134 If the value placed on a good by the two parties overlaps, then
a surplus exists and it must be divided. Whoever starts out owning the prop-
erty will appropriate all of the surplus. Most economists accept the validity of
the Coase Theorem. They disagree vigorously, however, on what transaction
costs exist and where and what kind of regulatory intervention is appropriate
to reduce or eliminate them. They generally also agree that while perfect
markets are desirable, no such markets exist. Accordingly, lawyers and
lawmakers who are literate in economics understand that regulatory regimes
should be designed to focus on reducing or eliminating transaction costs.
Such an exercise must begin by identifying specific transaction costs and
understanding how alternative regulatory measures will reduce them. Design-
ing regulatory regimes around transaction costs in particular markets can be
thought of as a kind of risk-based regulation, where the risks are not those to
health and safety, but instead those of allocational inefficiency or distributive
unfairness because of transaction costs.135
B. Market Failure and Opportunities for Exploitation: Allocative
Efficiency and Distributive Justice
Economic analysis of law—popularly known as “law-and-econom-
ics”—addresses allocative efficiency and distributive justice.136 Allocative ef-
ficiency is concerned with market failure that jeopardizes the optimal
allocation of resources.137 Distributive justice involves something else: an al-
133. See George J. Stigler, Two Notes on the Coase Theorem, 99 YALE L.J. 631
(1989) (summarizing theorem and its implications).
134. See id.
135. In the health and safety context, externalities are threats to health and safety; in
the economic rhetoric context the externalities are sources of friction for mar-
ket transactions.
136. RICHARD H. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (9th ed. 2014) (providing
overview of law-and-economics concerns); see also Richard A. Posner, Values
and Consequences: An Introduction to Economic Analysis of Law, John M.
Olin L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 53, https://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/
files/53.Posner.Values_0.pdf (examples of economic analysis of law).
137. See Richard S. Markovits, Legal Analysis and Economic Analysis of Allocative
Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811, 814–27 (1980) (describing and critiquing
of Posner’s allocative efficiency approach).
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location of resources that is “fair” or “equitable” in some moral sense.138
Allocative efficiency and distributive justice goals usually conflict.139 One
can improve the fairness of the distribution of resources, but only by making
their allocation less efficient. Single-minded pursuit of allocative efficiency
often results in an inequitable distribution of resources—a race to the bottom.
For ease of discussion, this article refers to shortcomings in distributive jus-
tice as “opportunities for exploitation.”
Microeconomics and markets limit the degree to which any regulatory
regime can pursue equitable distribution. Law can boost compensation for
any factor of production, including labor, only so far, so that regulation that
obligates an enterprise to pay out more of its revenue to workers and less to
its sources of capital will find it increasingly difficult to attract capital for
operations and expansion because it pays a subpar rate of return. An enter-
prise may seek to avoid this result by raising prices, but new entrants in the
market charging lower prices will gain market share at the enterprise’s ex-
pense and eventually put it out of business. The regulators can seek to shore
up the compensation norm by limiting market entry and thus allowing higher
prices for the entire industry, but then, unless the price elasticity of demand is
zero or negative—unlikely for most industries—the result of the higher
prices will lower demand. Depending on the exact level of elasticity and
pricing, the total revenue may drop, thus producing a smaller pool for worker
compensation. Ultimately, the compensation-boosting regulation pushes the
workers out of the market (if not the labor market for that particular industry,
then the broader markets for goods and services generally).
Even imperfect markets impose ultimate limits on how much regulation
can accomplish. Supply and demand continue to operate at some level of
efficiency, meaning that increasing the cost of labor reduces the demand for
their services. Rational lawmaking scrutinizes specific instances of market
failure that jeopardize efficient allocation and equitable distribution. The un-
willingness to look beyond the traditional distinction between independent
contractor and employee in deciding how to regulate gig markets is myopic.
It largely ignores an appropriate inquiry into instances of market failure and
opportunities for exploitation. What matters is not how the law could pro-
138. See Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, Fairness in Law and Econom-
ics: Introduction, Case-Sandor Working Paper Series in L. & Econ. 1 (2014),
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2381&con
text=law_and_economics (arguing that law and economics must confront ques-
tions of distributive fairness as well as allocative efficiency).
139. See Lewis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare: Notes on the
Pareto Principles, Preferences, and Distributive Justice, NBER Working Paper
9622, at 3–6 (2003) (acknowledging conflict between allocative efficiency and
distributive justice). But see Martha T. McCluskey et al., Law and Economics:
Contemporary Approaches, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 297, 301 (2016) (criti-
cizing teaching materials on law and economics because they overstate the ten-
sion between efficiency and equity).
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mote allocative efficiency and reduce opportunities for exploitation in a Ford
Motor factory of 1924 or a sewing sweatshop in New York in 1890; what
matters is whether and how to regulate the gig labor markets of the 21st
century. Yet it was the model of 1924 factory and the 1890 sweatshop on
which New Deal labor law was erected, concerning only “employees” and
leaving “independent contractors” largely out in the cold. A rational regula-
tory regime for gig markets begins by identifying specific instances of mar-
ket failure and opportunities for exploitation. The market structure analysis
of part II.D of this article suggests that regulatory intervention may be justi-
fied by the dependence of gig workers on platforms when the market for the
platforms is not competitive because of barriers to entry by new platform
providers, including gig workers themselves.
C. Politics of Regulation
Regulatory design reflects more than the rationality of an economist
looking at allocative efficiency and distributive justice. It also reflects the
politics of the disappointed.140 No market is perfect, and almost any reasona-
bly articulate critic can mobilize credible claims of market failure. Reasona-
bly sympathetic victims can organize a movement to address credible claims
of exploitation. Business interests that are doing well in unregulated markets
naturally advocate the superiority of markets over regulation. Laissez-faire
policy leaves them free to make their own decisions without regulators look-
ing over their shoulder contemporaneously or afterwards. Economic success
reinforces the preference of the successful in unregulated markets, but tides
turn and sometimes free-will decisions produce failure instead of success.
When that happens, the decision-maker is likely to seek someone else to
blame. In regulated markets, that might be the government, while in less
regulated ones, it’s more likely to be another entrepreneur or capitalist. That
blame game is likely to spawn proposals for regulatory initiatives to curtail
the power of those the market has made successful.
That phenomenon, at least superficially, explains the Populism of the
turn of the 20th century, when local merchants began to lose market share to
larger enterprises at the regional or national level. It illustrates the antago-
nism of textile workers, steelworkers, and autoworkers to foreign imports.
Similarly, it goes a long way toward explaining hostility by taxicab drivers
and medallion holders against Uber and Lyft.141 As a result, proposed regula-
tory regimes for gig enterprises usually reflect not only instances of exploita-
tion or market failure, but also the desire of incumbents, like taxicab
monopolies, to thwart competition from gig entities like Uber. Their natural
140. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE
116–18 (1991) (arguing that public law results from a combination of econom-
ics, politics, and ideology).
141. See MCAFEE & BRYNJOLFSSON, supra note 10, at 202 (explaining that incum-
bents seek to block new entrants by appealing to regulation).
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desire to defend their monopolies is reinforced by poorly informed beliefs
that the popularity of Uber and Lyft are increasing traffic142 and threatening
mass public transportation.143 On the other hand, it is hard to make a case for
additional regulation of labor markets, unless the participants in the labor
market are dissatisfied with the status quo.
D. Sources of Worker Dissatisfaction
The politics of regulatory intervention substantially depend on the cries
of citizens who claim to be victims of an entity they wish to regulate. Ac-
cording to the proverb “the squeaky wheel gets the grease,” some gig work-
ers claim they are victimized, and such sentiment, along with the preference
of the taxi industry for the status quo, gives life to proposals for regulation of
the gig economy.
Any inventory of worker grievances in gig markets should begin with
the grievances that have provoked litigation. A class action lawsuit by Uber
drivers is pending in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia,144 and the law firm representing the class is soliciting participation.145
Counsel describes the lawsuit as follows:
Uber drivers have filed a class action lawsuit claiming they have
been misclassified as independent contractors and are entitled to
be reimbursed for their expenses that Uber should have to pay,
like for gas and vehicle maintenance. The lawsuit also challenges
Uber’s practice of telling passengers that the gratuity is included
and not to tip the drivers, even though (until 2017) you were not
getting a tip!!146
142. See Steve LeBlanc, Studies are Increasingly Clear: Uber and Lyft Congest
Cities, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 25, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/
technology/ct-uber-lyft-congestion-20180225-story.html; Sean Wolfe, Uber
and Lyft are Creating More Traffic Congestion Instead of Reducing It, Accord-
ing to a New Report, BUS. INSIDER (July 27, 2018), https://www.businessin-
sider.com/uber-lyft-creating-traffic-cities-bruce-schaller-2018-7.
143. See Steven Hill, Ridesharing Versus Public Transit: How Uber and Lyft Tend
to Widen Disparities of Race and Class in Urban Transportation Systems, AM.
PROSPECT (Mar. 27, 2018), http://prospect.org/article/ridesharing-versus-pub-
lic-transit; Greg Lindsay, What if Uber Kills Off Public Transport Rather Than
Cars?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-
business/2017/jan/13/uber-lyft-cars-public-transport-cities-commuting.
144. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 13-3826-EMC (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17,
2014).
145. See Uber Drivers, LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C., http://www.uberlawsuit
.com/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
146. Id.
82 SMU Science and Technology Law Review [Vol. XXII
The inquiry into driver dissatisfaction then should extend into the gripes ex-
pressed on driver message boards and blogs. These include claims by drivers
(1) for minimum-wage and premium pay for overtime; (2) that they are enti-
tled to organize for purposes of collective-bargaining; (3) that they have been
deprived of promised benefits or subject to wrongful deductions from pay in
violation of consumer protection or fair business practices regulation; and (4)
that the platform provider unfairly sides with a customer against the driver.147
1. What the Drivers Say
After nearly a decade of debate on the unevenly regulated business prac-
tices of Uber through multiple unsettled class action suits148 and academic
scholarship, a void still exists in the literature related to the issues as per-
ceived by Uber Partners. The author set out to discover whether Partners
identified issues within the industry creating employment related concerns.
Specifically, the investigators were interested, inter alia, in Uber Partners’:
(1) perception of the hiring and task assignment processes; (2) grievance res-
olution procedures; (3) mistreatment and exploitation by the company; (4)
economic disadvantages; and (5) interpersonal relationships with the com-
pany and passengers. The ultimate research goal was to determine whether
issues exist in the business model warranting state regulation. Finally, the
author sought to determine how Uber Partners’ concerns should be ad-
dressed, namely via state regulation.
The author sought this information in two forms. First, the author re-
viewed posts by users on Internet message forums to collect data by observ-
ing group dynamics without interaction or contact with the group members.
Co-author Kunsman created user accounts on each website, read and ana-
lyzed posted messages by other users, and explored users’ complaints about
147. On the Uber Drivers Forum in UberPeople.net, the following categories had
approximatley the number of postings and comments indicated:
(1) Pay: 5,000 posts, 70,900 comments
(2) Technology: 3,400 posts, 30,000 comments
(3) Ratings: 2,100 posts, 33,800 comments
(4) Vehicles: 1,900 posts, 28,000 comments
(5) Tips: 1,200 posts, 19,000 comments
(6) Taxes: 1,100 posts, 12,700 comments
(7) Insurance: 857 posts, 13,400 comments
(8) Licensed: 236 posts, 2,700 comments
(9) Surge: 752 posts, 8,900 comments
Uber Drivers Forum, UBERPEOPLE.NET, https://uberpeople.net (last visited
Aug. 22, 2019); see also TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 10, at 26 (identifying
unauthorized deductions from wages (26%), unfair dismissal (19%), and terms
& conditions of employment—especially classification as independent contrac-
tors (13%) as the top three grievances).
148. See generally Deborah F. Buckman, Liability and Regulation of Ride-Sharing
Services Using Social Media, 6 A.L.R.7TH ART. 1 (2015).
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Uber practices.149 Research indicates that online forums are used by a vastly
diverse group for information support and exchange,150 so a diverse pool of
forum members was observed. The author analyzed and selected forum posts
to illustrate the purpose of this article. Next, the author interviewed active
and inactive Uber Partners regarding their experiences and impressions of the
Uber business model.
a. The Message Forums
Message boards and blogs are open to everyone who wants to post a
comment but are skewed toward negative comments, because those having
something bad to say are more willing to go to the trouble of posting some-
thing than someone who is satisfied. This bias is not a problem for present
purposes because the purpose of reviewing the posts is to determine the sub-
jects about which drivers are unhappy.
i. Love-Hate
The following is quoted from uberpeople.net; it typifies driver postings:
Uber and I are having a lovers quarrel.
Uber I love you but you have gone to far and need to be set strait.
This is a two way relationship and you have been asking for way
too much and giving very little in return. It was not like this at
first but now you clearly only think about yourself what happened
to the Uber I use to know.
Lately all you send me is 11 minute pickups to grocery stores that
I never take or cancel on you send me pax’s that want me to pick
them up in bus zones or busy streets with no parking or pax in
sight. Cancel. You want me to go on a long distance trip with
massive traffic on the way home or force me to work in the city.
If I call customer service I get nowhere every time.
You send me badges but steel my tips and when someone accuses
me of something you do not tell me who or why so I can not
defend myself.
Clearly this is a one sided relationship so I’ll just use you like you
use me.151
149. The author did not use a text mining or other automated data collection method.
150. Eun-OK Im & Wonshik Chee, Practical Guidelines for Qualitative Research
Using Online Forums, 30 COMPUTERS, INFORMATICS, NURSING 604, 605
(2012).
151. @Mole, Uber and I are Having a Lovers Quarrel, UBERPEOPLE.NET (July 28,
2018, 2:55 PM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/uber-and-i-are-having-a-lovers-
quarrel.274577/.
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“sounds like you [are] the b$tch in the relationship”152
“Sounds like it’s time to get a new GF . . . 8>)”153
“Time apart makes the heart grow fonder. Go a month without
driving and when you return your love will be even stronger than
before”154
“Lol I do this quite often.”155
ii. Compensation
Significant numbers of gripes relate to driver compensation. The follow-
ing exchanges are edited and excerpted from uberpeople.net.
Why is everyone complaining? I am considering driving for Uber/
Lyft on weekends to make some extra cash. My goal is to make
$100–$200 a week for a couple of days of driving (anywhere from
6–8 hours per day). I have a Toyota Prius at my disposal for the
endeavor.
Every single [Uber] driver I have met in person (about 8–10 peo-
ple by now) says this is very doable. But I see a lot of people here
constantly complaining about how they’re losing money or getting
ripped off on fares and/tolls by [Uber], etc. . . . Are these exper-
iences unique or more isolated concerns than what is the norm for
most?
I am located in the Dallas market and live north of town near
Denton. What say you? Is this feasible? If so or if not, why?
ps - please don’t let this turn into a uber @@@@@ session. Con-
structive comments are appreciated. Thank you.156
152. @Eugene73, Comment to Uber and I are Having a Lovers Quarrel, UBERPE-
OPLE.NET (July 28, 2018, 3:29 PM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/uber-and-i-
are-having-a-lovers-quarrel.274577/.
153. @Rakos, Comment to Uber and I are Having a Lovers Quarrel, UBERPEOPLE
.NET (July 28, 2018, 3:53 PM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/uber-and-i-are-
having-a-lovers-quarrel.274577/.
154. @Grahamcracker, Comment to Uber and I are Having a Lovers Quarrel,
UBERPEOPLE.NET (July 28, 2018, 4:10 PM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/uber-
and-i-are-having-a-lovers-quarrel.274577/.
155. @Mole, Comment to Uber and I are Having a Lovers Quarrel, UBERPEOPLE
.NET (July 28, 2018, 4:17 PM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/uber-and-i-are-
having-a-lovers-quarrel.274577/.
156. @MaxReaver, Why is Everyone Complaining?, UBERPEOPLE.NET (June 6,
2018, 10:18 AM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/why-is-everyone-com-
plaining.264790/.
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“Sure it’s feasible if you don’t care how many hours it takes you
to do it. Your rate in Dallas is .68 per mile plus .075 per minute. If
you wait in a drive thru line for 30 minutes you’re earning $4.50
per hour before car expenses. The X rate is a joke and not worth
your time. You can deduct $.54 per mile before you show any
taxable income and that includes your unpaid miles between rides.
At base rate you will show zero taxable income because you don’t
have any to tax. Drive only surge, boost or XL, or just stay
home.”157
“[E]xperience uber after your honey moon period. at first you will
get great trips, Uber then filters rides to keep people at a certain
hourly rate.”158
“You stated that you want to ‘make’ a couple hundred bux a
week. What is your definition of making money? Is it only what
you take home? Or, is it what you take home after expenses? If
you don’t mind spending $300 to ‘make’ $200 then yer good. If
that idea poses a problem for you, maybe you can see why the
drivers complain.”159
“$100.00/day for UberEats is what I shoot for but usually get tired
by $75 and that is not all day. If $100.00/week is all you want then
it is definitely doable. But some people want to do this to pay the
rent.”160
“If you want to make $200/wk expect to put about 15-20 hours
into it. That’s earnings before expenses, gas, taxes, etc. At least
you have a good car to keep the mileage cost down. XL gets paid
double but the Prius can’t do XL so it’s irrelevant, and it’s not
worth getting an XL-qualified vehicle because X to XL ratio will
be about 7 to 1, unless you do only XL, which just means you’ll
be spending a lot of time reading books in parking lots and mak-
ing less per hour. You would be better off doing 4 hours of driving
during prime time 4 days a week, rather than 2 days at 8 hours.
157. @Doughie, Comment to Why is Everyone Complaining?, UBERPEOPLE.NET
(June 6, 2018, 12:30 PM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/why-is-everyone-
complaining.264790/.
158. @fusionuber, Comment to Why is Everyone Complaining?, UBERPEOPLE.NET
(June 6, 2018, 12:52 PM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/why-is-everyone-
complaining.264790/.
159. @Gov Moonbeam, Comment to Why is Everyone Complaining?, UBERPEOPLE
.NET (June 6, 2018, 1:42 PM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/why-is-everyone-
complaining.264790/.
160. @columbuscatlady, Comment to Why is Everyone Complaining?, UBERPEOPLE
.NET (June 6, 2018, 1:53 PM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/why-is-everyone-
complaining.264790/.
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There are long stretches in the day where demand is very low. Just
from my personal experience.”161
“Dallas is far from the bottom paying market. There are places
around the US with 25% lower per mile per minute rates and . . .
higher expenses (gas being more expensive). So $200 a week
turns into $140 for the same number of hours driven, and the same
mileage. Then you have places that arn’t as busy as a top 10 city
in the country in terms of population, they will get less fares per
hour. So that $140 turns into $80, for the same number of hours.
Then you have places that are more spread out than Dallas. That
$80 turns into $75 because of higher number of empty miles. So
. . . $200 for the number of hours you work, might be closer to
$75 in podunk Tampa Florida for the same number of hours
driven. These two places do not offer the same opportunities driv-
ing for uber.”162
“In my market it’s so slow you REALLY have to hustle to make
‘decent’ money. I only need to make a few hundred $ profit a
week so it’s not too tough, but for the guys that need to pay the
rent, buy groceries or pay the Uber-Rental, I can see how they
would struggle. Although instead of complaining I wish they
would look for a ‘real’ job instead.”163
“Why is everyone complaining? Because they have been doing it,
and know what’s really going on. Independent studies have con-
firmed that drivers are in the bottom 10% of earners, nationwide.
The companies LIE to our faces. The companies DO NOT have
our backs. I could go on and on, but that should be enuf right there
to scare you off. I’m sure you don’t believe me (or the rest of the
people trying to warn you), so go ahead and get signed up. And
when you start to post some crap about Uber taking 40% of the
fare, remember this conversation. Good luck!”164
161. @henrygates, Comment to Why is Everyone Complaining?, UBERPEOPLE.NET
(June 7, 2018, 6:09 AM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/why-is-everyone-com-
plaining.264790/.
162. @Stevie The Magic Unicorn, Comment to Why is Everyone Complaining?,
UBERPEOPLE.NET (June 7, 2018, 7:02 AM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/why-
is-everyone-complaining.264790/.
163. @IERide, Comment to Why is Everyone Complaining?, UBERPEOPLE.NET (June
7, 2018, 7:05 AM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/why-is-everyone-com-
plaining.264790/.
164. @Mista T, Comment to Why is Everyone Complaining?, UBERPEOPLE.NET
(June 7, 2018, 6:48 PM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/why-is-everyone-com-
plaining.264790/.
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“I’ll give it to you straight forward. There is lots of ppl who com-
plain for the following reasons: (1) short trips with no tips; (2)
getting requests 20 minutes away only for it to turn out to be a
dumb ride that pays under $6 with no tip; (3) rude pax; (4) paying
for gas (although you may not worry about it); (5) depreciation
and dead miles. The list goes on. You have a great car to do this.
It’s only after some mistakes made along the way will you find the
best way to do this. Here’s some tips that may help you. (1) don’t
accept pings behind you on a highway; (2) try to accept pings of
pax 8 minutes away or less; (3) don’t cancel too much; (4) under-
stand that acceptance rate & cancelation rate is reset after one
week. In general, ppl complain bc they’re loosing money doing
this gig. Trial & error will teach you the best ways for this. You
pretty much have to train yourself.”165
“A New Member: trying to get positive results for earning ‘extra
cash’ and ‘Just drive a couple of days.’ LMAO. The truth is driv-
ing for Uber pays very little money. The drivers have accepted
minimum wage conditions with maximum risk. Assuming you
don’t work for Uber, which I’m assuming you do, don’t do it. One
bad accident or incident with a passenger could make you regret
the whole thing.”166
“It’s as simple as this: If you want to do this as a part time gig to
make some money, and can afford to just stop and go home on a
slow night, this is for you. If you go into this out of necessity you
will find nothing enjoyable about it. The fares, surges and passen-
ger demand are never constant, thus why many here complain.
Lastly, everyone here is your competition. They are fellow drivers
looking for the same fares as you. They’re not going to say it’s all
perfect because that would encourage you to be out more. By dis-
couraging you saying ‘this sucks,’ your competition now has more
fares if you decide to not do this, which = win for them.”167
“It may seem like a lot of drivers on here complaining. But re-
member this – Actually only about 10 drivers on UP . . . each with
15 screen names posting to each other. About 1000 posters who
165. @rideshare2870, Comment to Why is Everyone Complaining?, UBERPEOPLE
.NET (June 7, 2018, 9:04 PM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/why-is-everyone-
complaining.264790/.
166. @Luber4.9, Comment to Why is Everyone Complaining?, UBERPEOPLE.NET
(June 7, 2018, 9:13 PM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/why-is-everyone-com-
plaining.264790/.
167. @nj2bos, Comment to Why is Everyone Complaining?, UBERPEOPLE.NET (June
7, 2018, 10:30 PM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/why-is-everyone-com-
plaining.264790/.
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don’t drive and are just bored with life. 50 ‘New MEMBERS A
WEEK’ come in and post one stir the pot post for fun. And a few
shills trolls and just for fun moderators who are also school cross-
ing guards.”168
“Firstly, I don’t work for uBer for god’s sakes. Let me guess, eve-
ryone who poses a question gets accused of this at some point lol.
I do appreciate the responses from those that have offered their
constructive insight. I guess what strikes me as odd is that all the
nay-sayers I have seen are online. Of the few uBer drivers I have
met in person (DC markets and Dallas markets), their outlook is
not so grim.”169
“To be fair, whenever a pax asks me about Uber, I love it. People
don’t want to hear negativity. I don’t really feel like creating nega-
tivity. Getting paid peanuts is bad enough. So it’s more likely that
the drivers you meet are lying for your benefit. Bottom line is that
Uber pays drivers way below what the industry used to pay and
the keep cutting the pay. Why would anyone be happy with that?
Would you be happy with your company if they kept cutting your
salary every year?”170
iii. Uber Pools
Most Partners detest Uber Pool rides. One user, @Ribak, accepted a
Pool request and discovered rider’s destination only at pick up: the airport.171
The Partner asked the rider why he chose Pool for a ride to the airport to
which the ride replied it saved him $6.172 The Partner traveled twenty-four
miles in thirty-one minutes and only earned $28.79.173 Partner @Gam-
maRayBurst believes Pool pays significantly less than Uber X:
Do you guys cringe every single time you pick up somebody on
Uber pool yes or no? I always cuss myself out every time I see it
168. @IthurstwhenIP, Comment to Why is Everyone Complaining?, UBERPEOPLE
.NET (June 7, 2018, 10:45 PM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/why-is-everyone-
complaining.264790/.
169. @MaxReaver, Comment to Why is Everyone Complaining?, UBERPEOPLE.NET
(June 8, 2018, 9:22 AM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/why-is-everyone-com-
plaining.264790/.
170. @henrygates, Comment to Why is Everyone Complaining?, UBERPEOPLE.NET
(June 8, 2018, 9:26 AM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/why-is-everyone-com-
plaining.264790/.
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pop up uberpool I get so angry every time . . . they expect me to
drive 20 to 25 miles at 5 p.m. in traffic or 3 miles and get paid
willy nilly.174
He now declines pool trips,175 but @Robert Finnly saw his acceptance rate
drop from ninety-six percent to sixty-five percent in two days for declining
every pool request in the course of only two days.176 Partner @The Gift of
Fish says “only a fool does Pool.”177 Others call Pool UberFool.178 Partners
believe they would earn twice as much on Uber X in the same time frame as
earned on Pool:
On the Pool trip, the driver would have earned $9.41 more, or
73% more money than the X trip. But the Pool trip would take
him 53 minutes to complete instead of just 18 minutes on the X
trip. That’s an additional 35 minutes, or 194% more time. For only
73% more money.179
Partner @UberBlackNJ wants to know “whatever happened to Uber
takes 20%?”180 After Uber collected the service fee and booking fee for his
pool ride, Uber collected 43% of his Pool ride.181 One member, @Yozee,
replied, “Uber considers Drivers as slaves . . . .”182
174. @GammaRayBurst, I Dispise Uber POOL Let Me Explain, UBERPEOPLE.NET
(Feb. 9, 2018, 7:21 PM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/i-dispise-uber-pool-let-
me-explain.239430/.
175. @GammaRayBurst, To Pool or not to Pool, UBERPEOPLET.NET (Feb. 15, 2018,
10:29 AM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/to-pool-or-not-to-pool.240682/.
176. @Robert finnly, Say No to Uber Pool with Me!, UBERPEOPLE.NET (Aug. 21,
2017, 11:57 AM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/say-no-to-uber-pool-with-
me.195247/.
177. @The Gift of Fish, This is Why You Don’t Do Pool (or Line), UBERPEOPLE.NET
(Feb. 3, 2018, 1:55 AM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/this-is-why-you-dont-
do-pool-or-line.237796/.
178. @Mr.Belvedere, Uberfool, UBERPEOPLE.NET (Sept. 16, 2016, 3:47 AM), https:/
/uberpeople.net/threads/uberfool.104092/.
179. @The Gift of Fish, This is Why You Don’t Do Pool (or Line), supra note 177.
180. @UberBlackNJ, Uber Takes 43% on Pool Ride Today, UBERPEOPLE.NET (June
21, 2017 3:28 AM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/uber-takes-43-on-pool-ride-
today.186150/.
181. Id.
182. @Yozee, Comment to Uber Takes 43% on Pool Ride Today, UBERPEOPLE.NET
(Jun. 21, 2017 12:03 PM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/uber-takes-43-on-
pool-ride-today.186150/.
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iv. Surge
During a surge, a time of day during which a high demand for rides
exists, Uber charges riders a surge fee.183 Typically, the surge fee is based on
the level of demand and, at peak volume, surge fees may exponentially in-
crease the regular fare price.184 The increased demand could occur during
rush hours or events, but often Partners do not know the reason why a surge
occurs. For instance, in a Forum Post entitled “Uber’s New Cheat the
Driver,”185 one Partner, @joebo1963, reports the surge fee is not collected
and distributed to Partners at the expected rate and expressed his frustration:
“I accepted a fare at 1.9 surge, completed the ride but only received 1.1
surge. [Uber kept 90 percent of the surge fee]. I wrote Uber and called them
twice, but they called it dynamic pricing.”186 The adjusted McCormick Fare,
including surge fee, would cost $24–$29, and a Partner should expect to
receive $19–$23,187 but if @joebo1963 performed the McCormick Fare and
Uber only paid out 1.1 surge rate the partner would have only received
$14–$16.
@joebo1963 further reported that Uber cited Partner frustration as a rea-
son for keeping the larger surge fee, to which the Partner replied he “was
going to now frustrate some riders and go online [for] some cancels.”188 A
cancellation fee counts as the fare, of which the driver receives 80%.189 The
cancellation amounts to an easy way to collect a quick fare to recoup the
amount lost if Uber keeps the surge index. Thus, when a Partner cancels,
Uber issues a $5 standard cancellation fee to the rider, and the Partner makes
a quick $4. Of course, the rider may challenge the fee in their app and Uber
183. See What is Surge?, UBER, https://help.uber.com/partners/article/what-is-
surge?nodeId=e9375d5e-917b-4bc5-8142-23b89a440eec (last visited Aug. 22,
2019) (explaining Surge is sometimes referred to as a multiplier, e.g., 1.9 surge
would cost a user 1.9 times the normal rate).
184. See Alison Griswold, Does Uber’s Surge Pricing Take Unfair Advantage of
Drunk People?, SLATE (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/
2014/11/04/uber_price_surging_on_halloween_does_it_take_unfair_advantage
_of_drunk_people.html (explaining one twenty-minute ride on Halloween 2014
incurred a 9x surge and totaled $362.57).
185. @joebo1963, Uber’s New Cheat the Driver, UBERPEOPLE.NET (Mar. 25, 2018,
8:59 AM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/uber’s-new-cheat-the-driver.249588/.
186. See id. (explaining further dynamic pricing is an economic principle wherein
business vary the price of goods or services in response to which may increase
a company’s sales or profit margin).
187. See Uber Fare Estimator, supra note 51 (assuming 80%).
188. See @joebo1963, supra note 185.
189. See id.
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often, and without question, immediately credits the user’s account $5.190
Drivers cannot control whether the app charges a cancellation fee, but if the
driver cancels the ride and Uber receives $5, but pays out $4 to the driver,
plus another $5 to the rider, the company loses $4 and the Partner of course
gains $4 in the end.191
Additionally, if Uber does not automatically rebook the trip and the
rider is required to create a new ride request in the app, the rate may increase.
Of course, riders may choose to either accept the higher fee and request a
ride or decline the higher fee and secure an alternate form of transportation.
Some riders use multiple ride hailing apps, and if a ride fare increases for one
service, the requestor may be inclined to inquire and secure a ride using an-
other ride service, causing Uber to lose much more than $4. One member,
@thegiftoffish, replied to @joebo1963 and suggested retaliation if Uber ref-
uses to distribute the full surge price: “Just introduce dynamic ride length in
retaliation. For example, take a pax 1, 2 or 3 miles towards their destination
and [cancel the ride]. Just how far they’ll go, nobody knows-it’s dynamic! If
Uber wants to pay Partners for half a trip, give a pax half a trip.”192
v. Long Distance Pickups
Uber, but not Lyft, implemented long distance pickup fees to cover Part-
ners’ costs incurred when driving an exceptional distance to pick up a rider.
Partner @Seahawk3 says the fee has helped increase his profit margin.193
Partner @excel2345 replied the absence of such fee on Lyft is a deal breaker
for him because of his rural area.194 However, sometimes the Partner barely
breaks even.195 Partner @thegiftoffish believes Uber shorted him nearly $7
on a long-distance pickup fee:
I still had 13 miles and 24 minutes to go, and for this I should
have been paid $16.80 long distance pickup fee. But Uber only
190. See generally Trip Issues and Refunds, UBER, https://help.uber.com/riders/sec-
tion/trip-issues-and-refunds?nodeId=595d429d-21e4-4c75-b422-72affa33c5c8
(last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
191. See generally How are Rider Cancellation Fees Charged, UBER, https://
help.uber.com/riders/article/how-are-rider-cancellation-fees-charged-?nodeId=
eebc0564-5228-4d70-997c-0fe63f0753c2 (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
192. @TheGiftofFish, comment to Uber’s New Cheat the Driver, UBERPEOPLE.NET
(Mar. 25, 2018), https://uberpeople.net/threads/uber’s-new-cheat-the-
driver.249588/.
193. @Seahawk3, Lyft Needs Long Distant [sic] Pick Up Fees, UBERPEOPLE.NET
(Apr. 13, 2018, 5:08 AM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/lyft-needs-long-dis-
tant-pick-up-fees.253987/.
194. @Excel2345, comment to Lyft Needs Long Distant [sic] Pick Up Fees,
UBERPEOPLE.NET (Apr. 13, 2018, 5:17 AM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/lyft-
needs-long-distant-pick-up-fees.253987/.
195. See id.
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paid me for 8.31 miles and 11.82 minutes; $10.13 total. They
shorted me $6.57. Their hopelessly inaccurate initial estimate of
22 minutes caused them to overestimate the distance I should, ac-
cording to them, have [traveled] . . . .196
But @thegiftoffish197 and @BroOlomide report Uber keeps a large chunk of
the pickup costs:
For pickups from 0 Sec to 10 [minutes] - uber keeps 100 % of
distance covered plus time taken up to 10 minutes fees collected.
From [10 minutes] to arrival-Uber keeps 25% of distance covered
from 10.01 plus time (from 10.01 till arrival) fee collected; driver
keeps 75%. As usual, Uber’s take is rolled into the so called “Ser-
vice fee.”198
@BroOlomide declines rides if the pickup is slightly over 10 minutes,199 and
@excel2345 finds he barely breaks even.200
vi. Passenger issues
Rivaling compensation as a subject for driver grievances is passenger
behavior. Uber Partners in Chicago, and other cities, cannot see a rider rating
before accepting the ride request. User @ChicagoBlues states, at one time,
Partners could see rider ratings, but this changed in mid-2016.201 @Chi-
cagoBlues indicates that he tweeted Uber to ask why he could no longer see
rider ratings, calling it a safety issue: “I’ve had a couple of experiences with
bad riders recently. Is there a reason we can’t see rider ratings but they can
see ours? I’m sure I’m not the first driver to deal with these difficult rid-
ers.”202 Uber replied that the feature was “removed due to rider discrimina-
tion.”203 It is unclear whether Partners were leaving bad ratings for riders
196. @TheGiftofFish, Uber not Playing Fair with Long Distance Pickup Fees,
UBERPEOPLE.NET (Feb. 10, 2018 9:51 AM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/uber-
not-playing-fair-with-long-distance-pickup-fees.239534/.
197. See id.
198. @BroOlomide, Long Distance Fee Rip-off Explained, UBERPEOPLE.NET (Feb.
2, 2018, 10:01 AM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/long-distance-fee-rip-off-
explained.237602/.
199. Id.
200. See @Excel2345, supra note 194.
201. @ChicagoBlues, The Dark Secret of Passenger Ratings, UBERPEOPLE.NET
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based on protected characteristics such as race204 or if Partners were declin-
ing ride requests from low rated riders, but it is presumed the latter because
@ChicagoBlues further stated, “[o]f course I discriminate low rated riders
. . . shouldn’t we be able to discriminate based on low rider ratings . . .
nobody wants a 4 star drunk in their car when the bars close.”205
@ChicagoBlues believes Uber does not “care about the driver safety.
Just about the money.”206 @Unleaded cites fears of robbery and carjacking as
safety issues.207 One rider offered the Partner $500 for sex at the end of a
ride.208 In May 2017, a rider killed an Uber Partner with a machete.209 Some
drivers install dashcams in their vehicles, but the Partner pays for it.210 Uber
replied to @ChicagoBlues’s tweet by stating that they do an internal audit for
low rated riders and remove them when necessary. But is this enough?
@ChicagoBlues declares he may begin giving all riders one-star ratings to
compel Uber to sufficiently address the issue.211
Some Uber drivers also install cameras in their cars to protect them-
selves against bad reviews and false accusations.212 Partner @Qbobo re-
ceived a complaint that he was driving a vehicle other than the one registered
in his Partner account.213 Uber immediately deactivated his account and
204. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (emphasizing how Title VII protects prospective
employees from discrimination; the author merely references it for the list of
discriminatory features).
205. @ChicagoBlues, supra note 201.
206. See id.
207. @Unleaded, Crimes Against Uber Drivers Grim Reality, UBERPEOPLE.NET
(Feb. 26, 2018, 12:31 AM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/crimes-against-uber-
drivers-grim-reality.243074/#post-3660321.
208. This video was once posted on YouTube but has since been removed. It was
found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ar3ww7KHbU&app=desktop2.
Unfortunately, the page was not archived in the Wayback Machine.
209. Grace Wong & Brian L. Cox, Teen Girl Accused of Killing Uber Driver Asked
to Provide Phone Password, DNA, CHI. TRIB. (June 21, 2017), http://www.chi-
cagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-uber-driver-attacked-with-machete-
court-met-20170621-story.html.
210. See Can I Use a Video Camera?, UBER, https://help.uber.com/partners/article/
can-i-use-a-video-camera-?nodeId=efaad152-cbb6-45fe-9d7d-911842d21c8b
(last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
211. @ChicagoBlues, supra note 201.
212. Ryan is Driving, I Drive for Uber – Here Are Some of My Crazy Adventures,
YOUTUBE (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pVOJ5ZfzjF8
(showing thirteen minutes of extraordinary dash cam footage in a video which
has garnered nearly two million views).
213. @Qbobo, Passenger False Complaint; Account Deactivation, UBERPEOPLE.NET
(Mar. 28, 2018, 5:59 PM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/passenger-false-com-
plaint-account-deactivation.250405/
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called the deactivation final.214 The Partner attempted to vindicate himself by
emailing pictures of the vehicle he drove on the day in question but Uber
would not accept his story.215 Partner @5231XDMA received a one-star rat-
ing from his rider.216 The Partner maintains he greeted the rider with a “Hello
Sir” and thanked and wished him a great day at the end of the ride, but the
rider ignored him and rated him as unprofessional.217 A rider accused
@Chauffeurberg of driving while intoxicated.218 Lyft deactivated @Lu-
igi1892 for receiving too many low ratings, and like @Qbobo, Uber rendered
a final decision in this instance.219
Another Uber driver complaint is that the destination is not revealed to
the Partner receiving the ride request. If a Partner accepts a request for the
McCormick Fare, Uber does not reveal the destination until the Partner picks
up the rider. @touberornottouber wants to see the destination and estimated
revenue prior to accepting the request:220
We should have the information Uber has prior to accepting . . . so
that we can make a business decision as to whether or not we will
accept it . . . I would prefer to take no rides which pay under $8 as
part of my business strategy. I should be able to do this, but Uber
hides this information.221
@touberornottouber and others find this fundamentally unfair because it re-
stricts their ability to control their business and, as a result, their earnings.222
Moreover, drivers indicate Uber retains a larger percentage of short fares.223
214. See id.
215. Id.
216. @5231XDMA, It Finally Happened to Me: A 1 Star and Complaint for Profes-




218. @Chauffeurberg, Falsely Reported for Impaired Driving!?, UBERPEOPLE.NET
(Mar. 25, 2018, 12:18 AM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/falsely-reported-for-
impaired-driving.151466/.
219. See @Luigi1892, Deactivated, UBERPEOPLE.NET (Dec. 17, 2017, 11:12 AM),
https://uberpeople.net/threads/deactivated.226414/.
220. @touberornottouber, We Should Be Allowed to See the Destination and Esti-





223. See @Nuber-le, We Should Be Allowed to See the Destination and Estimated
Revenue Prior to Accepting the Ping!, UBERPEOPLE.NET (Mar. 24, 2018, 11:02
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@Nuber-le transported a passenger five blocks and earned only $2.17 of a $6
fare.224 @Nats121 believes Partners are poorly paid.225 @dirtylee said Uber
and Lyft once shared destinations with Partners.226
b. AmazonFlex
The indeed.com message board for AmazonFlex227 showed many com-
plaints highlighting:
• Rude, disrespectful warehouse personnel;
• Insufficient time to deliver all the packages;
• Often getting sent home without work because of insufficient pack-
ages during scheduled work block;
• Inability to earn sufficient compensation;
• Unreliable GPS software; and
• Inadequate on-road support.228
The overall tenor of the comments was positive, however, emphasizing
working whenever the driver wants, being your own boss, and not having to
pick up strangers.
You can make a decent living if you don’t mind putting a couple
hundred miles a day on your car, and dealing with a LOT of
problems that should be fixed by now. I’ll detail below:
App is wrong about 5% of the time. . . . I’ve had an hour of a 3 hr
route WASTED because the app routed me 25 minutes AWAY
from the correct location. The employees at the pickup are very hit
or miss. . . . [t]he staff WOULD NOT HELP YOU. There’d be
10+ people talking to each other, eating donuts, listening to head-
phones, and ONE person actually working (putting 30-50+ drivers




225. @Nats121, comment to We Should Be Allowed to See the Destination and Esti-
mated Revenue Prior to Accepting the Ping!, UBERPEOPLE.NET (Mar. 24, 2018,
11:48 AM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/we-should-be-allowed-to-see-the-
destination-and-estimated-revenue-prior-to-accepting-the-ping.249383/.
226. @dirtylee, comment to We Should Be Allowed to See the Destination and Esti-
mated Revenue Prior to Accepting the Ping!, UBERPEOPLE.NET (Mar. 24, 2018,
1:46 PM), https://uberpeople.net/threads/we-should-be-allowed-to-see-the-des-
tination-and-estimated-revenue-prior-to-accepting-the-ping.249383/.
227. See generally Delivery Driver/Warehouse (Current Employee) – Indianapolis,
IN, Terrible Experience, INDEED (July 29, 2018), https://www.indeed.com/
cmp/Amazon-Flex/reviews?fcountry=US&floc=Indianapolis%2C+IN.
228. Id.
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The app is UNFORGIVING about tardiness. Never mind the fact
that you CAN’T start earlier than 15 mins beforehand. Never
mind the fact that I’ve had to wait until MORE THAN AN HOUR
after my route was supposed to start before, because the amazon
employees were backed up and/or not doing their jobs. If you are
5 mins late, you lose the route, and wasted the drive (in my case
45mins) to the depot . . . .
The app breaks constantly. I’ve had it dump routes on me three
times now. . . routes I was in the middle of . . . .
All in all, it’s a mixed bag . . . . On avg, it probably works out to
where I’m getting paid for my time from pickup @ the depot to
my last drop-off . . . so as long as I don’t have any undeliverables
I must take back to the depot, the pay is fair. Once you take out
the cost of gas, and travel time to and from the depot, you make
around $10–20/hr . . . . but you do put a ton of wear on your
vehicle.229
c. YouTube Posts
Former driver Marc Freccero commented on his experience:
After driving for Uber & Lyft for a few years, doing hundreds of
rides, I’ve officially stopped. While this is mostly due to my DJ/
Music Production and Entrepreneurship career taking off, there
are a lot of reasons why I started to become frustrated with
Ridesharing. These reasons not only apply to Uber & Lyft, but
just about any other ridesharing app as well. I do want to say that I
like Uber & Lyft, and it really helped me balance time with other
endeavors while driving.230
Marc Freccero’s YouTube video identifies seven “things I am not especially
fond of”:
(1) You do not make as much money as before—3 times less than
the $60 per hour I could make in Boston a couple of years
ago, exacerbated by Lyft Line and Uber Pool;
(2) Zero raises and no upward mobility; bonuses are the same for
everybody; no credit for experience or longevity with Uber or
Lyft;
(3) “Taxes are a nightmare”; same as other independent contrac-
tor gigs; not like W-2 employment;
229. Flex Driver/Associate (Current Employee) – Philadelphia, PA, Nice Pay If You
Can Put Up with the MANY Drawbacks, INDEED (Mar. 25, 2018), https://www
.indeed.com/cmp/Amazon-Flex/reviews?fcountry=ALL.
230. Marc Freccero, The 7 Reasons Why I STOPPED Driving for Uber & Lyft,
YOUTUBE (May 12, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZHCiIJfnt1c.
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(4) You can’t drive anytime; you can, but there are only four
times when you can make a lot of money: 7–9 AM, 5–7 PM,
Friday and Saturday nights, and Saturday and Sunday during
the day; Friends that work 8-to-6 jobs and want to go out on
Friday and Saturday nights can’t make a lot of money; may
not be worth it, considering gas, maintenance, and deprecia-
tion on your car;
(5) Call logistics, such as finding a place to go to the bathroom,
eating, sitting for hours or days without being able to stand or
stretch;
(6) Legal implications involving insurance, employer versus inde-
pendent contractor, commercial plates, licenses;
(7) (the most frustrating thing) no pay for drive time to pickup,
even if she cancels, despite modest cancellation fee of only
$5-10, much less than surge rate.
“It’s still a great way to supplement your income,” he says. His note to the
video concludes with the links to sign up for Lyft and Uber.231
d. Henry Campbell’s The Rideshare Guide
Uber and Lyft drivers have published a number of small books summa-
rizing their experiences and offering tips to other Uber drivers. Harry Camp-
bell’s The Ride Share Guide232 is the most popular based on Amazon
rankings. Campbell calculates average gross earnings as consistent with the
author’s experience233 but ranging higher, probably because of his more ef-
fective and experienced pursuit of bonus opportunities, such as surge pric-
ing.234 He reports moderate levels of satisfaction by drivers, who generally
like Lyft better than Uber.235 He agrees with the author that driver support is
weak from both enterprises236 and recommends dashcams to protect drivers
from passenger misbehavior.237
231. Id.
232. HARRY CAMPBELL, THE RIDE SHARE GUIDE (2018); see also RICHARD GUTIER-
REZ, DRIVING FOR UBER (2017).
233. See infra Sec. III.D.1.f.
234. CAMPBELL, supra note 232, at 3 (showing table of gross earnings—not deduct-
ing fuel or maintenance— ranging from $16.19 to $33.16 per hour).
235. Id. at 4, 14–15 (reporting 75.8 percent of drivers satisfied with Lyft; 49.4 per-
cent satisfied with Uber and stating generally Lyft has better relationship with
drivers; Uber has better relationship with passengers).
236. Id. at 32–33 (reporting uneven driver support from both Uber and Lyft).
237. Id. at 26–27 (recommending purchase of dashcams).
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e. Driver Interviews
The author convened a small focus group of Uber and Lyft drivers on
April 15, 2018. Prompted by a list of some thirty-five questions, the drivers
discussed their experiences. They saw little need for regulation of the rela-
tionship between drivers and the platforms. They expressed concern that al-
most any form of regulation would be likely to restrict the flexibility that
drew them to Lyft and Uber in the first place. One of them said “you get out
of it what you put into it.” The participants had little patience for the driver
complaints on the message boards. They saw little role for collective bargain-
ing. “Drivers easily can switch from Uber to Lyft and vice versa if they are
unhappy, or qualify to drive a cab or do something else. The companies are
quite responsive to driver concerns. They’ve changed a lot already in re-
sponse to driver complaints and suggestions.”
The group talked about estimating turnover and realized that it’s made
more difficult in the Uber and Lyft context because no one ever really quits.
A driver may stop driving for an extended period of time—a year or more—
and then go back to it. He does not get de-activated because of inactivity. He
remains on the rolls as a driver but is not performing any service. They found
the levels of earnings reasonable. They estimated they made about $18 an
hour when they worked hard, especially if they strategically earned bonuses
and sought out surge pricing. An important limitation on surge pricing, how-
ever, is that the surge designation often disappears before a driver can get
there, as other drivers rush to the area as well.
All of the participants drove part-time and viewed their TNP work as
supplemental. Accordingly, the absence of benefits did not matter much.
They did not expect benefits. On the other hand, they speculated that one
would have to work really hard to earn a living wage driving full-time as the
only source of employment. One of the participants, a young engineer, drove
for forty hours at one point and found being confined in the car and stuck
behind the wheel for so long physically taxing. “It would be desirable for
drivers to be able to earn at least minimum wage, but you would have to
restrict the number of drivers in order to achieve that.”
None of the participants were interested in driving for AmazonFlex,
Domino’s, or Pizza Hut because those platforms would require them to com-
mit in advance to substantial blocks of time and it was the flexibility of
scheduling that drew them to the gig driver markets in the first place. None
of the participants recalled any significant disputes with passengers. In one
instance, a driver had to ask passengers to get out of his car because they had
run him back-and-forth over a considerable distance trying to find a destina-
tion different from the address they had entered into the software. They of-
fered no resistance and got out when he asked them to, although they were
angry. “The software app is okay, but it occasionally sends me to the wrong
address for pickup.”
The experience with accidents and insurance coverage was far less satis-
factory. Two of the drivers had been involved in accidents. In one case, an-
other driver broadsided the Uber vehicle at an intersection. In the other case,
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a Lyft passenger opened the door into a bicyclist. The intersection accident
was handled more smoothly than the bicyclist accident. In the case of the
intersection accident, the Uber driver reported it to Uber’s insurance carrier
(James River), and the insurance covered vehicle repair, less the deductible.
Whatever further controversy occurred did not require the involvement of the
Uber driver. In the case of the bicyclist, however, the Lyft insurer initially
took the position that it was not going to cover the claim; that the driver had
to look towards her own private insurer. That insurer disclaimed coverage
because the accident occurred while the insured was driving for Lyft and had
a passenger in the car. It took many phone calls, emails, and the informal
involvement of a lawyer friend for the Lyft carrier finally to concede
coverage.
“My roommate had an accident,” one of the other participants said, “and
it was so much of a hassle to get Uber to let him substitute a rental car while
his was being repaired that he gave up.” “In ten years, there won’t be any
more Uber or Lyft drivers; all ride hailing vehicles will be self-driving,” one
participant said. Separately, a delivery person for Domino’s told the author:
I drive for Domino’s three times a week and occasionally for
Uber. I make a lot more money driving for Domino’s, because I
make two dollars for every mile. It’s only about $.50 per mile for
Uber. The thing about Uber is that it beats up your car. In order to
make out with Uber you have to qualify for bonuses, but that
means you have to drive during rush hour traffic in Chicago or at
to the airport at rush hour, and that is stressful.238
f. Author Experience Driving for Uber and Lyft
To collect data for this article, the author signed up to become both an
Uber and Lyft driver in April 2018.239 Since qualifying, he has given a num-
ber of passenger rides on both services. When the driver logs out, the appli-
cation asks if he is going home and wants a fare in the same direction. Initial
Uber earnings for two trips were $26.18, or about $13.00 per hour plus a
$20.00 tip. The author was logged in from 9 AM to just before 11 AM,
performing other functions inside, while waiting for a ride order.
The Lyft software and driver support are significantly better than the
Uber software and support. The author sent several questions to the Uber
driver support link and typically had to wait a day or more for an answer. He
once responded to a promotion seeking a delivery driver and was told that he
would receive an email, which never came. Subsequently, he was asked to
confirm his agreement with a delivery driver agreement. A week later he still
had received nothing further to enable him to begin deliveries. Uber’s
software also has many blind alleys in its navigation alternatives. The Uber
238. Conversation between author and anonymous Domino’s delivery driver, about
forty-five years old, Apr. 13, 2018 5:05 PM.
239. See infra Section II.A (describing author’s signup experience).
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app is quite slow to calculate earnings and update time online. For instance,
the author gave a ride to a customer at about 3:30 on a Sunday afternoon and
it took more than an hour for the trip to be reflected on his earnings and on-
duty summary. The app screen is cluttered with promotions that take up half
the screen.
Lyft, on the other hand, responded within an hour to a question regard-
ing a glitch in Lyft’s software. This arose due to a message notifying him to
get his car inspected, but there were no inspectors available in his region—
Chicago! But he had his car inspected just two days earlier, uploaded the
inspection form, and received an automated acknowledgement that the in-
spection was complete. The response to his query confirmed that the inspec-
tion part of the activation process was complete. While driver support
functions exist for both services, communications for driver support person-
nel are robotic and generally unresponsive to specific driver issues.240 They
offer several emails, text messages, and pop-up notifications in the apps each
day, which focus on tips for increasing earnings. Both services have driver
advisory councils, with a representative selected regionally, and both make a
big show of modifying policies and their apps to respond to driver requests
and concerns.241 Both apps are excellent in the ways in which they connect
drivers with passengers, assist drivers in navigating to pick up spots and des-
tinations, and advise drivers of their earnings for each ride. Both are some-
what clumsier in facilitating direct driver-to-passenger communications, such
as when a driver and passenger cannot find each other for a pickup.
The basic compensation structure is generally fair and transparent. It
compensates drivers for excessive wait times and compensates them even
when a passenger cancels a trip.242 Even without chasing bonuses or surge
pricing, the author was consistently able to earn about $15.00 per hour while
on-duty by driving sporadically, mostly at non-rush-hour times.243 Despite
his infrequent and irregular driving, the author experienced no adverse ac-
tions or communications from either Uber or Lyft. Uber sent a number of
messages encouraging more driving, which might be occasioned by the au-
thors sparse record, but these messages are purely in the form of inducements
240. In one case, the author inquired about non-receipt of the Uber trade dress; in
another instance, he raised a question about inconsistent display of passenger
names in the Lyft Driver application.
241. Christian Perea, Lyft’s Driver Advisory Council Is Helping Lyft Build Better
Things For Drivers, THE RIDESHARE GUY (May 18, 2018) https://therideshare
guy.com/lyfts-driver-advisory-council-is-helping-lyft-build-better-things-for-
drivers/; Building Together in 2018, UBER https://www.uber.com/us/en/c/180-
days/feedback-and-improvement/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
242. How are Rider Cancellation Fees Charged?, UBER HELP, https://help.uber
.com/partners/article/how-are-rider-cancellation-fees-charged-?nodeId=eebc05
64-5228-4d70-997c-0fe63f0753c2 (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
243. This rate includes wait and searching times; the rate per hour when carrying
passengers is higher. See Uber Fare Estimator, supra note 51.
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to drive more rather than threats. The author, who is not only a helicopter and
airplane pilot but also a skilled driver, found that he drove especially care-
fully, more vigilant than usual about speed limit and another traffic regula-
tions, when he had passengers in the car. He did not want to create anxiety in
any passenger. He also expected that law-enforcement officers target ride-
hailing vehicles, especially within the city limits of Chicago where the city
government has generally been hostile to Uber and Lyft.244
2. Conflicts Between Workers and Customers
Conflicts with customers are an important source of driver grievance,
and as the empirical evidence synthesized in this subsection will reveal, gig
platforms like Uber and Lyft that link workers and customers directly are
vulnerable to these types of grievances. Viewing such grievances as evidence
of misallocation of resources or inequitable distribution of wealth is perilous.
However, favoring drivers tilts the playing field against passengers and vice
versa. Both drivers and passengers have claims for consideration by regula-
tors.245 Branding and protecting the brand, moreover, are important parts of
the business model. Passengers are willing to summon Uber or Lyft because
they believe the software will succeed in summoning a vehicle. They believe
that they will not be endangered or cheated by the driver. This is possible
because Uber and Lyft maintain reputations in the consumer community and
they have internal procedures which ensure their drivers fulfill customer ex-
pectations.246 These processes help the companies maintain and reinforce
their reputations. The success of most enterprises depends on keeping their
customers happy.
Customer satisfaction is more nuanced and subjective in service indus-
tries than in tangible-product industries. If a bolt of cloth or length of steel
rail is defective, that fact can be determined without much ambiguity. But
when the product is a haircut or a ride from point to point in urban traffic,
whether the job has been performed satisfactorily is more contestable.
Consumers would prefer to deal with an enterprise where “the customer
is always right.”247 An enterprise that takes the side of its personnel against
that of its customers is less attractive in the market. This presents a particular
dilemma for service enterprises that serve consumers. Delivery of a service
244. Jason Knowles & Ann Pistone, Chicago Traffic Jams Caused by Rideshare
Rule Breakers; City Cracks Down with Tickets, ABC, INC. (May 23, 2018),
https://abc7chicago.com/automotive/chicago-traffic-jams-caused-by-rideshare-
rule-breakers;-city-cracks-down-with-tickets/3514361/.
245. See Uber Community Guidelines, UBER LEGAL, https://www.uber.com/legal/
community-guidelines/us-can-en/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
246. See id.
247. Blake Morgan, A Global View Of ‘The Customer Is Always Right’, FORBES
(Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/blakemorgan/2018/09/24/a-
global-view-of-the-customer-is-always-right/#4ffc3d3e236f.
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rather than a tangible product opens up the possibility of more ambiguous
claims of dissatisfaction than would be credible with a tangible product. That
consumers are the buyers rather than other businesses generally means
smaller transactions, which in turn means lower tolerance for more elaborate
dispute resolution protocols. At the same time, however, an enterprise for
whom the consumer is always right may have difficulty obtaining and moti-
vating personnel to serve its customers, as the analysis of TNP driver griev-
ances indicated.248 Even if workers are willing to affiliate with the enterprise,
they may engage in a variety of guerrilla tactics that alienate customers.
Many of the driver comments, quoted in the subsection on driver forum and
blog posts, indicate driver threats to engage in such behavior.249 Some of the
threats are, no doubt, carried out.
A steel rolling mill operative’s attitude toward customers does not mat-
ter much because layers of marketing and sales personnel intervene between
the making of the product and the interface with the customer. When the
product is a haircut, a ride, or physical therapy, a worker providing these
services is the face of the enterprise to the customer; the enterprise has no
identity, except for the worker. Accordingly, in service industries, which now
make up about 80% of the American economy,250 customer dissatisfaction is
indistinguishable from dissatisfaction focused on the worker. If the company
always sides with its employee, it will damage its reputation in the consumer
community. If the company always sides with the customer, it will under-
mine employee relations. This creates a dilemma for ride-hailing services and
encourages implementation of dispute resolution procedures that are per-
ceived by both sides as being fair and convenient. Company trials—quasi-
lawsuit proceedings—may be used to resolve factual disputes, like they were
used in passenger railroading at its heyday.251 An employee who contests a
customer’s version of the facts is likely to want exactly that, something re-
sembling collectively bargained arbitration preceded by a trial type proceed-
ing before a company officer.
On the other hand, a customer filing a complaint is unlikely to be molli-
fied by hearing that he must appear somewhere at a company hearing and
present evidence. Driver complaints show that current procedures are not suf-
ficiently transparent to be perceived as fair by drivers.252 Some drivers allege
248. See supra Sec. III.D.1.
249. See Uber Driver Forum, UBERPEOPLE.NET, https://uberpeople.net/ (last visited
Aug. 22, 2019).
250. John Ward, The Services Sector: How Best to Measure It?, INT’L TRADE AD-
MIN., https://2016.trade.gov/publications/ita-newsletter/1010/services-sector-
how-best-to-measure-it.asp (last updated Jan. 19, 2017).
251. See Feldleit v. Long Island R.R., 723 F. Supp. 892, 894 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (sum-
marizing details of company trial by railroad).
252. See Chris Coffey, Rideshare Drivers Fight Back Against ‘Bogus’ Rider Com-
plaints, NBCUNIVERSAL (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.nbcchicago.com/investi-
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that the TNPs refuse to disclose the details of a passenger complaint, al-
though notice is a fundamental starting point for any system providing due
process.253 Others claim TNPs regularly refuse to believe driver-submitted
evidence.254 The criticisms are unlikely to be resolved by tweaking the inves-
tigatory and disciplinary systems. Experience shows that losers of adjudica-
tions complain about process.
An interesting possibility worthy of further consideration, however, is to
equip workplaces where workers interact with customers with video cameras,
as suggested in Section IV.G.255 Then, if disputes arise as to what actually
happened between customer and worker, the video recording will help re-
solve the dispute. Any such proposal will likely be met by an outcry over the
invasion of privacy. But it is hard to understand a customer’s claim of an
expectation of privacy when he gets into a vehicle with a driver whom he
does not know and who has no obligation to keep what he hears or observes
private. Similarly, it is hard to understand how a driver has any expectation
of privacy from a customer who has a plain view of him and is under no
obligation to keep the details of the ride private.
3. Psychology of Feeling Mistreated
Just because workers complain does not mean that the law should force
a change in their objective work conditions. Complaining about one’s boss
and one’s job is a common way of dealing with inevitable minor sources of
stress. Professors Boswell and Olsen-Buchanan explored feelings of mistreat-
ment at work.256 They studied the relationship between these feelings and the
filing of grievances, along with two kinds of withdrawal.257 The types of
withdrawal include: considering leaving the employer (exit-related with-
drawal) and on-the-job alienation (work withdrawal) such as tardiness, ab-
senteeism, shirking, making excuses to go somewhere to get out of work,
unfocused attention, and skipping meetings.258 The investigators controlled






255. See infra Section IV.G.
256. Wendy R. Boswell & Julie B. Olsen-Buchanan, Experiencing Mistreatment at
Work: The Role of Grievance Filing, Nature of Mistreatment, and Employee
Withdrawal, 47 ACAD. OF MGT. J. 129, 133 (2004).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 136.
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Generally, the investigators found that feeling mistreated had a statisti-
cally significant association with exit-related withdrawal.260 The investigators
classified types of mistreatment generally into personalized and policy -re-
lated mistreatment. Within the policy-related group were claims of unfair
hiring processes, demotion in rank, and rebukes for improper attire.261 Exam-
ples of personalized mistreatment included being disliked by supervisor, be-
ing accused of taking sick leave without being sick, and open embarrassment.
Generally, these types of mistreatment are captured by the colloquialism “be-
ing disrespected.”262
Employees who experienced personalized mistreatment were more
likely to engage in work withdrawal behavior than employees reporting pol-
icy-related mistreatment or those reporting no mistreatment.263 Employees
experiencing policy related mistreatment were more likely to engage in exit-
related withdrawal.264 The personalized and policy related mistreatment
groups did not differ in their levels of exit-related withdrawal; in other
words, mistreatment generally, regardless of its nature, correlated with exit-
related withdrawal.265 The study concluded that the availability of grievance
mechanisms had no statistically significant effect on withdrawal behavior.266
The conclusion is that grievance systems do not significantly help in promot-
ing employee satisfaction.267 That suggests that TNP enterprises will benefit
little from investing energy in improved grievance handling systems. On the
other hand, the tendency of unhappy drivers to exit, and the ease of doing so,
means that the problem tends to be self-correcting.
IV. REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES
A. Supply and Demand
Debate over supply and demand in labor markets is an old one. Oppo-
nents of each new proposal for regulating labor markets have warned that
driving up the price of labor will reduce demand for workers and lead to
unemployment.268 They also argued that restricting the terms on which some-
260. Id. at 134.
261. Id. at 133.
262. Boswell & Olsen-Buchanan, supra note 258, at 133.
263. Id. at 136.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 135.
266. Id. at 134.
267. Id.
268. Cary Coglianese, Regulation and Unemployment, WHARTON U. PENN., https://
publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/issue-brief/v1n3.php (last visited Aug. 22,
2019).
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one may work interferes with individual freedom to contract.269 Despite these
warnings, governments have consistently, though sporadically, intervened to
set floors under the terms and conditions of employment.270 Society prospers,
despite these regulatory interventions.271 Almost always, legally prescribed
labor standards have been limited to statutory employees; workers classified
as independent contractors have been left to fend for themselves.272 Critics of
gig labor markets argue minimum worker standards are part of the overall
Social Compact, and that leaving people to fend for themselves is immoral.273
A couple of underlying phenomena define how a regulated market will
operate. Mandating that Uber drivers earn minimum compensation will re-
duce the overall demand for Uber drivers.274 Either the platform providers
cannot earn an acceptable rate of return on their investment by having the
same number of drivers while paying them more, or passengers will use other
alternatives when they are forced to pay more for Uber.275 Increasing com-
pensation indirectly, by restricting the supply of drivers,276 will directly de-
prive some job seekers of work until a vacancy occurs. The effect is the
government saying to a potential worker, “I don’t care what you find as an
acceptable wage level; its’s not good for you to work for less than the mini-
mum, and we are not going to let you do it.”
B. State and Municipal Responses
The most significant variables in distinguishing the various regulatory
schemes are:
269. See Should the Federal Minimum Wage be Increased?, PROCON.ORG (Aug. 25,
2015), https://minimum-wage.procon.org/.
270. Summary of the Major Laws of the Department of Labor, U.S. DEPT. LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/majorlaws (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
271. See Graham Boone, Labor Law Highlights, 1915–2015, MONTHLY LABOR
REV. (Oct. 2015), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2015/article/pdf/labor-law-
highlights-1915-2015.pdf.
272. See Summary of the Major Laws of the Department of Labor, supra note 272.
273. See Thomas Kochan, Wages and the Social Contract, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 22,
2007), https://prospect.org/article/wages-and-social-contract.
274. See Alison Griswold, Simple Economics Explain Why Driving for Uber Will
Never be a Great Job, QUARTZ (Nov. 14, 2017), https://qz.com/1129367/driv-
ing-for-uber-will-never-be-a-great-job-thanks-to-these-simple-economics/.
275. Id.
276. The law can restrict the supply of drivers either by limiting the numbers who
can be registered in a platform’s network, by limiting the numbers who can
receive mandatory licenses from the governing entity, or by restricting the
numbers of vehicles. Control of the supply of taxicabs traditionally has been
effected by limiting the numbers of vehicles. See Hannah A. Posen, Note,
Ridesharing in the Sharing Economy: Should Regulators Impose ¨Uber Regula-
tions on Uber?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 405, 409 (2016).
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• Requirements for minimum levels of compensation;
• Regulation of supply – perhaps the most important variable defining
taxi regulation;
• Insurance requirements;
• Requirements for a higher level of driver’s license; and
• Higher intensity background checks.277
Most detailed ride-hailing regulation occurs at the municipal level, as an ex-
tension of the tradition that cities regulate taxicabs.278 Some states have en-
acted legislation directly regulating the industry, or explicitly setting the
terms under which municipalities can regulate it. The following subsections
consider both state and municipal regulation in each of the enumerated states.
1. New York
New York City has some of the most stringent regulations in the coun-
try for ride-hailing services, which give rise to for-profit intermediaries to
help drivers navigate the regulatory thicket for licenses, vehicles, and insur-
ance.279 New York City is actively considering a minimum wage requirement
for Uber and Lyft drivers, which would result in a pay floor equivalent to
$15.00 per hour.280 Despite reports that imposition of the requirement was
imminent, the de Blasio administration pulled back and claimed the proposal
was under review, along with others to benefit ride-hailing drivers.281 The
proposal was touted as help for yellow cab drivers by the head of the taxi
commission and a proponent of the proposal: “Help for yellow drivers is a
277. See Robert Hahn & Robert Metcalfe, The Ridesharing Revolution: Economic
Survey and Synthesis, Brookings, BROOKINGS (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www
.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/ridesharing-oup-1117-v6-brook-
ings1.pdf.
278. See Leigh Anne Schriever, Uber and Lyft Lobby Their Way to Deregulation
and Preemption, REGULATORY REV. (June 28, 2018), https://www.thereg
review.org/2018/06/28/schriever-uber-lyft-lobby-deregulation-preemption/.
279. Emma G. Fitzsimmons & Noam Scheiber, New York City Considers New Pay
Rules for Uber Drivers, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/07/02/nyregion/uber-drivers-pay-nyc.html.
280. “If a driver’s earnings fall below $17.22 per hour over the course of a week, the
companies would be required to make up the difference.” Id.
281. Dana Rubenstein, Report Advocating a Minimum Wage for Uber Drivers
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big focus of ours right now.”282 New York City is also considering, for the
second time, a limit on the number of ride-hailing vehicles in the city.283
2. Colorado
Colorado was one of the first states to adopt regulations specifically for
TNCs.284 Its regulations, promulgated by the state public utilities commis-
sion, are intended to encourage Uber, Lyft, and other such platforms to oper-
ate in Denver and other cities in the state.285
3. Massachusetts
On August 5, 2016, Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker approved a
statute enacted by the Massachusetts General Court (the legislature)286 as a
compromise between the positions of Uber and Lyft and the positions of the
taxicab medallion holders.287
4. Georgia
The Georgia General Assembly adopted House Bill 225 in September
2016.288 The bill “creates a new framework that allows [Uber and Lyft] to
grow with light regulation and common-sense policies.”289 It requires ride-
282. Id.
283. Emma G. Fitzsimmons & William Neuman, This Time It’s Uber’s Turn to
Wage an Uphill Battle, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/07/27/nyregion/uber-nyc-cap-city-council.html (reviewing politics of pro-
posal for a one-year moratorium on new Uber and Lyft licenses quoting Mayor
de Blasio and Council speaker Johnson as supporting it).
284. See Niraj Chokshi, Colorado Expected to Pass the First State Law Regulating
UberX and Lyft, WASH. POST (May 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/05/20/colorado-expected-to-pass-the-first-state-
law-regulating-uber-and-lyft/?utm_term=.60362574303f.
285. Regulation of Carrier Services and Transportation Network Companies, LEG.
COUNCIL STAFF 2, table 1 (Jan. 9, 2017) (citing Section 40-1-102(3) C.R.S.; 4
C.C.R. 723-6 (6208–6215), https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/17up-
date_memo_on_regulation_of_carrier_service_and_tncs.pdf (comparing levels
of PUC oversight for taxis, other common carriers, and TNCs)).
286. H.R. 4570, 190th Gen. Court of the Commonwealth of Mass. (2015–2016).
287. See Shira Schoenberg, Gov. Charles Baker Signs Law Regulating Uber and
Lyft In Massachusetts, MASS. LIVE (Aug. 5, 2016), http://www.masslive.com/
politics/index.ssf/2016/08/gov_charlie_baker_signs_law_regulating_uber_and_
lyft_in_massachusetts.html.
288. 40 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-1-190–40-1-200 (2015).
289. Janel Davis, Georgia Senate Passes Bill Regulating Uber, Lyft, ATL. J. CONST.
(Sept. 24, 2016), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/
georgia-senate-passes-bill-regulating-uber-lyft/tHXGqEKw5CyWqrJv4duijI/
(quoting senate sponsor Brandon Beach).
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hailing services to register with the Department of Public Safety, for a fee not
exceeding $100.00.290 Registered services must maintain a list of drivers
within their networks,291 provide state insurance coverage,292 and provide
drivers with digital information available on the their smart phones. Drivers
must make this information available to a law enforcement officer who has
“reasonable suspicion” of improper operation.293 The bill preempts municipal
regulation.294 It requires background checks of drivers, but allows the ride-
hailing service to obtain them based on information provided by the driver.295
It also requires proof of liability insurance.296 The Georgia Supreme Court
upheld the statute in Abramyan v. State of Georgia297 against claims by taxi
medallion owners that the lighter regulation of ride-hailing programs consti-
tuted a taking and inverse condemnation of their property interest in their
medallions.298 The case engendered little sympathy among lawmakers.299
5. Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 984 in 2016 to
regulate TNCs.300 The statute empowers the parking authorities of cities of
the first class (which includes only Philadelphia) to regulate TNCs.301 TNCs
must be registered, for a fee of $50,000.00. It imposes insurance require-
ments on TNC drivers, or on TNCs “on the driver’s behalf,” that meet speci-
290. 40 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-1-90–40-1-200 (2015).
291. Id. § 40-1-193(b).
292. Id. § 40-1-193(c)(4).
293. Id. § 40-1-193(d).
294. Abramyan v. State of Georgia, 800 S.E.2d 366, 367–68 (Ga. 2017) (noting
statutory preemption of local regulation).
295. 40 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-39(e).
296. Id. § 40-5-39(e)(4)(F).
297. Abramyan, 800 S.E.2d at 369 n.3 (citing Minneapolis Taxi Owners Coalition,
572 F.3d 502, 509 (II)(A) (8th Cir. 2009); Ill. Transp. Trade Ass’n v. City of
Chi., 839 F.3d 594, 596–97 (7th Cir. 2016)).
298. Id. at 367 (describing claims).
299. “I don’t know what the hell they’ve got to sue for. We didn’t take anything. If
their medallions lost value, it is because of an outdated system.” Nick Sibilla,
Georgia Supreme Court Rules Taxis Must Compete With Uber, Have No Right
to an ‘Unalterable Monopoly’, INST. FOR JUSTICE (May 18, 2017), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2017/05/18/georgia-supreme-court-rules-
taxis-must-compete-with-uber-have-no-right-to-an-unalterable-monopoly/2/
#23025c707264 (quoting state representative Alan Powell).
300. Act of Nov. 4, 2016, Pub. L. 1222, No. 164, Sess. of 2016, No. 2016-164,
codified in 53 Pa. C.S.A. § 5701 (definitions), §§ 57A01–57A22 (chap. 57A—
Transportation Network Companies).
301. Id. § 57A03 (giving parking authority jurisdiction to issue TNC licenses).
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fied coverage limits.302 It limits TNC vehicles to those less than ten model
years old303 and requires regular vehicle inspection, plus random inspection
of vehicles based on levels of use.304 It prohibits the authority from requiring
a driver’s license separate from the individual’s driver’s license.305 It requires
TNCs to obtain background checks306 and to issue digital driver creden-
tials.307 General authorization to operate as a TNC or a TNC driver does not
extend to the airport308 or to the Amtrak station.309 One year after enactment,
intense controversy continues over the content of the regulation.310
6. San Francisco
Uber and Lyft are regulated at the state level by the California Public
Utilities Commission, while taxis are regulated by cities or counties.311 The
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) oversees statewide policies
for TNCs and is currently engaged in Phase III of a rulemaking process to
refine regulations for these companies.312 In addition to existing state regula-
tions, there are local business registration requirements and airport permit
requirements in place in San Francisco.313 It has been estimated that as many
as 45,000 TNC drivers may operate in San Francisco.314
302. Id. § 57A07.
303. Id. § 57A08(a).
304. Id. § 57A09.
305. Id. § 57A12(a).
306. 53 Pa. C.S.A. § 57A12(c).
307. Id. § 57A15.
308. Id. § 57A16(n).
309. Id. § 57A16(o).
310. See Jason Laughlin, Philly’s For-Hire Drivers Vent Their Rage About Uber
and Lyft, But Fixes Not Likely, PHIL. INQUIRER (Sept. 1, 2017), http://www
.philly.com/philly/business/transportation/ppa-uber-lyft-regulate-20170831
.html (noting controversy over further regulation of ride-hailing services by
Philadelphia Parking Authority).
311. Adopting Rules and Regulations to Protect Safety While Allowing New En-
trants to the Transportation Industry, Decision 13-09-045, at 65, 71 (Cal. Pub.
Util. Comm’n Sept. 19, 2013), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Pub-
lished/G000/M077/K192/77192335.pdf.
312. S.F. CTY. TRANSP. AUTH., THE TNC REGULATORY LANDSCAPE: AN OVERVIEW




314. Id. at 9.
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TNCs are required to complete national criminal background checks of
all prospective drivers.315 They must exclude any drivers who have been con-
victed within the past seven years of driving under the influence of drugs or
alcohol, fraud, sexual offenses, use of a motor vehicle to commit a felony,
theft, or acts of terror.316 In California, each vehicle must undergo a nineteen-
point vehicle inspection before service annually or every 50,000 miles.317
TNCs must establish a driver training program to ensure that drivers are
safely operating their vehicles prior to offering service,318 and drivers are
allowed to drive a maximum of ten hours, which resets after an eight-hour
rest period.319 TNCs in California are required to maintain commercial liabil-
ity insurance policies, providing not less than $1 million per-incident cover-
age, for incidents involving vehicles and drivers while they are providing
TNC services.320 TNC drivers are required to provide proof of the TNC’s
commercial insurance in the event of a collision.321 On October 4, 2017, the
CPUC issued a proposed decision declining to require TNCs to conduct fin-
gerprint (biometric) criminal background checks for its drivers.322
San Francisco city law requires TNC drivers operating in San Francisco
to obtain a local business license.323 All businesses, including TNC drivers,
are required to renew the Business Registration Certificates annually and pay
a tax ($91.00 for drivers with $100,000 or less in San Francisco gross re-
ceipts) if they expect to drive on San Francisco streets for seven or more days
that year.324 Furthermore, San Francisco International Airport (SFO) issues
315. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5445.2(a)(1) (West Supp. 2019).
316. Phase III.B. Issue: Criminal Background for Transp. Network Co. Drivers, De-
cision 17-11-010, at 13 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Nov. 9, 2017), http://
docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M199/K073/199073743.pdf.
317. Phase II Issues and Reserving Additional Issues for Resolution in Phase III,
Decision 16-04-041, at 55 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Apr. 21, 2016), http://
docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M161/K474/161474505.pdf.
318. THE TNC REGULATORY LANDSCAPE, supra note 314, at 4.
319. Id. at 6.
320. Phase II Issues, Decision 16-04-041, at 56.
321. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5442 (West Supp. 2019).
322. THE TNC REGULATORY LANDSCAPE, supra note 314, at 3.
323. Id. at 1 n.3 (“Most state constitutions permit local jurisdictions to develop their
own regulatory ordinances in areas where state and federal governments have
not explicitly established exclusive regulatory power, provided that those ordi-
nances do not conflict with state or federal laws.”).
324. See S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX REGULATIONS CODE art. 6, § 6.2-12(h) (2018),
http://library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/California/business/businessandtax
regulationscode?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:sanfrancisco_ca
$sync=1; art. 8, §§ 853(a), 855(e)(1), 856.
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permits to TNCs that provide transportation services at the airport.325 SFO
was one of the first airports in the country to create an airport permit process
for TNCs.326 To operate at SFO, TNCs must: (1) receive a permit from the
CPUC; (2) apply for and obtain an Airport operating permit; and (3) comply
with all CPUC and SFO Rules and Regulations.327 Similar to the CPUC, the
Airport issues permits to TNCs, not individual drivers.328 Drivers must com-
ply with the requirements of their TNC’s operating permit and the Airport’s
Rules and Regulations concerning parking and traffic.329 In 2016, SFO col-
lected $21,817,219 in TNC fee revenue from a total of 5,709,336 trips (based
on the current $3.80 figure).330
To promote safety, TNCs are required to provide driver training pro-
grams and report the number of drivers completing the course.331 The San
Francisco Bicycle Coalition has also provided additional safety training
videos to the TNCs for use by TNC drivers to reduce conflicts with bicyclists
in San Francisco.332 In California, 0.33% of a TNC’s gross California reve-
nues, plus a $10.00 administrative fee, are collected by the CPUC on a quar-
terly basis as part of overall fees.333 These funds are then paid into the
CPUC’s Transportation Reimbursement Account, for the purpose of funding
325. Rules and Regulations § 4.7(G)(2), S.F. INT’L AIRPORT (Oct. 21, 2014), http://
media.flysfo.com/media/sfo/about-sfo/sfo-rules-and-regulations.pdf.
326. See Press Release, SFO Announces Agreements with Lyft and UberX, S.F.
Int’l Airport (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.flysfo.com/media/press-releases/sfo-
announces-agreements-lyft-and-uberx. The California State Aeronautics Act of
the Public Utilities Code grants the State agency powers and jurisdiction over
airports in California. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21631 (West 2013).
327. Under San Francisco Administrative Code § 2A.171(b), the issuance and revo-
cation of operating permits at SFO is at the sole discretion of the Airport Direc-
tor. See S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 2A, art. IX, § 2A.171(b) (2018), http://
library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/California/administrative/administrative
code?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:sanfrancisco_ca$sync=1.
328. Rules and Regulations § 4.7(G)(2), S.F. INT’L AIRPORT.
329. Id. § 4.7(G)(3).
330. THE TNC REGULATORY LANDSCAPE, supra note 314, at 8.
331. Id. at 4 (“There is no publicly available data on whether and how TNCs have
complied with the CPUC requirements, and further, to what degree drivers are
watching the safety training videos made available for them.”).
332. Driver Education Now Reaching Hundreds of Thousands, S.F. BICYCLE COALI-
TION (Sept. 22, 2016), https://sfbike.org/news/driver-education-now-reaching-
hundreds-of-thousands/.
333. THE TNC REGULATORY LANDSCAPE, supra note 214, at 5; see Adopting Rules
and Regulations to Protect Safety While Allowing New Entrants to the Transp.
Indus., Decision 13-09-045, at 33 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Sept. 19, 2013),
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M077/K192/77192335
.pdf.
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any expenses incurred by the CPUC in regulating TNCs, TNC drivers, and
TNC vehicles.334 Further, there is currently no limit to the number of TNC
drivers or vehicles that can be associated with each TNC permit.335
Information that has been reported is not currently available to other
public agencies, or to the general public. In June 2017, San Francisco City
Attorney Dennis Herrera filed a public records request to the CPUC to re-
lease all annual reports submitted by TNCs since 2013.336 This request also
sought other data the CPUC collected on congestion, public safety, green-
house gas emissions, effect on public transit operation and parking, and other
areas relevant to maintaining San Francisco’s transportation networks.337 The
CPUC declined to provide this information.338 As a user of public rights-of-
way, TNCs are also affected by transportation engineering decisions. The
San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency is responsible for making
decisions about the installation and modification of traffic control devices,
including traffic signs, traffic striping, traffic signals, and color curb
markings.339
7. Los Angeles
In Los Angeles, only vehicles manufactured in 2002 or later may be
used by TNC drivers.340 In 2016, Lyft reported that in Los Angeles and San
Francisco, more than 130,000 people who applied to become Lyft drivers did
not have qualifying cars.341 Both Uber and Lyft presently contract with pri-
vate companies to conduct background checks where they search multi-state
334. THE TNC REGULATORY LANDSCAPE, supra note 314, at 5.
335. Id.
336. Herrera Secures Agreement with Lyft on Subpoenaed Operational Data, CITY
ATT’Y S.F. (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/2018/02/14/herrera-
secures-agreement-lyft-subpoenaed-operational-data/.
337. Herrera Orders Uber, Lyft to Provide Data on Driver Practices, Accessibility




339. See History of the SFMTA, S.F. MUN. TRANSP. AGENCY, https://www.sfmta
.com/about-us/history-sfmta (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
340. Vehicle Requirements Los Angeles, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/los-an-
geles/vechicle-requirements/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
341. John Swartz, Lyft, GM Expand Car-Rental Deal Into 3 Markets, USA TODAY
(July 11, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2016/07/11/lyft-gm-ex-
pand-express-drive-program-3-markets/86777234/.
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and multi-jurisdictional criminal record databases.342 Uber and Lyft are the
two largest TNC companies in Los Angeles.343
Each TNC in California must file its insurance policies under seal344
with the Safety and Enforcement Division as part of applying for a license.345
Since July 1, 2015, there have been new insurance requirements which de-
fined TNC services as having three periods.346 Period one is when the app is
on, but the driver has not yet accepted a ride request.347 For period one, TNCs
must have primary insurance of at least $50,000.00 for death and personal
injury per person, $100,000 for death and personal injury per incident, and
$30,000.00 for property damage.348 The TNC must also have $200,000 in
excess coverage.349 Periods two and three, respectively, cover the period
when the driver has accepted a ride but has not yet picked up a passenger and
when the driver is transporting the passenger. During these two periods, pri-
mary commercial insurance of $1 million for death, personal injury, and
property damage is required.350 In addition, TNCs shall maintain $1 million
of uninsured motorist insurance from the moment the passenger enters the
vehicle until the passenger exits the vehicle.351
Under Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) regulations, TNC driv-
ers must adhere to certain terms to ensure that they avoid fines of up to $1
million.352 All drivers must pass the LAX quiz in order to get an LAX permit,
and Uber drivers can take this quiz directly from the Uber Driver App by
scrolling down on the home screen.353 In order to receive trip requests to pick
342. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5445.2(a)(1) (West Supp. 2019).
343. See Liam Dillon, Meet the Man Driving the Future of Uber and Lyft in the
California Legislature, L.A. TIMES (June 16, 2017), www.latimes.com/busi-
ness/technology/la-pol-sac-future-of-uber-taxi-law-20170615-htmlstory.html.
344. Meaning there is no public access.
345. Adopting Rules and Regulations to Protect Safety While Allowing New En-
trants to the Transportation Industry, Decision 13-09-045, at 59 (Cal. Pub. Util.
Comm’n Sept. 19, 2013), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/
G000/M077/K192/77192335.pdf.
346. Decision Modifying Decision 13-09-045, Decision 14-11-043, at 24 (Cal. Pub.
Util. Comm’n Nov. 20, 2014), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Pub-
lished/G000/M143/K313/143313104.pdf.
347. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5433(c).
348. Id. § 5433(c)(1).
349. Id. § 5433(c)(2).
350. Id. § 5433(b)(1).
351. Id. § 5433(b)(2).
352. Instructions for Driver-Partners Los Angles International (LAX) Airport,
UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/los-angeles/airports/los-angeles-interna-
tional-airport/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
353. Id.
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up riders at LAX, driver-partners must be inside the designated TNC Airport
Assignment area.354 The Airport Assignment Area operates on a first-in, first-
out basis, and drivers may not drive around the central terminal area or wait
anywhere else in the neighborhood.355 Furthermore, LAX does not allow for
drivers with the following convictions in the past seven years: (1) driving
under the influence; (2) fraud; (3) a crime involving property damage or
theft; or (4) other acts of violence.356
8. Phoenix
Under Arizona statutes, a person may not act as a TNC driver unless the
TNC has been issued a permit by the Department of Transportation.357 A
TNC must implement a zero-tolerance policy on the use of drugs and alcohol
while a TNC is providing transportation network services or the TNC driver
is logged in to the app but is not providing transportation network services.358
Under the driver requirements section, the TNC company must conduct, or
have a third party conduct, a local and national criminal background check
for each applicant that includes a search of multi-jurisdiction criminal
records database and a national sex offender registry database.359 All vehicles
used by TNC drivers must meet vehicle safety and emissions standards for
private vehicles and have annual brake and tire inspections performed by a
qualified third party.360 Further, a TNC may not allow a person to act as a
company driver who has had more than three moving violations or one major
violation pursuant to this title in the preceding three years.361
A TNC in Arizona shall also maintain an individual’s trip records for at
least one year after the date each trip was provided and transportation net-
work company driver records until the one-year anniversary of the date of the
driver’s activation on the TNC’s digital network and make the records availa-
ble to the department on request.362 The Arizona state legislature changed the
outdated Arizona Department of Transportation rules that did not differenti-
ate between the regulation of TNC companies, such as Uber and Lyft, and
vehicles for hire, such as Taxis.363 This change replaced those outdated rules
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id; see CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5445.2.
357. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-9552(A) (Supp. 2018).
358. Id. § 28-9554(A).
359. Id. § 28-9555(A)(2).
360. Id. § 28-9555(A)(4).
361. Id. § 28-9555(B)(1).
362. Id. § 28-9556(B).
363. Vehicle for Hire Licensing Recent Licensing Changes: House Bill 2135, ARIZ.
DEP’T TRANSP., https://www.azdot.gov/motor-vehicles/professional-services/
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with ones consistent with statutory changes that lessened regulatory require-
ments on TNCs.364 In other news, Arizona Governor Doug Ducey suspended
Uber’s self-driving vehicle testing privileges in March 2018, in the wake of a
pedestrian fatality in a Phoenix suburb.365 After this accident on March 18,
2018, Uber immediately suspended its self-driving testing in Arizona, Pitts-
burgh, San Francisco, and Toronto.366
9. Dallas/Fort Worth
In 2017, Governor Greg Abbott signed Texas House Bill 100, which
created a single set of ride-hailing rules throughout Texas.367 As a result,
TNC drivers may accept trip requests anywhere in Texas without worrying
about varying city-to-city requirements. House Bill 100 states that the regula-
tion of TNCs, drivers logged into a digital network, and vehicles used to
provide digitally prearranged rides is an exclusive power and function of the
state of Texas.368 It may not be regulated by a municipality or other local
entity, including by: (1) imposing a tax; (2) requiring an additional license or
permit; (3) setting rates; (4) imposing operational or entry requirements; or
(5) imposing other requirements.369 But an airport owner, operator, or the
governing governmental body with jurisdiction over a cruise ship terminal,
may impose regulations, including a reasonable fee, on a TNC that provides
rides from the terminal.370
A person may not operate a TNC in Texas without obtaining and main-
taining a permit issued by the Department of Transportation.371 A TNC is
then required to pay an annual fee to the Department in order to maintain a
valid permit in Texas.372 TNCs must confirm that the TNC driver is at least
eighteen years old, maintains a valid U.S. driver’s license, and possesses
proof of registration and automobile financial responsibility for each motor




365. Arizona Gov. Doug Ducey Suspends Uber from Autonomous Testing, CBS
NEWS (Mar. 26, 2018), www.cbsnews.com/news/arizona-governor-doug-du-
cey-suspends-uber-autonomous-testing-letter-today-2018-03-26/.
366. Id.
367. See H.B. 100, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017).
368. Id. § 2402.003.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. § 2402.051.
372. Id. § 2402.052.
373. Tex. H.B. 100 § 2402.107.
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commercial multi-state and multi-jurisdictional criminal record background
check and a national sex offender check and may not permit an individual to
drive for their company if the individual: (1) has been convicted of more than
three offenses classified by the Department of Public Safety as moving viola-
tions within the past three years; or (2) has been convicted of (a) fleeing or
attempting to elude a police officer; (b) reckless driving; or (c) driving with-
out a valid driver’s license within the past three years.374 A driver is not
permitted to work for a TNC if the driver has been convicted in the preceding
seven-year period of any of the following: (1) driving while intoxicated; (2)
use of a motor vehicle to commit a felony; (3) a felony crime involving
property damage; (4) fraud; (5) theft; (6) an act of violence; or (7) an act of
terrorism.375 Furthermore, House Bill 100 provides that each TNC company
shall adopt a policy that prohibits a driver logged in to the company’s digital
network from: (1) discriminating on the basis of a passenger’s or potential
passenger’s location or destination, race, color, national origin, religious be-
lief or affiliation, sex, disability, or age; and (2) refusing to provide service to
a passenger with a service animal.376
Getting access to a Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) is
simple for a TNC driver. A TNC driver must take his/her vehicle to the
Ground Transportation Office at DFW and fill out the appropriate form to
provide the driver’s personal and vehicle details.377 The driver must show the
Ground Transportation representative his driver app, and then he is given a
DFW permit to be placed on the vehicle’s windshield.378
In 2015, Texas lawmakers passed House Bill 1733, which introduced a
set of insurance liability requirements for TNCs and TNC drivers. This legis-
lation went into effect on January 1, 2016.379 This law requires TNC drivers
to carry primary automobile insurance to operate as TNC drivers.380 The
TNC, TNC driver, or a combination of both, can maintain the automobile
insurance.381 During the time a TNC driver is logged on to the TNC’s digital
network and is available to receive network requests but is not engaged in a
ride, the automobile insurance policy must provide at least: (1) $50,000 for
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. § 2402.112.
377. DFW Airport Permit, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/dallas/resources/dfw-
airport-permit/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
378. Id.
379. Michael Theis, How a Texas-Sized Fight over Laws Regulating Uber, Lyft
Might Play Out, AUSTIN BUS. J. (May 10, 2016, 8:13 AM), www.bizjournals
.com/austin/blog/techflash/2016/05/how-a-texas-sized-fight-over-laws-regulat-
ing-uber.html.
380. H.B. 1733, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1954.051 (Tex. 2015).
381. Id.
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bodily injury to or death for each person in an incident; (2) $100,000 for
bodily injury to or death of a person per incident; and (3) $25,000 for damage
or destruction of property of others in an incident.382 When the TNC driver is
engaged in prearranged ride, the automobile insurance policy must provide,
at a minimum, coverage with a total aggregate limit of liability of $1 million
for death, bodily injury, and property damage for each incident.383
10. Seattle
Seattle has attempted to permit ride-hailing drivers to band together to
engage in collective bargaining with their platform companies. The City of
Seattle adopted an ordinance to permit ride-hailing drivers to engage in col-
lective bargaining.384 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sum-
marized the ordinance:
The Ordinance requires “driver coordinators” to bargain collec-
tively with for-hire drivers. Id. § 1(I). A “driver coordinator” is
defined as “an entity that hires, contracts with, or partners with
for-hire drivers for the purpose of assisting them with, or facilitat-
ing them in, providing for-hire services to the public.” Seattle,
Wash., Municipal Code § 6.310.110. The Ordinance applies only
to drivers who contract with a driver coordinator “other than in the
context of an employer-employee relationship”—in other words,
the Ordinance applies only to independent contractors. Id.
§ 6.310.735(D).
The collective-bargaining process begins with the election of a
“qualified driver representative,” or QDR. Id. §§ 6.310.110,
6.310.735(C). An entity seeking to represent for-hire drivers oper-
ating within Seattle first submits a request to the Director of Fi-
nance and Administrative Services (the Director) for approval to
be a QDR. Id. § 6.310.735(C). Once approved by the City, the
QDR must notify the driver coordinator of its intent to represent
the driver coordinator’s for-hire drivers. Id. § 6.310.735(C)(2).
382. Id. § 1954.052.
383. Id. § 1954.053.
384. Ordinance 124968 amends § 6.310.110 of the Seattle Municipal Code and adds
section 6.310.735 to the Code. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE §§ 6.310.110,
6.310.735 (2018); For-Hire Driver Collective Bargaining, CITY OF SEATTLE
(2018), https://www.seattle.gov/business-regulations/taxis-for-hires-and-tncs/
for-hire-driver-collective-bargaining (summary of provisions of ordinance);
Nick Wingfield & Mike Isaac, Seattle Will Allow Uber and Lyft Drivers to
Form Unions, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/
15/technology/seattle-clears-the-way-for-uber-drivers-to-form-a-union.html
(reporting unanimous city council approval of ordinance and mayoral
skepticism).
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Upon receiving proper notice from the QDR, the driver coordina-
tor must provide the QDR with the names, addresses, email ad-
dresses, and phone numbers of all “qualifying drivers.” Id.
§ 6.310.735(D). This disclosure requirement applies only to driver
coordinators that have ‘hired, contracted with, partnered with, or
maintained a contractual relationship or partnership with, 50 or
more for-hire drivers in the 30 days prior to the commencement
date’ set by the Director. Id.
The QDR then contacts the qualifying drivers to solicit their inter-
est in being represented by the QDR. Id. § 6.310.735(E). Within
120 days of receiving the qualifying drivers’ contact information,
the QDR submits to the Director statements of interest from quali-
fying drivers indicating that they wish to be represented by the
QDR in collective-bargaining negotiations with the driver coordi-
nator. Id. § 6.310.735(F)(1). If a majority of qualifying drivers
consent to representation by the QDR, the Director certifies the
QDR as the “exclusive driver representative” (EDR) for all for-
hire drivers for that particular driver coordinator. Id.
§ 6.310.735(F)(2).
Once the Director certifies the EDR, the driver coordinator and
the EDR shall meet and negotiate in good faith certain subjects to
be specified in rules or regulations promulgated by the Director
including, but not limited to, best practices regarding vehicle
equipment standards; safe driving practices; the manner in which
the driver coordinator will conduct criminal background checks of
all prospective drivers; the nature and amount of payments to be
made by, or withheld from, the driver coordinator to or by the
drivers; minimum hours of work, conditions of work, and applica-
ble rules. Id. § 6.310.735(H)(1) (emphasis added).
If an agreement is reached, the driver coordinator and the EDR
submit the written agreement to the Director. Id.
§ 6.310.735(H)(2). The Director reviews the agreement for com-
pliance with the Ordinance and Chapter 6.310 of the Seattle Mu-
nicipal Code, which governs taxicabs and for-hire vehicles. Id. In
conducting this review, the Director is to ‘ensure that the sub-
stance of the agreement promotes the provision of safe, reliable,
and economical for-hire transportation services and otherwise ad-
vance[s] the public policy goals set forth in Chapter 6.310 and in
the [Ordinance]. Id.
The Director’s review is not limited to the parties’ submissions or
the terms of the proposed agreement. Id. Rather, the Director may
gather and consider additional evidence, conduct public hearings,
and request information from the EDR and the driver coordinator.
Id.
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The agreement becomes final and binding on all parties if the Di-
rector finds the agreement compliant. Id. § 6.310.735(H)(2)(a).
The agreement does not take effect until the Director makes such
an affirmative determination. Id. § 6.310.735(H)(2)(c). If the Di-
rector finds the agreement noncompliant, the Director remands it
to the parties with a written explanation of the agreement’s fail-
ures, and may offer recommendations for remedying the agree-
ment’s inadequacies. Id. § 6.310.735(H)(2)(b).
If the driver coordinator and the EDR do not reach an agreement,
“either party must submit to interest arbitration upon the request
of the other,” in accordance with the procedures and criteria speci-
fied in the Ordinance. Id. § 6.310.735(I). The interest arbitrator
must propose an agreement compliant with Chapter 6.310 and in
line with the City’s public policy goals. Id. § 6.310.735(I)(2). The
term of an agreement proposed by the interest arbitrator may not
exceed two years. Id.
The interest arbitrator submits the proposed agreement to the Di-
rector, who reviews the agreement for compliance with the Ordi-
nance and Chapter 6.310, in the same manner the Director reviews
an agreement proposed by the parties. Id. § 6.310.735(I)(3).
The parties may discuss additional terms and propose amendments
to an approved agreement. Id. § 6.310.735(J). The parties must
submit any proposed amendments to the Director for approval. Id.
The Director has the authority to withdraw approval of an agree-
ment during its term, if the Director finds that the agreement no
longer complies with the Ordinance or furthers the City’s public
policy goals. Id. § 6.310.735(J)(1).
. . . .
[T]he Director designated Teamsters Local 117 (Local 117) as a
QDR on March 3, 2017. On March 7, 2017, Local 117 notified
Uber, Lyft, Eastside, and nine other driver coordinators of its in-
tent to serve as the EDR of all qualifying drivers who contract
with those companies, and requested the qualifying drivers’ con-
tact information.385
The chamber of commerce and associated pro-business groups chal-
lenged the validity of the ordinance in two lawsuits.386 In both, the plaintiffs
385. Chamber of Comm. of United States v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769, 777–79
(9th Cir. 2018).
386. Chamber of Comm. of United States v. City of Seattle, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1140,
1147 (W.D. Wash. 2017), No. C17-0370RSL, 2017 WL 3641901 (W.D. Wash.
Aug. 24, 2017) (denying injunction pending appeal; noting that antitrust claims
had been found meritless), appeal dismissed, No. 17–35371, 2017 WL
5197158 (9th Cir. Sep. 6, 2017); Chamber of Comm. of United States v. City
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argued that the ordinance violated the antitrust laws and that it was pre-
empted by the NLRA.387 In one case, the district court found sufficient
probability of success on the merits of the antitrust claim to grant a prelimi-
nary injunction against enforcement of the ordinance.388 The court found in-
sufficient probability of success on the merits of the NLRA preemption
claims.389 Its injunction prohibited disclosure of driver information to the
Teamsters union.390 The other case was reversed on appeal to the Ninth Cir-
cuit.391 The appellate court rejected the argument, embraced by the trial
court, that the ordinance was immune from antitrust liability by the state
action exemption under Parker v. Brown.392 The court held that the Seattle
ordinance failed to reflect a clearly articulated state (as opposed to munici-
pal) policy to displace competition and that its implementation be closely
supervised by the state.393
On the labor law preemption questions, however, it rejected the chal-
lenger’s two arguments. The first argument, which the court of appeals la-
beled “Machinists preemption,” was that the ordinance was preempted by the
NLRA’s exclusion of independent contractors.394 By allowing independent
contractors to engage in collective bargaining, the argument went, the state of
Washington was thwarting a federal determination that independent contrac-
tors should not engage in collective bargaining.395 This is because indepen-
dent contractors are businessman rather than workers who are shielded by the
labor exemptions to the antitrust laws.396 The court of appeals held that,
while independent contractors are excluded from the NLRA and its provi-
sions regulating collective-bargaining,397 one could not infer from that exclu-
sion a determination that independent contractors should not be regulated by
any labor law.398An equally plausible inference was that the Congress left it
of Seattle, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1155 (W.D. Wash. 2017), rev’d, 890 F.3d 769 (9th
Cir. Feb. 2018).
387. City of Seattle, 274 F. Supp. 3d at 1147.
388. Id. at 1155.
389. Id. at 1149.
390. Id. at 1155.
391. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d at 795.
392. Id. at 779–80; Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943).
393. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d at 789.
394. Id. at 791.
395. Id. at 792.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 793.
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to the states to regulate the employment the relations of independent contrac-
tors and those that hire them.399
The second NLRA preemption argument, labeled the “Garmon preemp-
tion” by the court of appeals, asserted that the ordinance would impermissi-
bly draw local agencies into a determination of who qualifies as an employee
and who qualifies as an independent contractor.400 This, however, was argua-
bly a determination reserved exclusively to the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB). Both the district and appellate courts rejected that argument
because the ordinance excluded employees, and the plaintiffs had made no
showing that the drivers might be employees.401
The plaintiff may petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to
obtain review of the court of appeals labor law preemption findings, but the
deadline for such petitions has not yet occurred as of this writing.402 The
Supreme Court is unlikely to hear the labor law preemption questions by
themselves, but are more likely to wait at least until the antitrust claims are
subjected to further litigation. Rigorous assessment of the effectiveness of
collective bargaining for ride-hailing drivers in Seattle is not yet possible
because the implementation of the ordinance is blocked by the antitrust
challenges.
C. Enforceability
Sometimes the regulators decide that they cannot regulate an industry
effectively as the market has shaped it. Then, they may require that it be
reengineered so that regulation can be more effective. This is exactly what
happened with the prohibition of industrial homework. The Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act could not be enforced effectively when the work was dispersed so
widely into small production units: the workers’ homes.403 So, Congress and
the Labor Department prohibited industrial homework.404 The benefit was
heightened compliance with labor standards; the cost was the loss of flexible
work opportunities for the population.
399. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d at 793–94 (noting that some categories of workers
excluded from scope of NLRA have been found to be subject to state
regulation).
400. Id. at 794.
401. Id.
402. See SUP. CT. R. 13 (setting time limit of ninety days for filing petition for writ
of certiorari). The court of appeals case was decided on May 11, 2018. So, the
deadline for filing a petition is August 11, 2018. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d at
769.
403. Analyst in Labor Policy (name redacted), Child Labor in America: History,
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Similarly, gig work could be forced into a factory matrix. Although it is
not entirely clear what this would mean for urban on-demand transportation,
it would likely resemble traditional taxicab regulation with its monopolistic
character. That would be a considerable setback for new technologies’ power
to make work more flexible and accessible to a wider variety of people. The
English Taylor Review put it well with respect to the goal of preserving
flexibility: “If a change of this type were to result in a loss of the flexibility
so many platform workers desire, this would represent failure. As such, these
changes must be accompanied by a new approach that supports genuine two-
way flexibility enabled by digital platforms.”405
The following subsections consider each traditional type of labor protec-
tive regulation and consider the need for it to address the grievances of gig
workers. They also consider the likely distortions in efficiency that would
result from adopting it. Forcing TLPs into a taxicab model is also likely to be
justified on the grounds that that enforcement resources are limited and,
therefore, compliance is rarely perfect. A taxicab commission can have very
stringent limits on the number of cabs allowed to be on the street, working
hours of drivers, and vehicle inspections, but only a handful inspectors are
available to enforce the requirements. The likelihood of cheating is high.
Enforcement can be enhanced by requiring for-hire vehicles to have distinc-
tive paint schemes, special equipment on their roofs and inside, and distinc-
tive license plates. These requirements preclude drivers from using their
personal cars and precludes drivers from using these modified cars for other
purposes. Requiring meters in the cab would enhance enforcement of duty-
time limitations without detection.
The network technologies used by platform providers significantly
change the enforcement and compliance part of any regulatory equation. The
Uber app, for example, tracks speed and acceleration as well as routes.406 It
thus easily can be programmed to detect speeding violations by drivers.407 It
also can be programmed to detect violations of pick-up-location require-
ments.408 The traditional practice of having a complex web of regulatory re-
quirements, backed up by a battalion of inspectors, is obsolete. A template
for a simpler set of regulations can be built into software routinely used by
workers.
405. TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 10, at 36.
406. Jacob Bogage, Someone is Watching your Uber Driver, WASH. POST (July 5,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/07/05/some
one-is-watching-your-uber-driver/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.20cdc7943e54.
The author received a pop-up notice on his Uber driver app shortly after he
began driving for Uber telling him that his stopping and starting practices in
traffic were consistent with good practices.
407. Id.
408. Id.
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D. Types of Worker Protection
This article consistently argues for risk-based regulation: a model in
which legal intervention is justified only by specific instances of resource
misallocation or inequitable distribution arising from market failure. An in-
ventory of all of the types of traditional labor and employment regulation
suggests that most of them are unsuitable for the ride-hailing industry.409
Classification of ride-hailing drivers as employees would subject them to the
categories of traditional labor and employment regulation discussed below
and would force a considerable modification of existing practices. Yet the
categories of protection analyzed below do not match very well with what
the drivers themselves say they are concerned about—mostly levels of com-
pensation and adjustment of disputes with passengers.
TNPs have significantly different levels of power to control different
elements of the work of their drivers.410 Application of the right-to-control
tests on an element by element basis results in different levels of regulatory
intervention compared with reliance on market forces to govern each element
of the relationship. The right to control test is the centerpiece of the multi-
factored formula for distinguishing independent contractors from employ-
ees.411 For example, TNPs have nearly unlimited power to control the ele-
ments and level of compensation paid to drivers.412 They decide on the pay
formulas and program them into their app software, beyond reach of negotia-
tion between drivers, lower-level personnel of the TNPs, and passengers.413
In contrast, TNPs have very little control over driver safety. The driver
provides his own tools for work—his privately-owned automobile414—and
decides for himself how safely he will drive it. TNPs can make rules for safe
driving, in addition to highway traffic safety regulators, but the drivers ulti-
409. Alyssa M. Stokes, Driving Courts Crazy: A Look at How Labor and Employ-
ment Laws Do Not Coincide with Ride Platforms in the Sharing Economy, 95
NEB. L. REV. 853 (2016), http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol95/iss3/7.
410. Alex Rosenblat, The Truth About How Uber Manages Drivers, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Apr. 6, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/04/the-truth-about-how-ubers-app-
manages-drivers.
411. IRS 20 Factor Test –Independent Contractor or Employee?, OREGON.GOV,
https://www.oregon.gov/ODA/shared/Documents/Publications/NaturalResour
ces/20FactorTestforIndependentContractors.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
However, rigorous application of the Hohfeldian terminology for classifying
legal relationships, suggests this is a power, not a right.
412. Rosenblat, supra note 412. Even if a driver and the passenger were to bilater-
ally negotiate a deal different from that programmed into the software, in viola-
tion of the terms of service, the software would bill the passenger the
prescribed rate and pay the driver the prescribed rate.
413. Id.
414. Uber and Lyft Car and Driver Requirements, HYRECAR (Dec. 14, 2017), https:/
/hyrecar.com/blog/uber-lyft-car-and-driver-requirements/.
124 SMU Science and Technology Law Review [Vol. XXII
mately determine whether they will follow them. Unlike a factory environ-
ment, one cannot justify imposing employee health and safety obligations on
the TNPs because they, unlike factory owners, do not control and have no
power to control the instrumentalities of work.
Other elements of the work relationship may be associated with signifi-
cant power to control, but there is little evidence that the power is being, or
can be, misused. The equal employment opportunity is an example. All of the
empirical evidence, backed up by the author’s experience, supports the infer-
ence that TNPs do not practice discrimination based on race, national origin,
gender, religion, or sexual orientation. The workforce is quite diverse on all
of these characteristics.415 Virtually no complaints about racially, ethnically,
religiously, or gender-based discrimination can be found. Little justification
appears for subjecting TNPs to burdensome notice and reporting obligations
under title VII aimed at employers. Disability discrimination represents a
more plausible problem. Few instances of disability discrimination accusa-
tions have surfaced.416 But if they do, they could be handled within the
framework of Title II of the ADA, accepting that ride hailing drivers are
independent contractors, rather than employees.
1. Adequate Compensation
A grievance theme for factory workers in the 19th century was the ab-
sence of a living wage. This complaint led the law in the 19th century to
allow collective bargaining and later, in the 20th century, to set a minimum
wage.417 The risk is that the market will not allow workers to be paid
“enough” and that they will be practically unable to seek other, more remu-
nerative, work. This proposition makes two assumptions. The first presup-
poses some objective level of adequate compensation. The other is that a
worker dissatisfied with his compensation is stuck with a stingy purchaser of
his work, for some reason.
At the most general level, the cause of low worker compensation is too
many workers compared to the level of demand for their work. Accordingly,
reformers who seek to raise the level of compensation often propose mea-
sures to restrict the supply of workers.418 This is the case with craft unions
that will not allow someone to work who has not been selected by the union
415. Taxi Drivers & Chauffeurs, DATA USA, https://datausa.io/profile/soc/533041/
(last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
416. Chris McGuinness, Local Uber Driver Sues Company for Discrimination,
NEWS TIMES SAN LUIS OBISPO (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.newtimesslo
.com/sanluisobispo/local-uber-driver-sues-company-for-discrimination/Content
?oid=6263943.
417. National Labor Relations Act, NAT. LABOR RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb
.gov/how-we-work/national-labor-relations-act (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
418. Craft Union, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/
craft-union (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
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and completed a multi-year apprenticeship program.419 It is the case with
occupations—more than one hundred in Illinois420—that have persuaded leg-
islators to restrict entry to the labor market unless the worker obtains some
kind of license, often requiring ridiculously long and complicated periods of
study. It is the case with traditional taxis, primarily by limiting the number of
medallions that can be outstanding, but also imposing qualification require-
ments on drivers.421 Conceptually, supply restrictions also can include re-
stricting the number of vehicles.
A substantial portion of the complaints by Uber drivers relates to the
perceived inadequacy of compensation.422 The available data, limited though
it is, suggests that the foundational reality is that the prices that consumers
are willing to pay for services like those provided by Uber and Lyft are not
high enough to support very generous compensation for drivers. The author’s
experience validates other evidence that drivers can earn $13.00–$15.00 an
hour, gross.423 A driver working forty hours per week therefore would earn
on the order of $31,000.00 annually.424 That places TNP driving in the mid-
419. Jack Barbash, Union Interests in Apprenticeship and Other Training Forms, 3
J. HUMAN RESOURCES 63, (Winter 1968), https://www.jstor.org/stable/144648?
seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.
420. See generally 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2-745 §§ 1–199 (West 1997) (pre-
scribing licensing requirements for scores of occupations, ranging from athletic
trainers to audiologists, to genetic counselling, to shorthand reporters, to auc-
tioneers, to hair braiders, to charity solicitors).
421. Driving a Taxi, DMV.ORG, https://www.dmv.org/special-licenses/driving-a-
taxi-cab.php (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
422. The limited data available shows that Uber drivers do not make much money.
See Len Sherman, How MIT Dragged Uber Through Public Relations Hell,
FORBES (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lensherman/2018/03/07/
how-mit-dragged-uber-through-public-relations-hell/#2ed8de0115f2 (reporting
on flawed MIT study, admitted by MIT to be incorrect; corrected to show
driver hourly earnings of $8.55–$10 per hour, with 41–54% of drivers making
less than minimum wage in their state).
423. This is about twice what was calculated by MIT researchers. See Stephen
Zoepf et al., The Economics of Ride-Hailing: Driver Revenue, Expenses and
Taxes, MIT CCEPR Working Paper Series (Feb. 2018), https://orfe.princeton
.edu/~alaink/SmartDrivingCars/PDFs/Zoepf_The%20Economics%20of%20
RideHialing_OriginalPdfFeb2018.pdf (author’s revision statement reporting re-
vised median profit for Uber drivers of $8.55/hour; see Sherman supra note
424 (regarding controversy over MIT study).
424. Net earnings would be lower, taking into account vehicle expenses and
depreciation.
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dle of low-skill occupations425 but considerably higher than the federal pov-
erty level for individuals.426
Most Uber and Lyft drivers do not make an explicit calculation of how
much depreciation and maintenance on their vehicles costs.427 Assume a
driver buys a new Toyota Camry for $25,000428 and that the car has a resale
value of $10,000 after five years.429 Also assume straight-line depreciation at
$4,000 per year, $333.33 per month, or about $76.92 per week. That is con-
sistent with a lease rate of $299 per month.430 Maintenance on a new car
should not run more than, say, $500 per year, or another $10 per week. So,
four hours of driving per week is necessary to pay the vehicle expense. That
is 10% of a forty-hour week, which brings the net compensation down to
about $13.50 per hour.
The law could intervene and require paying drivers a minimum wage,
but that would necessitate price increases in a highly elastic consumer mar-
ket.431 The result would be a diminution in TMP services and job opportuni-
425. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics computes the median average annual in-
come from all occupations as $44,720. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR AND STA-
TISTICS: LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY
(2018–2019), https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat37.htm (reporting median weekly
earnings for 2017 full-time employment as $860); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR AND
STATISTICS: LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SUR-
VEY (2017-2018), https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat38.htm (reporting median
weekly earnings from part-time employment as $260); see generally U.S. BU-
REAU OF LABOR AND STATISTICS: MAY 2016 NATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL EM-
PLOYMENT AND WAGE ESTIMATES UNITED STATES (2016), https://www.bls
.gov/oes/2016/may/oes_nat.htm#00-0000 (showing detailed data on wages for
hundreds of occupations).
426. Federal Poverty Level, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glos-
sary/federal-poverty-level-FPL/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2019) (showing $12,140
for individuals, and $25,100 for a family of four).
427. JC, How Much Does it Really Cost to Drive Your Car for Uber and Lyft?,
RIDESTER (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.ridester.com/uber-lyft-driver-costs-
and-expenses/.
428. See, e.g., NORTHBROOK TOYOTA, https://www.northbrooktoyota.com/?gclid=Cj
wKCAjwq_vWBRACEiwAEReprM2WLySSXw3njPVgDXYp2ob4WwVv77
meUkE_etOnX3A1DfmkyuA87BoCCcgQAvD_BwE (showing prices for 2018
Toyota Camrys for $23,000 to $25,000).
429. See KELLEY BLUE BOOK, https://www.kbb.com/toyota/camry/2013/ (showing
price range from $9,800 to $12,950).
430. See Car, Truck, SUV & Hybrid Lease Deals, TOYOTA, https://www.toyota.com/
deals/lease/ (last visted Mar. 3, 2019) (showing 2018 Camry SE lease price of
$299 per month with no cash at signing).
431. But see Lagos, An Analysis of the Market for Taxicab Rides in New York City,
supra note 131 (noting two studies showing that demand for taxi rides is “per-
fectly inelastic”). Even if demand for on-demand transportation in price inelas-
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ties for drivers. That in many ways is the story of American railroads, where
labor costs and labor market restrictions caused substantial loss of market
share to trucks and barges, with concomitant reductions in rail industry em-
ployment.432 Increases in compensation also may have perverse results. The
empirical data suggests that higher wages do not necessarily draw forth more
supply.433
a. Minimum Wage and Overtime Premiums
The Fair Labor Standards Act, and its ubiquitous state counterparts, set
a floor on hourly wages, requiring that employers pay a premium for work in
excess of a regular work week—usually defined as forty hours.434 The justifi-
cation is that competition among employers encourages a race to the bottom,
while switching costs and barriers to entry limit employee alternatives to
accepting low wages.435 A similar case for setting a minimum wage in gig
labor markets is weak because market failure is not evident and there are
enforceability problems. Even if alternative buyers of driver services exist,
switching costs may nevertheless cause the drivers to be stuck with their
current arrangements and render the market less competitive than it might
seem.
This is not the case, however. Switching costs are quite low. Both Uber
and Lyft permit their drivers to drive for other ride-hailing services and per-
mit them to hold other jobs, gig or traditional.436 Nothing in the Uber or Lyft
rules or municipal regulation so far ties a driver’s car to a particular service,
and all of the equipment, mainly driver cell phones, is usable for anything
tic, cross elasticities, as between different forms of on-demand transportation
are likely to be substantial.
432. A Short History of U.S. Freight Railroads, ASS’N AM. RAILROADS (May 2018),
https://www.aar.org/data/short-history-u-s-freight-railroads/.
433. See Orley Ashenfelter et al., A Shred of Credible Evidence on the Long-Run
Elasticity of Labour Supply, 77 ECONOMICA 637, 641 (2010) (data from New
York taxi drivers indicates that response to fare increase is to drive less; evi-
dence implies that long-run elasticity of labor supply is -0.2); accord, Lagos,
An Analysis of the Market for Taxicab Rides in New York City, supra note 131,
at 432 n.14 (“sources says that some drivers will work fewer hours if they
make more per hour, preferring the leisure time”).
434. Compliance Assistance – Wages and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
U.S. DEPT. LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/whd/flsa/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
435. Economic dependence is the usual way of testing whether the employee has
alternatives. The criteria for distinguishing employees from independent con-
tractors under minimum wage law emphasizes an economic realities test of
economic dependence. See Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308,
1311–13 (11th Cir. 2013) (listing criteria).
436. Nat, How to Drive for Uber and Lyft (at the Same Time), RIDESTER, https://
www.ridester.com/drive-for-uber-and-lyft/ (last updated Jan. 21, 2019).
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else as well as driving for Uber or Lyft.437 The training and human capital
associated with both services is modest; it amounts to little more than follow-
ing safe driving practices.438 No apparent basis exists for minimum wage
regulation based on market failure. Minimum wage standards must be justi-
fied, if at all based on some distributional fairness concept. Moreover, this
form of regulation is pretty straightforward when it is applied to a workplace
where employees arrive in a particular starting time, punch a time clock, and
leave at an appointed time, clocking out as they do so. An unambiguous
record exists as to their hours of work. Driving for Uber is completely differ-
ent. It should be extended to other aspects of traditional employment law.
Harris and Krueger would leave independent workers outside the Fair Labor
Standards Act and similar state laws.439
If one cannot reliably calculate how long the worker is on duty, one
cannot reliably calculate his average pay rate. For the same reason, one can-
not determine when premium overtime pay is triggered. To be sure, the Uber
software keeps track of how many hours a driver is online, and it records the
time involved in each passenger trip.440 It does not, however, consider other
drivetime may be associated with the drivers positioning his vehicle to an
area where he thinks he will have the most attractive trips, or the time in-
volved in his returning home or some other personal destination after he logs
out.441 To the driver it is the total time when he may not engage in other
activities that matters in terms of his personal compensation for the effort he
is expending.442 Yet any standard regime is unlikely to consider the time not
online as work time. Further, an Uber driver is not only selling his labor, but
also the use of his automobile. The former results in depreciation and mainte-
nance costs that increase with mileage.443 Should a regulatory regime aimed
at establishing foreign earnings take these costs into account? Wage and hour
administrators struggled for decades with when to consider a work-related
expenditure for personal clothing and equipment as a deduction from the
wage paid.
These are significant problems with respect to calculating minimum
wage. Resolving these problems will almost certainly be politically driven,
rather than by rational economic calculation. When it comes to premium pay
for overtime, the problems loom larger. What is a standard workweek for an
437. Id.
438. Uber and Lyft Car and Driver Requirements, supra note 416.
439. Harris & Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing, supra note 14.
440. Introducing a New Feature: Driving Hours Limit, UBER BLOG: SOUTH AFRICA
(Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.uber.com/en-ZA/blog/driving-hours-limit/.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. How Much Does it Really Cost to Drive Your Car for Uber and Lyft?, supra
note 429.
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Uber driver? Some work only a few hours a week, while others work sixty or
eighty hours a week, and work time is likely to be considered longer by the
driver then the passenger, because of the deadheading time considered in the
preceding paragraphs.
b. Wage Payment Statutes
Historically, a common grievance against employers was that they
failed to do what they had said they would do.444 Temporal asymmetry be-
tween performance of the work and payment exacerbated the risk, particu-
larly when payment is long deferred, as it is with respect to pension
payments. The market did not prove very effective in controlling this risk,
even though law-and-economics enthusiasts argue that the importance of rep-
utation and choice by workers of whom to work for provides adequate
protection.
Wage payment statutes require employers to make timely payment of
promised wages in cash money.445 They do not prescribe the level of such
payments. Accordingly, they are basically mechanisms to reduce the transac-
tion costs of enforcing contracts of employment. Instead of having a lawyer
file suit in the regular courts, an employee denied the payment of promised
wages can file a simplified complaint with a state administrative agency. The
employee then undertakes an investigation and, if necessary, adjudicates the
claim. Wage-payment statutes also protect against employers deducting pay.
The analysis of gig workers grievances in Section III.D.1 shows that
many of them relate to claims of wrongful deductions from compensation.
These take the form of the charging of an exceptional or undisclosed fee for a
particular service by the platform or failing to pay the driver a share of a
payment received from a passenger for a particular service. These resemble
wage payment claims filed by employees under wage payment statutes.
Moreover, gig workers have a limited ability to hire lawyers and litigate
breach of contract lawsuits for small amounts of money.446 So, it is sensible
to ensure gig workers access to a forum in which they may complain about
platform failures to pay monies owed. TNPs unilaterally set various elements
of compensation in complex and varying formulas; the law should require
444. “BLS reported that wage payment legislation was needed because numerous
employers made it difficult for workers to collect compensation which caused
‘unrest, dissatisfaction, and hardship’ for both kinds of workers; those who
were fired and those released after completion of a specific work assignment.”
Smith v. Superior Court (L’Oreal), 39 Cal. 4th 77 (2006), 34 W. ST. U. L. REV.
284, 286 (2007) (quoting California Bureau of Labor Statistics report from
1911).
445. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 115 § 1 (West 1986); Tex. Labor Code
§§ 61.051–61.067.
446. Helping the Gig Economy Work Better for Gig Workers, INT’L LABOR ORG.,
https://www.ilo.org/washington/WCMS_642303/lang—en/index.htm (last vis-
ited Aug. 22, 2019).
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them to keep their promises. The relevant question for gig labor markets is
whether special protections are needed. For example, if Uber promises to
charge a rider a fare of $10.00, and to remit $4.00 of it to the driver, does the
driver have meaningful relief available in the regular courts?
If additional governmental action is justified, it is likely limited to mak-
ing access to adjudicatory machinery for wage and benefit claims more ac-
cessible. One possibility is simply to relax the definition of employee under
wage payment statutes, giving independent contractors standing. Another
possibility is to examine the barriers to access in the small claims court sys-
tem. Such barriers disadvantage both workers and small claimants. The soci-
ety would benefit from reducing or eliminating them. On the other hand, the
argument “it’s not worth the trouble to go to small claims court” is not a
persuasive reason for adding a new layer of regulatory protection, unless
there is an economic barrier.
c. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)447 was en-
acted primarily in response to highly publicized failures of the union sector
to make promised retirement pension payments, and the perception that pen-
sion fund trustees looting the funds.448 The statute was written far more
broadly than this risk and covers “benefit plans” as well as “pension
plans.”449 Now, much of the litigation under ERISA involves healthcare ben-
efits rather than benefits under defined-benefit pension plans.
Nothing in ERISA requires employers to make pensions or healthcare
benefits available; it simply provides a federal mechanism for enforcing
those promises if they are made and are for assuring the financial integrity of
defined-benefit pension plans, if they are established.450 ERISA is fundamen-
tally a federal scheme for reinforcing common-law contract and trust law.451
It does not bar employers from providing pension for welfare benefits such
as health care insurance. Rather, it generally leaves it to the employers to
design the terms of benefits when they do elect to provide them. Employers
are subject to some general vesting requirements for pension plans, which are
447. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (1974).
448. William J. Isaacson, Employee Welfare and Pension Plans: Regulation and
Protection of Employee Rights, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 96, 96 (1959) (examples of
negligence, mismanagement, and wrongdoing, establish a “compelling need” to
enact legislation).
449. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(3) (1974) (definition of employee benefit plan); see, e.g.,
id. § 1022(a) (applying disclosure requirements to all employee benefit plans).
450. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), U.S. DEPT. LABOR, https://webapps.dol
.gov/dolfaq/go-dol-faq.asp?faqid=225&faqsub=ERISA&faqtop=Retirement+
Plans+%26+BenefBen&topicid=4.
451. Colleen E. Medill, The Federal Common Law of Vicarious Fiduciary Liability
under ERISA, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249, 250 (2011).
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aimed at assuring their solvency and further reinforcing an employer’s ability
performance promises more detail regulation of healthcare plans is the prov-
ince of state insurance regulation and the affordable care act not ERISA.
ERISA is also a disclosure statute, requiring “summary plan descriptions”
and “plans” to formalize employer benefit promises, thus alerting employees
to them and enforcing them when they are not fulfilled.452
It is not clear what meaningful additional protection to drivers would
result from extending ERISA coverage to their platform providers. On the
other hand, merely extending the statute would impose few additional costs
on a platform that did not itself elect to provide benefits. Some platform
providers may be inclined to provide some kind of healthcare protection and
then whether they should become covered may become a more interesting
question.453
d. Disclosure of the Terms of Work
American labor and employment law does not generally require em-
ployers to post the terms and conditions of work.454 When collective bargain-
ing agreements exist, they generally provide terms and conditions in great
detail, but collective bargaining does not have a significant presence in the
U.S. private sector anymore. Many employers also provide and publish em-
ployee handbooks that address certain employment related matters, but they
generally do not contain details about wage levels and payments because
those are so varied and are often determined on an individual basis. How-
ever, vacation and sick leave pay may be prescribed.
Franchise regulation is not altogether unlike franchise work, which is
not altogether unlike gig work; accepted franchisees undeniably are indepen-
dent contractors rather than employees under the traditional test.455 Despite
their status as independent contractors, federal and state governments have
enacted legislation to protect them against overreaching by their franchisors.
These regulatory regimes are centered on disclosure of the terms of the
franchise. A similar arrangement might be appropriate for gig workers, at
452. 29 U.S.C. 1022(a) (1974).
453. See Douglas Ver Mulm (@DouglasVerMulm), TWITTER (Nov. 6, 2018, 11:36
AM), https://twitter.com/DouglasVerMulm/status/1059892296798425089; see
Welcome Lyft Drivers, LYFT EHEALTH, https://www.ehealthinsurance.com/indi-
vidual-health-insurance?rte=allC&allid=lyf244000 (portal to enable Lyft driv-
ers to shop for individual plans).
454. See generally Workplace Posters, U.S. DEPT. LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/gen-
eral/topics/posters.
455. See SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75, at *1 (NAT’L LABOR RELA-
TIONS BD. Jan. 25, 2019); see also Martin H. Malin, Protecting Platform Work-
ers in the Gig Economy: Look to the FTC, 51 IND. L. REV. 377 (2018) (arguing
that gig workers should be protected like franchisor/franchisees and that the
employer/independent contractor debate largely misses the point).
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least for those who work for large platforms under contract. Ride-hailing
services prescribe the detailed terms and conditions for payment, and they
are embedded in the software.456 The Uber and Lyft apps currently provide
breakdowns of the elements of compensation for each ride and for weekly
payments.457 Requiring the platform to disclose those to the workers using
the platform would not be burdensome. The benefit could be substantial, as it
would reduce misunderstandings where employees are aggrieved because
they were denied something the platform never promised. It also would facil-
itate enforcement of wage payments and detailed terms of service that cus-
tomers, Uber, Lyft, and Amazon Flex require drivers to agree to—which
most drivers do not read. The terms of service are mostly silent on the specif-
ics of compensation, and that is what the drivers might care the most about.
2. Occupational Safety and Health
Conventional labor and employment law protects employees from
work-related injuries and illnesses through two distinct regulatory regimes:
workplace safety rules and systems for compensating injured employees.458
a. Safety Rules
The Occupational Safety and Health Act459 exists because employers,
having the power to control the details of work in traditional workplaces,
ultimately determine how safe the workplace is. Employees have little to say
about it, except in the exceptional case of strong union representation. The
case for additional regulations to protect worker safety in the gig labor-mar-
ket context is weak. Uber and Lyft drivers are exposed to risks to their per-
sonal safety, but those are no different than the risks any other motor vehicle
driver is exposed to. The risks can be—and are expected to be—reduced
primarily by careful and skilled driving in vehicles that are in a safe condi-
tion. An Uber driver has complete control over how safely he drives. The fact
that he provides the vehicle also means that he has complete control over the
safety characteristics of the vehicle.
To the extent that the naked market is perceived as providing insuffi-
cient assurance of motor vehicle safety, elaborate regulatory regimes are in
place with respect to both driver qualification and behavior and motor vehi-
cle characteristics. Uber drivers are subject to these. It is not apparent why
any additional driver safety-oriented obligations need to be imposed on Uber
456. See Lyft Terms of Service, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/terms (last updated Feb.
6, 2018); U.S. Terms of Use, UBER, https://www.uber.com/legal/terms/us/ (last
updated Dec. 13, 2017).
457. Lyft Terms of Service, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/terms (last updated Feb. 6,
2018); U.S. Terms of Use, UBER, https://www.uber.com/legal/terms/us/ (last
updated Dec. 13, 2017).
458. See Summary of the Major Laws of the Department of Labor, supra note 272.
459. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (1970).
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and Lyft themselves. This is quite different from the situation in the tradi-
tional factory environment where employers provide the machinery. There,
employers have control over design and how the machines are operated that
may pose a safety risk to employees. Likewise, in process industries, em-
ployers provide the chemicals and the rules for their use that may jeopardize
or protect employee health.
Gig work is performed almost entirely at premises that are not under the
control of the platform provider, namely, in the automobiles and trucks of
Uber, Lyft and Amazon Flex drivers, on the premises’ mechanical Turk
workers, and, most often, in the homes of Task Rabbit workers.460 Seeking to
impose obligations on the platform is infeasible. How is the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration to assure that any employee working at
home has a fire extinguisher ready at hand? In addition, in many cases where
there are safety hazards, regulation already exists and no further regulation is
needed.
While it would be an overstatement to say that gig workers are not ex-
posed to safety and health threats, the threats they are exposed to are not
heightened by their working. This is entirely unlike an environment in which
an employer provides a complicated machine with many moving parts and
extreme temperatures that can snag workers or expose him to exotic chemi-
cals that will give him cancer. It is one thing to regulate a ladder or personal
protective gear provided by the employer, it is another matter entirely to reg-
ulate equipment that a worker provides for himself, such as a personal
automobile.
b. Worker’s Compensation
Worker’s compensation was one of the first labor reforms adopted, be-
ginning at the end of the 19th century.461 It provides insurance protection for
a worker’s injuries or illness incurred during the scope of their employ-
ment.462 These reforms have been surrounded by disputes between workers
and their employers over what is job-related and the seriousness of a
worker’s compensable incident. Although the solvency of workers compen-
sation funds and the level of employer premiums have been the subject of
controversy, the system achieves its intended purpose. These systems, how-
ever, are compatible with factory-like environments, where it is generally
straightforward to decide whether a worker got hurt “on-the-job,” and more
spatially dispersed work where an injury to the employee is almost certain to
be occasioned by employer-provided heavy equipment such as a railroad lo-
460. See Lin Grensing-Pophal, What You Need to Know About the Gig Economy,
FORBES (Apr. 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adp/2018/04/29/what-
you-need-to-know-about-the-gig-economy/#445aec5b3d4d.
461. Price V. Fishback & Shawn E. Kantor, The Adoption of Workers’ Compensa-
tion in the United States, 1900–1930, 41 J.L. & ECON. 305, 305 (1998).
462. See id. at 305–06.
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comotive or car. To extend the system into an environment where all of the
work is outside of the TNP’s premises and in the worker’s own vehicle, or
using other worker-provided tools, is difficult and largely unprincipled.
In most states, the workers’ compensation systems are distressed be-
cause of the near insolvency of backup state funds.463 The strains on these
systems are exacerbated by the abuse of the system by fraudulent employee
claims and undue employer resistance to legitimate claims. Gig workers have
far less need for workers’ compensation protection than the factory workers
of the early 20th century because of the availability of insurance for gig
workers and the likely extension of healthcare coverage, notwithstanding the
Trump Administration’s efforts to dismantle the Affordable Care Act. The
only exception might be an automobile accident while a passenger is in the
car or while an Amazon package is in the trunk. Lyft and Amazon Flex
require proof of insurance and offer supplemental insurance, so the need for
the existence of any gap that workers’ compensation needs to fill is
questionable.
3. Discrimination
Conventional employment law protects employees from exclusion from
the labor market because of their race, gender, ethnicity, religion, age, na-
tional origin, or sexual orientation.464 Centuries of American history show
that markets are not good at mitigating these risks. Discrimination based on
one or more of these characteristics has been rampant in different periods of
American history. Thus, legislatures enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act,465 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,466 and the Americans
With Disabilities Act,467 along with state counterparts. In addition to these
regulatory regimes, which mostly limit their protections to employees, a wide
and complex array of similar protections exist for others in society: clients of
governmental agencies, customers of private places of public accommoda-
tion, and customers of housing units.
The handful of cases excluding independent contractor workers not only
from the protections of employment law but also from protections of public
accommodations and commercial-establishment law are irrational and should
be repudiated. Explicitly affording antidiscrimination protection to gig work-
ers is unobjectionable. The scope of anti-discrimination protection is already
much broader than statutory employees. To exclude workers who are inde-
463. See generally Meg Fletcher, Guaranty Funds not Guaranteed for Self-Insured
Comp Claims, BUS. INS. (Mar. 15, 2009), https://www.businessinsurance.com/
article/20090315/STORY/100027305/Guaranty-funds-not-guaranteed-for-self-
insured-comp-claims.
464. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964).
465. Id. §§ 2000e–2000e-17.
466. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (1967).
467. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (1990).
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pendent contractors from the protection of antidiscrimination law applicable
to commercial entities and places of public accommodation is not backed up
by any discernible logic. This practice creates an irrational gap in protection.
4. Unemployment Compensation
Unemployment compensation systems are premised on the idea that
workers should be able to draw on insurance when they lose their jobs.468
Losing a job presupposes involuntary termination. No unemployment com-
pensation system allows a worker to draw benefits when he voluntarily quits,
making this central concept work in the gig labor market context likely im-
possible. But it may be feasible to distinguish between a driver going off-line
from a situation in which the driver is online but gets no pick up orders, or an
Amazon flex driver who goes to the warehouse to be available for his sched-
uled block and get some packages is infeasible. This in turn would require
designing an insurance system to protect workers against a decline in piece-
work. Moreover, most gig workers are paid on a piecework basis—a notori-
ously difficult problem for regulators attempting to calculate minimum
wage.469 Calculating the effective minimum wage for piecework always has
been a problem for wage and hour regulators.470
If one cannot determine when gig workers are working, one cannot de-
termine when they have been laid off or otherwise become unemployed and
thus entitled to receive benefits. It is clear that an Uber driver who decides to
be online and thus available to give rides less often has not been “terminated”
under existing unemployment compensation rules. Likewise, if his access to
the system is deactivated, termination has occurred. But platform-initiated
deactivation is almost always for-cause, which would disqualify the driver
from unemployment compensation anyway.471 Uber drivers would presuma-
bly like to be insured against the simple loss of opportunity occasioned by a
falloff in demand or, more likely, an excess of supply, but deciding upon
triggers for unemployment compensation for these reasons is fraught with
difficulty. It would effectively impose a tax on platform providers for facing
insufficient demand or contracting with too many drivers. The existing un-
employment compensation system is unsuitable for gig labor markets.
468. See I.R.C. §§ 3301–3311 (2018).
469. See Karla Walter & Kate Bahn, Raising Pay and Providing Benefits for Work-




471. See New Uber Driver Deactivation Policy Created from Lawsuit Settlement,
BECOMEARIDESHAREDRIVER.COM (May 19, 2018), https://becomearideshare
driver.com/new-uber-driver-deactivation-policy/.
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5. Tax Withholding
Requiring platforms to withhold taxes for gig workers would benefit
workers and impose minimal burdens on employers and employees. With-
holding tax ensures that non-employee workers pay their tax obligations.472 It
also spares them from getting tangled up in enforcement actions flowing
from inadvertent failures to pay estimated taxes.473 It imposes some addi-
tional burdens, but hiring entities must already obtain paperwork such as W-
4 forms and provide 1099 forms to independent contractors.474
6. Collective Action
Collective bargaining is a helpful labor market institution, fully consis-
tent with a cultural preference for decentralized, privatized, and market-ori-
ented regulation.475 The gig economy faces threats not unlike those faced by
the newspaper markets of the 1950s.476 Likewise, to the extent that markets
are not satisfying distributive goals with respect to incomes, there is nothing
472. Howard Gleckman, Making Sure Gig Workers Pay the Right Amount of Tax,




475. It is a straightforward way to “remedy the individual worker’s inequality of
bargaining power.” See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Pubs., 322 U.S.
111, 126–27 (1944). “The mischief at which the Act is aimed and the remedies
it offers are not confined exclusively to ‘employees’ within the traditional legal
distinctions separating them from ‘independent contractors.’ Myriad forms of
service relationship, with infinite and subtle variations in the terms of employ-
ment, blanket the nation’s economy. Some are within this Act, others beyond
its coverage. Large numbers will fall clearly on one side or on the other, by
whatever test may be applied. But intermediate there will be many, the inci-
dents of whose employment partake in part of the one group, in part of the
other, in varying proportions of weight. And consequently the legal pendulum,
for purposes of applying the statute, may swing one way or the other, depend-
ing upon the weight of this balance and its relation to the special purpose at
hand.” Id. at 126–27.
476. Id. at 111 (reversing court of appeals and enforcing NLRB order to bargain
over working conditions of “independent contractor” newsboys). “The news-
boys work under varying terms and conditions. They may be ‘bootjackers,’
selling to the general public at places other than established corners, or they
may sell at fixed ‘spots.’ They may sell only casually or part-time, or full-time;
and they may be employed regularly and continuously or only temporarily. The
units which the Board determined to be appropriate are composed of those who
sell full-time at established spots. Those vendors, misnamed boys, are generally
mature men, dependent upon the proceeds of their sales for their sustenance,
and frequently supporters of families. Working thus as news vendors on a regu-
lar basis often for a number of years, they form a stable group with relatively
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structurally distinct about the gig economy that matters. The action by the
Seattle City Council to allow ride-hailing drivers to engage in collective bar-
gaining is a potential model.477 Collective bargaining for ride-hailing drivers
can proceed in a modified form. For example, if it is a creature of state and
local law, there is no reason selection of a bargaining representative need be
accompanied by exclusive representation rights. Individual drivers could de-
cide for themselves whether they want to be represented by an agent or to
take care of themselves.
Mancur Olsen’s The Logic of Collective Action478 teaches that such an
arrangement would be fragile. This is because of the tendency toward free
riding, and the experience of the late 19th century suggests that competing
representatives can multiply work stoppages and other disruptions. The scope
of mandatory subjects of bargaining might be different for gig workers than
for workers under the NLRA. The formula crafted in Fibreboard and First
National Maintenance479 might be different because of the different consider-
ations in the “partnership” between gig workers and their network platforms
and because of their direct contacts and relations with the final customers.
Ultimately, the power of workers in any system of free collective bar-
gaining is determined by their ability to interrupt their opponent’s operations.
This is determined by a combination of group solidarity on the worker side
and labor market conditions. If group solidarity is high, few members of the
workgroup will cross picket lines and perform struck work; if it is low, any
strike will not be effective. If labor market conditions are tight, the platform
will have difficulty finding replacement workers, but if conditions are slack,
significant numbers will be willing to cross picket lines and “scab.” Bargain-
ing under the NLRA or a new regime is not a magic bullet for empowering
workers. Ultimately, worker welfare depends on supply and demand in the
labor markets. But affording them the privilege of engaging in concerted ac-
tion gives them a sense of empowerment and evens out the balance of power
in many gig workplaces. Section IV.G.3 explores more fully the idea of ex-
little turnover, in contrast to schoolboys and others who sell as bootjackers,
temporary and casual distributors.” Id. at 115–16.
477. See infra Sec. IV.B.10 (describing framework for collective bargaining under
ordinance and reviewing judicial challenges).
478. MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 11 (1965); see Brishen Rogers, Passion and Reason in
Labor Law, 47 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 313, 343 n.157
(2012) (citing Mancur Olsen and using his analysis of collective action to ex-
plore psychology of union organizing).
479. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 379 U.S. 203,
210–15 (1964) (including decision over whether to contract out work within
mandatory subjects of bargaining under NLRA); First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v.
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 452 U.S. 666, 687–88 (1981) (distinguishing effects
bargaining from bargaining over decision to terminate a business relationship
itself).
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tending the labor exemption to the antitrust laws to permit collective bargain-
ing at the local level by workers classified as independent contractors: the
critical open issue relating to the Seattle City Council initiative.
E. Third-Party Protection: Vicarious Liability
The distinction between employer and independent contractor is often
crucial in the tort context. For example, in deciding whether masters should
be vicariously liable for the acts of their servants has nothing to do with fair
treatment of workers. Of course, gig workers will have accidents, and the
employer/independent contractor distinction remains relevant to tort law.
Employee status makes the hiring entity vicariously liable.480 Independent
contractor status leaves the hiring entity without liability unless it has en-
gaged in an independent act that is wrongful, such as negligent hiring or
negligent specification of work.481 The respondeat superior doctrine assigns
liability to an employer.482 Employee status for third-party tort purposes does
not necessarily mean employee status for labor and employment law entitle-
ments.483 But the boundary line for the one has historically been treated as
appropriate for the other.
Here, the justification for legal intervention would not be that a hiring
entity is legally responsible for damages because its powers to control the
work makes it responsible for accidents. Rather, it is that the hiring entity has
deeper pockets, and therefore is more likely than the driver to be able to
compensate the victim. This justification is diminished when drivers have
liability insurance. The possibility that the driver may evade such a require-
ment and be judgment proof is eliminated by requiring the TNP to provide
liability insurance covering its drivers, to the extent that the drivers own in-
surance does not provide coverage.
F. Customer Disputes and Video Cameras
The Uber-driver blogs and gripe sites show that one common source of
complaint by drivers is the perceived unfairness of Uber’s system for dealing
480. Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 774, 781 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
481. Id. at 788.
482. See id. at 780 (enumerating claims against Uber for sexual assault by driver,
including respondeat superior clams and negligent hiring, supervision, and re-
tention and denying motion to dismiss most of them).
483. “[A] person who, for instance, is held to be an ‘independent contractor’ for the
purpose of imposing vicarious liability in tort may be an ‘employee’ for the
purposes of particular legislation, such as unemployment compensation.” Nat’l
Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Pubs., 322 U.S. 111, 122 (1944) (agreeing with
NLRB that newsboys, formally classified as independent contractors, should be
treated as employees under the NLRA).
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with customer complaints.484 Drivers complain that Uber always treats the
customer as right, even when the customer is wrong.485 One way to protect
drivers against false or exaggerated passenger claims is to install video and
audio recording equipment in cars. Drivers can buy their own cameras for
less than $200 and install them themselves.486 Some degree of experimenta-
tion might be necessary to get the camera angle right to capture interactions
between the driver and passenger regardless of where the passenger is sitting.
Three possible objections to the self-help camera approach exist. First,
capturing imagery of the passengers violates statutory rights of publicity or
constitutes common-law invasion of privacy.487 The likelihood of a passenger
asserting such a claim is low, but the claim of invasion of such rights could
be negated if the driver posts notice saying, “if you ride in this vehicle, you
are consenting to having a video and audio recording made of your ride,
which will be used only for the purpose of resolving any dispute that might
arise with respect to the ride.”488 Second, adding such equipment to the Uber
approved vehicle violates the contract between the driver and Uber.489 The
current Lyft rules contain no express prohibition of recording equipment. The
third objection could be expressed on an ad hoc basis by riders through com-
plaints to Uber about the driver. This may prompt Uber to modify its policies
to prohibit recording.
On the other hand, when passengers and drivers have disputes, the pos-
sibility always exists that a passenger’s attempt to impose liability on the
driver can spill over to Uber, no matter how strongly Uber tries to structure
the relationship to minimize that risk. Having unambiguous evidence as to
what happened will give Uber additional defenses – assuming that most of its
drivers behave appropriately most of the time.490 Even if Uber does not pro-
484. See, e.g., Complaints, UBERPEOPLE.NET, http://uberpeople.net/forums/Com-
plaints/.
485. Harry Campbell, Why Do So Many People Quit Driving for Uber?, THE
RIDESHARE GUY (July 11, 2016), https://therideshareguy.com/why-do-so-
many-people-quit-driving-for-uber/.




487. See Emily L. Dyer, Need a Ride? Uber: The Trendy Choice that Could Turn
Threatening, 17 NEV. L.J. 239, 262 (2016).
488. Id. at 265.
489. Can I Use a Video Camera?, supra note 210.
490. The judgment required of police departments whether their officers should
wear body cameras evokes a similar calculus. If the department believes that
most claims of police brutality are frivolous or exaggerated, cameras are a good
idea; if it believes that most of them are valid, cameras are a bad idea from the
standpoint of the police department. See generally German Lopez, Police Body
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hibit recording equipment, it can take adverse action against drivers who are
the subject of complaints in this regard, thereby discouraging the practice. A
more rigorous regulatory approach would approve, and perhaps mandate,
cameras as part of a broader regulatory regime for transportation network
providers. Section IV.H also discusses cameras.
G. Legal Regimes
1. Governmental Level of Regulation
Most gig product markets vary greatly in different regions of the coun-
try. Accordingly, the need for regulation at the federal level cannot be estab-
lished. There is little interregional competition for gig services and any race
to the bottom, such as occurred with labor protective legislation in the textile
industry in the 19th century, is unlikely.491 The tradition of regulating taxis at
the municipal level suggests that continued regulation at the municipal level
may be the appropriate choice. While regulatory capture by the taxicab mo-
nopolies is a significant problem, Uber, Lyft, and Amazon Flex are big
enough to take care of their own interests. Voters at the municipal level can
decide for themselves whether they want the benefit of Uber and Lyft and
other gig-delivered services.
Chicago, for example,492 regulates taxis,493 limousines,494 and TNPs495
under separate regulatory regimes. All three must obtain a license from the
city to offer services.496 They may not use drivers who do not possess chauf-
feur licenses,497 but the chauffer licensing requirement for TNP drivers is
simple.498 The ordinance requires insurance to satisfy claims by third parties
Cameras, Explained, VOX (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2014/9/17/
6113045/police-worn-body-cameras-explained.
491. See David R. Meyer, The Roots of American Industrialization, 1790–1860, EH
.NET (Mar. 16, 2008), https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-roots-of-american-indus-
trialization-1790-1860/.
492. Deanna Dupuy, The Regulation of Transportation Network Companies, AGORA
114–22 (2017), https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/1365
82/Dupuy_TheRegulationOfTransportationNetworkCompanies.pdf?sequence=
1&isAllowed=y (summarizing approach of different U.S. municipalities).
493. CHICAGO, IL. MUN. CODE § 9-112-020 (2013).
494. Id. § 9-114.
495. Id. § 9-115.
496. Id. § 9-112-020.
497. Id. § 9-112-260 (requirements for taxi drivers); § 9-114-285 (requirements for
limo drivers); § 9-115-150(a) (requirements for TNP drivers).
498. Illinois — Chicago Driver Application Requirements, LYFT, https://www.lyft
.com/driver-application-requirements/chicago-il (last visited Mar. 4, 2019)
(The Lyft application process administers the necessary “instruction” to drivers
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and passengers.499 Taxi and TNP drivers may not drive more than twelve out
of twenty-four hours.500 Taxis and TNPs must disclose the details of their
pricing and the identity of drivers to passengers.501
The taxi ordnance alone prescribes the level of fares to passengers and
charges to drivers.502 The city’s commissioner of business affairs and con-
sumer protection sets specific prices for taxi rides.503 The ordinance empow-
ers the commissioner to set lease rates that the driver pays the taxi
enterprise.504 This provides “adequate revenues to pay the lessor’s reasonable
expenses and receive a just and reasonable rate of return on the lessor’s in-
vestment” and to “ provid[e] lessees [the drivers] with an opportunity to earn
a fair and reasonable income.”505 The taxi ordinance prohibits discrimination
against drivers506 and bans retaliation against them for acting to promote
compliance with the ordinance and other applicable laws.507
In no event should new regulation be implemented at the federal level.
The original justification for federal labor legislation was the inherently na-
tional markets by enterprises for which employees worked. Labor legislation
in Massachusetts could not be effective when textile capital was free to es-
cape those labor standards by absconding to the South and erecting factories
there instead. On-demand automobile transportation is entirely unlike that. It
is inherently local in nature. New York has imposed costly restrictions on
Uber and Lyft well beyond what any other major metropolitan area has im-
plemented.508 Platform companies unhappy with New York’s regulatory re-
gime cannot serve New York markets from somewhere else. Ultimately, they
by disclosing about two pages worth of tips on safety mandates by the city, as
part of the basic driver application process online).
499. CHICAGO, IL. MUN. CODE § 9-112-330 (taxis); § 9-114-170 (specific levels of
liability coverage for limos); § 9-115-090 (TNP operators required to cover
whatever drivers’ insurance does not).
500. Id. § 9-112-250 (taxi drivers’ hours of service); § 9-115-190 (TNP drivers’
hours of service).
501. Id. § 9-112-490 (taxis); § 9-112-510 (taxi fare meter); § 9-115-200 (disclosure
of TNP service charges and fare rates). This requirement is unnecessary for
limos presumably because the terms of a limousine ride are negotiated in ad-
vance between passenger and the service.
502. Id. § 9-112-600 (fares).
503. Id.
504. Id. § 9-112-220; § 9-112-230.
505. CHICAGO, IL. MUN. CODE § 9-112-220(a).
506. Id. § 9-112-180.
507. Id. § 9-112-190.
508. Shoshana Wodinsky, In Major Defeat for Uber and Lyft, New York City Votes
to Limit Ride-Hailing Cars, THE VERGE (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.theverge
.com/2018/8/8/17661374/uber-lyft-nyc-cap-vote-city-council-new-york-taxi.
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simply can exit the New York market and leave it unserved. This may be the
very purpose behind municipalities’ actions and is presumably a reflection of
local attitudes on this issue.
2. Class Actions
The workers in the gig economy always have access to class action law-
suits to seek relief against abuse, but they cannot be successful unless the
plaintiffs are asserting some underlying legal right. One example is the 2010
class action suit by owner operators against brokers in Florida, Owner-Oper-
ator Independent Drivers Association, Inc. v. Landstar System, Inc.509 The
O’Connor case is another.510 They are discussed in Section III.D.
3. Extending the Labor Exemption from the Antitrust Laws
Allowing collective action by workers without their risking antitrust lia-
bility has the advantage of allowing the workers to decide whether market
forces alone within status-quo market structures provide them adequate work
environments. If they believe the status quo is insufficient, the level of griev-
ance will make it easier to organize them, and the inherently local nature of
the service will permit them to be effective in exerting pressure with a modi-
cum of solidarity. It avoids regulation based on the interests of someone
else—entrenched taxi interests—rather than the gig workers.
One area in which change may be appropriate is collective bargaining.
Gig workers should have the privilege to act together to discuss their work-
ing conditions with their platform providers without running the risk of anti-
trust liability. That does not mean, however, that the full panoply of NLRA
or Railway Labor Act mechanisms should be brought into play. Instead,
worker preference functions and priorities should be allowed to shape institu-
tions for worker representation. If legal intervention turns out to be neces-
sary, it can be shaped around particular problems, once they actually emerge.
Realizing this objective entails the prospect that antitrust liability for
collective action by independent contractors must be dealt with. The scope of
the labor exemption to the antitrust laws could be expanded beyond the realm
of collective bargaining under the NLRA and the common-law definition of
employee.511 It would permit groups of workers forced to work under a con-
509. 622 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2010).
510. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 13-3826-EMC (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17,
2014).
511. See Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Joseph A. Seiner, A Modern Union for the Modern
Economy, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1727 (2018) (promoting idea of Uber Guild
and similar quasi unions to protect gig workers); Marina Lao, Workers in the
“Gig” Economy: The Case for Extending the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 51
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1543 (2018) (arguing for expansion of labor exemption so
gig workers can engage in collective bargaining); accord, SETH D. HARRIS &
ALAN B. KRUEGER, A PROPOSAL FOR MODERNIZING LABOR LAWS FOR
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tract of adhesion to organize and to bargain collectively over the terms and
conditions of their work.512 Only employees are privileged to participate in
collective bargaining.513 Independent contractors are outside the scope of the
labor exemption.514 Therefore, if they work together to achieve uniform and
improved terms and conditions of work, they violate the antitrust laws.
Most labor lawyers assume that independent contractors are outside the
scope of the labor exemption, on the strength of Allen Bradley,515 Columbia
River Packers,516 and a number of lower court opinions. However, the case
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK 15 (2015) (“Antitrust laws should be amended
to allow independent workers to organize . . . .”, but not proposing coverage by
NLRA).
512. Uber and Lyft already have established institutions for collective driver consul-
tations. Dara Kerr, Uber Creates Advisory Forum to Get Drivers’ Lowdown,
CNET (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.cnet.com/news/uber-creates-driver-advi-
sory-forum-for-drivers-feedback-early-tester/ (reporting on establishment of
Driver Advisory Forum comprising of driver representatives from all parts of
the country that the company will fly to Seattle twice annually to discuss driver
concerns with the CEO and other executives); Christian Perea, What Happened
at the Uber Driver Advisory Forum, THE RIDESHARE GUY (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://therideshareguy.com/what-happened-at-the-uber-driver-advisory-forum/
(reporting that first meeting with thirty-five representatives was 50% PR and
50% genuine focus groups discussing topics such as driver earnings, support,
in-app navigation, and Uber’s vision for the future); Meet the Lyft Drivers Ad-
visory Council, LYFT, https://thehub.lyft.com/dac/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2019)
(describing 2016 establishment of seven-member council with driver represent-
atives from seven regions, with applications open to join the council every six
to nine months); March 2018 Driver Advisory Council Monthly Update, LYFT
(Apr. 3, 2018), https://thehub.lyft.com/blog/2018/4/3/march-2018-dac-update
(reporting that out of 100 driver requests, twenty have been completed and
forty-one are being designed, tested, or coded).
513. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 3d 1004,
1006 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (noting that Uber drivers are covered by the NLRA only
if they are “employees”; enforcing NLRB subpoena).
514. “[T]he owners themselves must be considered independent businessmen rather
than employees of WTA. While there is nothing illegal in the desire of this
‘group of entrepreneurs’ to have a single agent represent them, that desire does
not exempt them from the anti-trust prohibitions against group boycotts.”
Wash. Trotting Ass’n v. Pennsylvania Harness Horsemen’s Ass’n, 428 F.
Supp. 122, 126 (W.D. Pa. 1977); see Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton,
315 U.S. 143, 146 (1942) (holding that disputes among businessmen are
outside scope of labor exemption to antitrust laws); Conley Motor Express, Inc.
v. Russell, 500 F.2d 124, 127 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that association of trucker
owner-operators was outside labor exemption because case did not involve
“employer-employee relationship”).
515. Allen Bradley Co. v. Int’l Broth. of Electrical Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
516. Columbia River Packers Ass’n, 315 U.S. at 143.
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law supporting that proposition is not as strong as one might assume. To be
sure, the language in Columbia River Packers says that businessmen are not
entitled to the protections of the labor laws, but the businessmen involved in
Columbia River Packers were employers and not mere workers like Uber
drivers.517 Furthermore, the Columbia River Court observed that “by the
terms of the statute there may be a ‘labor dispute’ where the disputants do
not stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.”518
The labor exemptions originate in the Norris LaGuardia Act,519 which
builds on the Clayton Act’s recitation that “labor is not an article of com-
merce,”520 by stating that “public policy . . . [is to give] aid to ‘the individual
unorganized worker . . . commonly helpless . . . to obtain acceptable terms
and conditions of employment.’”521 The Act contains an explicit exemption
from the antitrust laws.522 One can take that language and consider the nature
of the exchange between worker in Uber and Lyft services. An Uber driver
exchanges their labor and the use of the driver’s vehicle for contact with
passengers and a share of what the passengers pay. One can plausibly argue
that kind of exchange is within the scope of Norris-LaGuardia and is clearly
what the statute meant to protect.
The law could simply recalibrate the line separating independent con-
tractors from employees under the NLRA and permit workers to bargain col-
lectively. This need not imply any particular treatment under other statutory
and common law regimes. Alternatively, a new labor exemption could be
crafted in the context of antitrust adjudication that would address the needs
of gig workers without saddling them with a century’s worth of baggage
from collective bargaining practices developed in factory settings. For exam-
ple, worker representatives might not enjoy the right of exclusive representa-
tion. They could decide whether they want to join an organization and give
the organization power to negotiate for them. Others might elect to join other
organizations or to deal for themselves.
If the labor exemption were expanded to cover gig workers, the law
would have to reconsider the hallmarks of collective bargaining: not only
exclusive representation, but also the scope of bargainable subjects, permissi-
ble ends and means of concerted economic pressure, good-faith bargaining
obligations, and discrimination based on membership in worker organiza-
tions. It is neither necessary nor appropriate to throw open the gates to con-
certed action by all types of small businesses. Any expansion of the labor
517. Id. at 143 (noting that some of the fishermen had employees of their own).
518. Id. at 146.
519. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115 (1932).
520. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 804 (characterizing Section 6 of Clayton Act).
521. Columbia River Packers Ass’n, 315 U.S. at 145 (quoting statute 29 U.S.C.
§ 102).
522. 29 U.S.C. § 105 (1932) (which has come to be known as the “statutory
exemption”).
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exemptions should be predicated on the insistence of contracts of adhesion,
making workers dependent on those with whom they seek to bargain.
4. Common Law
Wrongful dismissal protection is not limited to common-law employ-
ees.523 The public policy tort conceptually covers any termination of an at-
will legal relationship under circumstances that undermine public policy.524
The implied-in-fact contract theory of wrongful dismissal simply accommo-
dates traditional common law breach of contract law to situations in which a
party buying labor services makes promises of employment security that it
does not keep. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to
all contractual relationships. The caselaw on its application in the employ-
ment context at most suggests it might have a more restricted application to
common-law employees than to independent contractors. Deviations from
promised compensation, a common source of ride-hailing driver complaint,
can be adjudicated in common-law breach-of-contract actions.525
H. Cameras in the Car
The accuracy of the process for resolving disputes between drivers and
passengers can be improved if drivers put video cameras in their cars, as
suggested by section IV.F. Drivers can buy their own cameras for less than
$100 and install them themselves.526 Some degree of experimentation might
be necessary to get the camera angle right capture interactions between driver
and passenger regardless of where the passenger is sitting. Audio as well as
video obviously is desirable. Three possible objections exist to the self-help
camera approach. The first is that capturing imagery of the passengers vio-
lates statutory rights of publicity or constitute common-law invasions of pri-
vacy.527 The likelihood of a passenger asserting such a claim is low, and any
possible claim can be negated if the driver posts a notice saying “if you ride
in this vehicle, you are consenting to having a video and audio recording
made of your ride, which will be used only for the purpose of resolving any
dispute that might arise with respect to the ride.”
523. See generally HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRAC-
TICE 2–5 (4th ed. 1988) (analyzing common law theories for wrongful
dismissal).
524. See id.
525. See infra Sec. III.D.1.a.ii.–v.
526. Car and Driver–Minio Pro CDC-628 Dash Cam–Silver, supra note 488.
527. See 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COUNSELING & LITIGATION § 57.07 (2018)
(discussing publicity rights); see Survey of Deceased Celebrity Rights, 25 ENT.
& SPORTS LAW 20 (2007) (discussing common-law invasion of privacy in a
multitude of jurisdictions).
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The second objection might be that adding such equipment to the Uber
approved vehicle violates the contract between the driver and Uber. An Uber
“partner” help screen expressly allows cameras:
Can I use a video camera? Uber allows driver-partners to install
and use video cameras to record riders for purposes of safety.
Please note that local regulations may require individuals using
recording equipment in vehicles to fully disclose to riders that
they are being recorded in or around a vehicle and obtain consent.
Please check local regulations in your city to determine if these
apply.528
The third objection could be expressed on an ad hoc basis by riders
through complaints to Uber about the driver, and that might motivate Uber to
modify its policies to prohibit recording. On the other hand, when passengers
and drivers have disputes, the possibility always exists that a passenger’s
attempt to impose liability on the driver can spill over to Uber, no matter how
strongly Uber tries to structure the relationship to minimize that risk. Having
unambiguous evidence as to what happened will give Uber additional de-
fenses—assuming that most of its drivers behave appropriately most of the
time.529 A more rigorous regulatory approach would approve, and perhaps
mandate, cameras as part of a broader regulatory regime for transportation
network providers.
V. NEW CATEGORY OF “DEPENDENT CONTRACTOR?” OR
REINTERPRETATION OF “EMPLOYEE”
Uber and Lyft drivers should not be classified as employees. They do
not satisfy the traditional legal criteria for that status under either the right to
control test or the economic realities test.530 And to do so would be bad pol-
icy. An analysis of market structure and practices by the two platform prov-
iders shows that existing labor markets are working pretty well. Drivers
easily can switch between Uber and Lyft or drive for both of them. The
intensity of advertising for new drivers indicates that labor market conditions
confer reasonable bargaining power on the drivers. Though drivers cannot
negotiate their own terms individually, both companies are sensitive to driver
528. Can I Use a Video Camera?, supra note 210.
529. The judgment required is like that of a police department deciding whether to
equip its police officers with body cameras. If it believes that most claims of
police brutality are frivolous or exaggerated, cameras are a good idea; if it
believes that most of them are valid, cameras are a bad idea—from the stand-
point of the police department.
530. See Robert T. Szyba, Determining Employment Status: How Do You Know
Whether a Worker is an Employee, Independent Contractor, or Perhaps an
Independent Worker?, AM. BAR ASS’N 1–6 (2017), https://www.americanbar
.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/2017/03/err/papers/syzba_paper.pdf
(discussing the “right to control” and “economic realities” test).
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complaints and suggestions, regularly soliciting feedback, listening to driver
representatives through driver advisory councils, and making changes to their
policies and app software to add features the drivers want. Within the last
year alone, they have permitted tipping,531 allowed drivers to accept only
those ride requests that get the driver closer to a destination he specifies,532
and started re-admitting drivers to their places in airport queues after they
have been stuck with a short ride.533 Part IV.B’s review of the traditional
elements of labor and employment regulation reveals that most of the ele-
ments are ill-suited for gig labor markets, unnecessary, and likely to interfere
with the flexibility the workers are so drawn to. Moreover, the labor markets
are local and thus the traditional justification for federal regulation is lacking
whatever regulation occurs should occur at the municipal or metropolitan
level.
Two sets of commentators largely agree with this outcome. They have
sensibly concluded that, if gig labor markets need regulatory protection for
their workers, it should not take the form of simply imposing traditional labor
and employment regulation. Among the commenters are two former Obama
administration economic policy officials. They proposed, in 2015, a separate
legal regime for protecting the interests of workers in gig labor markets.534
They proposed a new category of “independent worker.”535 This proposition
was based on: the uncertainty of employee/independent contractor determi-
nations; the unsuitability of these traditional categories for much of what gig
workers do; and the need to assure that all work falls within the “social com-
pact” developed over the last century and a half for American workers.536
They would afford independent workers the right and privilege of collective-
bargaining, but keep them outside the existing NLRA and, by implication,
the Railway Labor Act because of the uncertainties associated with protec-
tion under those statutes and because of the accumulation of bureaucratic
531. Connie Loizos, Uber is Implementing Tipping, But How Well It Works Will be
Critical, TECH CRUNCH (Jun. 20, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/20/
uber-is-implementing-tipping-but-how-well-it-works-will-be-critical/.
532. Alison Griswold, Uber is Letting Some Drivers Pick and Choose Where They
Drive, QUARTZ (Aug. 16, 2017), https://qz.com/1055050/uber-is-testing-a-
drop-off-area-filter-that-lets-drivers-choose-where-they-drive/.
533. Pro-Tips for Giving Airport Rides, LYFT, https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/
115013080368-Pro-Tips-for-Giving-Airport-Rides (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
534. See Harris & Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing, supra note 14, at 15–21
(proposing new legal category of “independent worker,” who would be pro-
tected by rights to bargain collectively, prohibitions against discrimination, tax
withholding and unemployment taxes, and workers compensation, but not min-
imum wage and overtime rules).
535. The Taylor Review proposed a similar category: “dependent contractor.” TAY-
LOR ET AL., supra note 10, at 35.
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rigidity under the often partisan decisions of the NLRB.537 They would then
allow collective bargaining to be shaped by gig labor markets organically.538
This proposal would put teeth to what Uber is already doing with its Drivers
Advisory Council and reflect the Seattle initiative.539
Harris and Krueger are agnostic on how far they should extend their
proposed regime into independent contractor territory.540 They propose ex-
tending anti-discrimination protection under the civil rights laws to gig work-
ers. They propose applying payroll tax withholding obligations to platforms
that hire gig workers. The reasoning behind Harris and Kruger’s exclusion of
independent workers from minimum wage and overtime protection541 is
sound, recognizing the difficulty in measuring work time in gig labor mar-
kets. These difficulties in distinguishing between worktime and non-work-
time also makes application of workers compensation, which Harris and
Krueger favor,542 as Section IV.B.7 explains. The same considerations mili-
tate against affording unemployment compensation protection to gig work-
ers, which Harris and Krueger also propose.543 Harris and Krueger’s proposal
is similar to the proposal by the Taylor Review in England for a new cate-
gory of “dependent contractor.”544 The Taylor proposals are developed with
somewhat less concreteness, however, with a significantly different starting
point.
In no event should regulators attempt to subject gig labor markets to
minimum wage and overtime premium standards. The New York City initia-
tives represent bad policy. Application of such standards is a poor fit for the
flexible working conditions and hours of gig workers. And, as Section
IV.D.2.a explains, health and safety regulation designed for traditional work-
places is also ill-suited for work that takes place in the field with worker-
provided equipment. Attempting to regulate Uber and Lyft now is likely to
damage not only those labor markets but labor markets for gig workers more
generally. Because of their prominence, any regulatory regime is likely to
537. Id.
538. Id.
539. See infra Sec. IV.B.10 (summarizing municipal grant of collective bargaining
privileges to ride-hailing drivers).
540. See Harris & Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing, supra note 14, at 21–24
(considering taxi drivers, temporary staffing agencies such as Kelly Services
and Manpower, labor contractors, union hiring halls, outside sales employees
and direct sales workers and suggesting that some, but not all, should be classi-
fied as independent workers).
541. Id. at 20.
542. Id. (proposing that gig workers be able to opt in).
543. Id.
544. See TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 10, at 36 (“dependent contractors” must main-
tain flexibility).
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reflect the particular characteristics of ride-hailing markets, but the tempta-
tion will be strong for regulators to extend coverage to gig labor markets
generally. The structure of the labor market for Mechanical Turk, Taskrabbit,
or Airbnb is vastly different from the structure of ride-hailing markets. If
they need regulatory protection for workers, the type of protection they need
will almost certainly be substantially different. Courts can extend the labor
exemptions to gig workers without legislation. Enough ambiguity and flexi-
bility exists in the case law on the labor exemptions to allow them to be
molded around the conditions of particular labor markets, and applying com-
petition policy to markets for gig workers is surely a case of first impression.
An important advantage of limiting reforms to collective bargaining and
anti-discrimination is the fact that either can be adopted without the necessity
of federal legislation. Gig workers can organize and seek to bargain with
their platform providers and await an antitrust action filed by the platforms.
Then, they may assert that they acted within a labor exemption to the anti-
trust laws, as they should be properly understood. Antitrust laws expose vio-
lators to potential criminal penalties, but the likelihood of conviction and
incarceration for good faith efforts to engage in bargaining over terms and
conditions of work is low.
Antidiscrimination protection can be afforded by judicial and agency
interpretation of existing public accommodation and commercial establish-
ment law, without reclassifying gig workers as statutory employees. Gig
workers subjected to discrimination can assert claims under the commercial-
establishment and public-accommodations sections of the civil rights laws
and the Americans With Disabilities Act. Such aggrieved parties may man-
age to persuade federal and state courts to include gig workers within the
protections of those statutory provisions. Tax withholding would require a
change in Internal Revenue Service regulations.545 To the extent that worker
protective regulation is justified, the most efficient way to implement it
through the existing municipal regulatory regimes for transportation network
providers.
545. See Internal Revenue Service Release No. 200835025, Index No. 3121.04-01,
3306.05-00, 3401.04-02 at pp. 3–4 (May 21, 2008) (discussing relationship be-
tween statutory definitions and IRS regulations in determining employee
status).
